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Abstract
This dissertation is about the acquisition of presupposition. The specific focus is on the
interplay between presuppositional content as hardwired in the semantics of particular ex-
pressions and the conversational contexts in which utterances containing those expressions
may be used. A series of behavioral experiments examine what children in the preschool
age range know about the pragmatic principles governing presupposition, and how they
come to acquire this knowledge.
The dissertation is organized into two thematic halves. The first half investigates the
conditions that govern when presupposing something is appropriate, hence allow for the
use of a presupposition triggering expression. Specifically, I ask: do young children know
the common ground requirement -the formal requirement that presuppositions be previ-
ously established common knowledge - and do they know when and how this requirement
can be violated? Two sets of experiments, using two presupposition-carrying expressions
with importantly divergent properties (too and the), reveal that children, like adults, gen-
erate a default expectation that a presuppositional sentence be uttered to a listener who
already takes for granted the presupposition. However, they hold onto this expectation even
in circumstances where adult speakers do not. Unlike adults, children do not expect that
an otherwise 'neutral' listener might accommodate a speaker's informative presupposition.
Together, these findings point to a developmental path where the formal requirement - that
presuppositions be presuppositions -is acquired before an understanding that the rule can
be bent and how.
The second half examines the conditions that make marking of presuppositions obliga-
tory, hence require the use of a presupposition triggering expression. Are children sensitive
to Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991) as a principle governing competition and utter-
ance choice? The ability to deploy Maximize Presupposition! in an adult-like way shows a
more protracted developmental trajectory. Moreover, children's ability to rule out presup-
positionally weaker sentences seems to vary across competition environments. Taking the
non-uniformity in development as signaling non-uniformity in the underlying phenomena,
I develop an alternative account for a pair of expressions commonly thought to compete
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for Maximize Presupposition!: another vs. a. Ultimately, I suggest that Maximize Pre-
supposition! is one of several pragmatic principles that lead to competition and selection
of structures imposing the strongest contextual requirement. Children have command of
some of these conditions, but not others. The acquisition trajectories are modulated by
various factors, including the type of requirement imposed on the context (e.g. that some
proposition is salient vs. accepted common belief) and the types of knowledge that are
pre-requisites (e.g. knowledge of idiosyncratic properties of the lexicon).
Thesis Supervisor: Martin Hack]
Title: Associate Professor of Linguistics
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel Fox
Title: Anshen-Chomsky Professor of Language and Thought
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview and goals
Natural language affords us with means of distinguishing the main point of an utterance, its
asserted content, from background information taken for granted by the conversation par-
ticipants, its presuppositions. A speaker uttering the sentences in (1) and (2), for example,
would be asserting (1-a) and (2-a) respectively. In both cases, the speaker presupposes that
they spoke to a unique woman.
(1) The woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate.
a. The unique woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate
b. There is a unique woman that I talked to
(2) It's not the case that the woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate.
a. The unique woman that I talked to is not an MIT graduate
b. There is a unique woman that I talked to.
The implications in (a) and (b) have in common that a sincere speaker of the utterance
is committed to them. However, asserted and presupposed content differ with respect to
both usage and compositionality. Unlike asserted content, the implication in (b) is not
offered up as new information that is up for debate. Moreover, unlike asserted content, the
presupposed content seems to interact differently with embedding operators (e.g. negation):
presuppositions "project'.
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A core issue in the study of natural language meaning concerns the organization of
and division of labor between these components of meaning. What are the semantic and
pragmatic assumptions we need to capture these empirical properties? When and how does
a child acquire the ability to differentiate these aspects of meaning and identify how they
factor into the ways sentences can be used? In this dissertation, I home in on the second set
of questions and in attempting to answer them, aim to contribute answers to the first. In a
series of behavioral experiments, I investigate what children, roughly in the preschool age
range, know about the principles of language use governing presupposition, and how they
come to acquire this knowledge.
My broader aims in carrying out these studies are two-fold. The first is descriptive. De-
velopmental research on presuppositions as a class of phenomena is limited. Consequently,
we know very little at present about what children know of the system underlying pre-
suppositional phenomena. This gap is unfortunate, as presuppositions, located squarely at
the intersection of lexical-semantics, syntax and pragmatics, provide a unique window into
understanding children's developing grammatical and communicative competence. Presup-
positions are generally thought to be conventionally associated with, i.e. written into the
meanings of, specific lexical items.1 Beyond this, they are associated with a set of rules of
presupposition projection - how a presupposition triggered in a sub-constituent is inherited
by the more complex structures it is part of- and usability - what the discourse context
must look like so that the use of a presupposition is deemed appropriate in that context.
Despite the manifest intricacy of the system underlying presuppositions, there is suggestive
evidence to the fact that children learn its ropes early on. First uses of presuppositional
expressions can be seen as early as 1;6 years of age. The CDI's Vocabulary Checklist for
8-to-18-month olds (Fenson, Marchman, Thal, Dale & Reznick 2007) includes 23 words
typically thought to trigger a presupposition (2 Action Words, 11 Pronouns, 6 Question
Qords, 4 Quantifers), a further indication that presuppositional expressions are among the
first words that a child produces. 2 This raises important questions of interest to both devel-
opmentalists and semanticists: What do they know about these words? If they only have
partial knowledge, what parts do they know, and how do they learn the rest? If they have
'There are also constructions, e.g. clefts, which have been said to be conventionally associated with pre-
suppositions. Even in these cases, it is not clear whether the presuppositionality is contributed by a specific
morpheme present in the structure, e.g. a silent definite determiner (Akmajian 1970; Hedberg 2000; Percus
1997).
2The CDI lists a total of 396 typical words in young children's vocabularies.
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master their meanings and use early on, what grammatical knowledge must children come
in with order to allow for such swift mastery? What social and cognitive abilities must
already be in place so that they can deploy this grammatical knowledge, and what does it
tell us about the relationship between grammar and those other components of the mind?
My second goal is theoretical. The domain of presupposition is a complex and noisy
empirical terrain. As will be explicated shortly, we find considerable variability in the us-
ability of presuppositional sentences across contexts and heterogeneity within the class of
presupposition-triggering expressions. Moreover, much of what is involved in the interpre-
tation of presuppositional sentences might not be accessible to stable, direct intuition or
inspection. As a result of all of this, there is substantial disagreement among theories about
virtually every aspect of presupposition. The time-course of acquisition of this component
of grammar may help constrain the space of possible theories by providing a set of facts that
must be captured by any adequate theory. With this in mind, findings from the studies con-
ducted here will be discussed in relation to linguistic theories of the particular phenomena
of interest, with the intent to inform these theories.
1.2 Presuppositions and anti-presuppositions
The specific focus of this dissertation will be on young children's understanding of the
interplay between presuppositions and the context. I will examine two separate, but inter-
connected aspects of presupposition use: (i) the conditions that govern when presupposing
something is appropriate, hence allow for the use of a presupposition triggering expression,
and (ii) the conditions that make marking of presuppositions obligatory, hence require the
use of a presupposition triggering expression. This section spells out these conditions in
more detail.
1.2.1 The conversational common ground
Following Stalnaker (1974, 1978), I assume that sentences used in communication con-
tribute to an existing conversational record among the discourse participants. Part of this
record is the set of assumptions taken for granted by the discourse participants, the conver-
sational common ground. The common ground describes a set of worlds, the context set,
which are those worlds in which all of the propositions in the common ground are true, and
17
which constitute the range of worlds that conversational participants take to be candidates
for being the actual world.
The common ground guides the course of a conversation, but it evolves as conversation
unfolds. Exchange of information is taken to be a cooperative endeavor, where agents aim
to increase the body of mutually accepted assumptions, in turn narrowing down the set of
candidate worlds that could be the actual world. The main way of doing this is by making
an assertion. The goal of an assertive speech act is to update the common ground with the
proposition it describes. To update the common ground with an assertively used sentence
is to eliminate those worlds in the context set at which the proposition expressed is false,
while retaining those at which the proposition is true. If successful, the end result of an
assertion is a new set of worlds that is a proper subset of the context set at the previous
stage in discourse.
1.2.2 Presuppositions
Presuppositions of a sentence impose constraints on the types of contexts against which
that sentence can be uttered. The sentences in (3) - (5) all require that the presupposed
proposition already be part of the common ground of conversation at the point of utterance.
(3) The woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate.
Presupposes that there is exactly one (relevant3 ) woman that I talked to
(4) Both of her children are MIT graduates.
Presupposes that she has exactly two children
(5) Dana knows that MIT has a swimming requirement.
Presupposes that MIT has a swimming requirement
Where does this requirement come from? On one view, originally suggested by Stalnaker
himself (Stalnaker 1978) and elaborated upon in von Fintel (2008), it derives in a principled
manner from the semantics of presuppositional sentences and general conversational rules
governing cooperative discourse. Following the Fregean tradition, a sentence S semanti-
cally presupposes another sentence S' if S' must be true in order for S to have a denotation.
3The condition is not that the speaker has talked to exactly one woman among all the women in the world.
The domain of the definite description is restricted to a contextually relevant subset.
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On this view, then, the semantic values assigned to sentences must encode a formal dis-
tinction between presupposition failure. One way of doing this (described in e.g. Heim &
Kratzer 1998) is to treat presuppositional sentences as expressing partial functions, which
have an interpretation (or receive a classical truth value (1 or 0)), only in circumstances
where the presuppositions are true. Thus:
(6) Given the interpretation function j and any world w:
a. The woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate E dom( 11) iff I talked to a
unique woman in w
b. When defined, The woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate. w = 1 if the
unique woman I talked to is an MIT graduate in w;
otherwise The woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate w = 0
As mentioned earlier, assertively used sentences are proposals to update the common ground
against which they are uttered. To carry out this update, the listener must be able to deter-
ministically evaluate the relevant proposition as true or false in each world in the context
set. If the context set contains a world in which the proposition cannot be evaluated as true
or false, then it would be unclear whether or not this world should be kept or eliminated
during the update procedure, and the proposal to update will not go through. This is at
the heart of the requirement that presuppositions of a sentence not only be known to the
speaker, but be shared common knowledge. If sentences with semantic presuppositions fail
to receive a classical truth-value at worlds where its presuppositions are false, and more-
over, assertively used sentences must receive a classical truth-value in every world in the
context set, a cooperative speaker should only use presuppositional sentences if its presup-
positions are met in every world in the context set against which it is uttered. Throughout,
I refer to this requirement as the "common ground requirement" of presuppositions.
The common ground requirement, on this view, is a formal requirement that results
from the partial semantics of presuppositional sentences 4 and the fact that assertions are
4 Stalnaker is silent on why some sentences are associated with semantic presuppositions in the first place.
Soames (1989) provides a "functional" answer: semantic presuppositions provide speakers with conventional
means of indicating what assumptions they are making about the conversational backgrounds to which their
utterances contribute. But why do certain expressions, but not others, enable such redundancy? This is the
triggering problem of presuppositions. Abrus.n (2011) provides a way of answering this question for verbal
triggers. Consider aspectual verbs like stop, which describe a transition from one state to another. The tendency
is for the preceding state to be presupposed. Abrusdn 2011 suggests that this is systematic and relates to the
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meant to update the common ground. The "bridge" between the semantics and pragmatics
is the condition that a proposition can update a context set only if it has a determinate truth-
value in every world in the context set. This empirical picture, however, is complicated by
the fact that the formal requirement is not always met in ordinary conversation. Speakers
often use presuppositional sentences, seemingly felicitously, in contexts that do not entail
their presuppositions. Consider (7), from (von Fintel 2008). I might utter this, having just
walked into a meeting full of people I barely know. Here, I seem to be presuppose that I
have a daughter, even though I do not assume that my audience knows this. In this context,
then, the presupposition - that I have exactly one daughter -is "informative".
(7) I am sorry that I am late. I had to take my daughter to the doctor.
To account for the fact that update of the context with (7) can be successful in spite of the
fact that it has a semantic presupposition not entailed by it, we have to enrich the previously
articulated picture somewhat. Specifically, a procedure of "presupposition accommodation"
is assumed, whereby listeners, knowing that certain contextual constraints are in force, will
adjust their beliefs to bring the common ground in line with the requirements of an uttered
sentence. The basic idea is this. Strictly speaking, a speaker should not assert a sentence
whose presupposition is not entailed by the common ground. However, the common ground
is never explicitly settled and is constantly in flux. When a sentence with a missing presup-
position is used, listeners can use the semantic presupposition of that sentence as a clue as
to the type of context the speaker wants to take for granted. If they don't have qualms about
shifting to such a context, they play along, either for the purpose of the conversation or for
real. Thus, on the view articulated here, two systems must be distinguished: (i) the formal
requirement that presuppositions be presupposed in the common ground prior to assertion
and (ii) a cooperative strategy for when the formal requirement is violated by an otherwise
cooperative speaker.
1.2.3 Anti-presuppositions
The existence of presuppositions shows us that sentences can be conventionally linked to
use conditions of the form: "Assert me only to propose an update of a context with property
fact that we are more interested in what is at stake at the evaluation time than at a time prior. This results in a
systematic demoting, or backgrounding, of the information about the past event.
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X". This raises the question: what kinds of properties can such conventionally derived use
conditions make reference to? At least first blush, sentences like (8)-(10) seem to impose
contextual demands of a similar nature. For instance, the requirement associated with (8)
makes it look like the sentence presuppose the opposite of what (1) does: non-uniqueness.
Similarly, (9) seems to presuppose the opposite of what (4) does: anti-duality.
(8) A woman that I talked to is an MIT graduate.
It's not the case that there is exactly one woman that I talked to
(9) All of her children are MIT graduates.
It's not the case that she has exactly two children
(10) Dana thinks that MIT has a swimming requirement.
It's not the case that MIT has a swimming requirement
However, a closer look at the data shows otherwise. If, for instance, (4) presupposed a dual
domain and (9) a non-dual one, neither would be appropriate in circumstances where the
number of children has not yet been established. However, the fact of the matter is that all
is fine here (and the listener is not compelled to accommodate the existence of more than
two children, either).
(11) I don't know exactly how many children she has, but I do know that...
/all/#both of her children are MIT graduates.
So what is the nature of the requirement associated with (8)-(10)? These sentences re-
quire a certain proposition not to be entailed by the common ground; they anti-presuppose
that proposition. And while they share a family resemblance with presuppositional require-
ment, the general consensus is that anti-presuppositions of this sort do not have the same
cognitive status as presuppositions. Unlike presuppositional requirements, anti- presuppo-
sitional requirements do not arise as a direct consequence of the formal properties of the
sentences in question. Rather, they arise indirectly, due to competition. Specifically, in
cases where (8)-(10) is unuseable, this is because they are blocked by the possibility of
using the sentences in (3)-(5) above.
The competition view of anti-presuppositional effects originates with Heim (1991),
who proposed a principle Maximize Presupposition!, which requires speakers to mark the
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strongest presupposition compatible with the context. So, in situations where e.g. (3) and
(8) would communicate the same information, we would need to use the sentence with
the rather than a because the contributes a stronger presupposition than a. If this view is
right, this suggests that the part of the grammar that determines anti-presuppositions does
not merely look at a single syntactic structure, the one that gets associated with an anti-
presupposition. Rather, it compares this syntactic structure with a competing structure, and
determines whether it can be used by considering whether its competitor could be used
instead.
1.3 Outline of the dissertation
In this dissertation, I focus on those aspects of grammar and language use that lead to pre-
suppositions and anti-presuppositions, as described above. Specifically, I ask two questions:
(i) What are the developmental trajectories of presuppositional and anti-presuppositional
constraints?
(ii) What does the particular acquisition path chosen by the child tell us about the nature
of these constraints?
Investigation into these questions proceeds in two parts. In the first thematic half of
the dissertation (Chapters 2-3), I examine children's understanding of when speakers have
grounds to use a presuppositional sentence. In Chapter 2, I examine the common ground
requirement. To preview the results, we find that by 4-years of age, children are sensitive to
this requirement and have a default expectation that the presuppositions of an asserted sen-
tence is shared knowledge among the speaker and addressee. This result, in turn, informs us
that young children have underlying knowledge of the distinction between presuppositions
and asserted content in the semantics and the principles of language use that modulate the
appropriateness of these different aspects of meaning.
The topic of Chapter 3 is accommodation. Do children expect, like adults, that presup-
positions can be informative in the right circumstances? Do they know how accommodation
works? The results reveal that children, unlike adults, do not expect that an otherwise ig-
norant listener should be able to accommodate a novel presupposition. This suggests that
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children not only have the common ground requirement in place, but they start out with the
assumption that the requirement is inviolable.
In the second half of the dissertation (Chapters 4-5), I turn to anti-presuppositions.
Specifically, I ask whether children are sensitive to Maximize Presupposition! as a principle
governing utterance choice. In Chapter 4, I show that unlike the common ground require-
ment, the principles that lead to anti-presuppositional effects develop in a more protracted
manner. Moreover, children's ability to rule out presuppositionally weaker sentences seems
to vary across environments. I take the non-uniformity in development as evidence for non-
uniformity in the underlying phenomena. Chapter 5 examines this non-uniformity in-depth
and develops an alternative account for one of the test environments that was previously
thought to fall under the purview of Maximize Presupposition!.
Ultimately, Maximize Presupposition! is shown to be one of several conditions that lead
to competition and selection of the structure imposing the strongest contextual requirement.
Children have command of some of these conditions, but not others. I suggest that the ease
and speed of acquisition are modulated by various factors, including the type of requirement
imposed on the context (e.g. that some proposition is salient vs. accepted common belief)
and the type of knowledge that are pre-requisites (e.g. knowledge of specific lexical items).
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Chapter 2
Knowing when to presuppose
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 The common ground requirement
On a common approach to presuppositions, the propositions that a sentence presupposes
are those that must be entailed by the common ground against which that sentence is ut-
tered (Stalnaker 1974, 1978; Karttunen 1974). The common ground, roughly, is the set
of all those propositions that the conversation participants take for granted, either because
they constitute permanent shared knowledge within the speaker community, or because they
have been established over the course of the preceding discourse. In this respect, the prag-
matics of presupposition differs fundamentally from that of asserted content, which need
not - and should not - be previously established common knowledge. The pragmatic re-
quirement associated with presuppositional sentences is stated in (1).
(1) Felicity condition on presupposition use: A sentence S with presupposition p may
be used in a conversational context c only if c entails p at the time that S is uttered.
I will label theories committed to this condition the 'common ground theories of presuppo-
sition.'
As explicated in the Introduction, I take this requirement to fall out as a consequence of
the partial semantics of presuppositional sentences and general rules governing cooperative
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discourse (von Fintel 2008).1 The crucial ingredients are listed in (2).
(2) a. Semantics: A presuppositional sentence is undefined (or receives a third truth-
value, '#') in worlds where its presuppositions are not true.
b. Pragmatics: The goal of an assertion is to update the common ground by elim-
inating a set of worlds from the context set (i.e. by adding new information).
c. The Bridge: A proposition is assertable in a conversational context only if
every world in that context set is such that the proposition is either true or false
in it.
To summarize: Presuppositions are conventionally encoded components of sentence mean-
ing. Sentences are asserted as proposals to eliminate from the context set those worlds in
which the proposition is false. This can happen only if the listener can identify in a de-
terministic way those worlds in which the relevant proposition is false. The listener can
deterministically evaluate the truth of a sentence only if they know that its presuppositions
are satisfied. Consequently, cooperative speakers should only use a presuppositional sen-
tence in circumstances where the listener already knows that the sentence presuppositions
are met.
The main goal of this chapter is to investigate children's acquisition of the use condi-
tion on presuppositions given in (1). Given the theoretical assumptions outlined above, an
investigation into the acquisition of the felicity condition on presupposition use is indirectly
also an investigation of children's knowledge of the semantic distinction between assertive
and presuppositional components of meaning, as well as general principles governing nat-
ural language use. In a series of experiments, I examine participants' biases about the
information state of the addressee generated by a speaker's utterance of a presuppositional
sentence. That is, given the utterance of a sentence S with the presupposition p, how likely
is it that the addressee is presumed to already know that p holds? Such biases, in turn, serve
as a proxy for expectations about the state of the conversational context, i.e. about what
properties the context must have in order for S to have been appropriate.
1My theoretical views thus diverge somewhat from the original proposals in e.g. Stalnaker (1974), who
remained agnostic about whether or not pragmatic presuppositions are fundamentally associated with semantic
presuppositions.
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2.1.2 Informative presuppositions
If the characterization of presupposition use described above is correct and the child learner
must converge on a rule such as in (1), her acquisition task is bound to be non-trivial.
This is because evidence for this rule in actual conversation - which makes up the child's
input -is noisy. In actual conversation, speakers routinely violate the common ground
requirement and use presuppositions to introduce new information.
Let us consider again the predictions of the framework sketched above. A straightfor-
ward prediction on this approach is a clean division between assertions and presuppositions
in language use. Assertions must contribute new information and presuppositions must
express old information that is already part of the conversation participants' background
assumptions. If a presuppositional sentence is used against a context that is neutral with
respect to the sentence presupposition (i.e. it neither entails the truth or falsity of the pre-
supposition), the expectation on the common ground theory - in its simplest form - is that
the conversation comes to a snag. The context does not entail the presupposition, and update
of the context with the content expressed by the sentence cannot happen. The listener might
then challenge the presupposition or request clarification, allowing the speaker a chance to
back up and fill in the missing presupposition so that the conversation can move forward.
This may indeed happen, but it has been observed that there are cases where such
missing presuppositions do not lead to a conversation breakdown. For example, (3), which
presupposes that the speaker has a daughter, can very well be felicitously and successfully
uttered even when it is not common knowledge that the speaker has a daughter. Moreover,
the utterance of such a sentence is successful even without any explicit signaling that a
conversational rule is being violated.
(3) I am sorry that I am late. I had to take my daughter to the doctor this morning.
On the common ground approach to presuppositions, the felicity of this sentence results
from the availability of presupposition accommodation, whereby listeners can adjust the
contextual assumptions so as to satisfy the presuppositional requirements of the sentence.
The basic idea is as follows. Suppose a speaker utters a sentence S which requires that the
common ground satisfy certain requirements, e.g. that it entails a certain proposition p.
But suppose that although p is not part of the common ground, it is not controversial and
the speaker believes that the listeners will be ready to update the common ground with p
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in any case. A cooperative and efficient listener, knowing that a requirement like (1) is in
force, and assuming that the speaker intends her utterance to effect an update to the common
ground, will simply adjust her beliefs in the necessary way and bring the common ground in
line with the requirements imposed by the utterance. That is, even if p is not entailed by the
context, the listener might nevertheless agree to accept the presupposition and interpret the
sentence as if p is established common knowledge. The speaker, anticipating the listener's
cooperative stance, might then rely on their ability to accommodate and use sentences with
unsatisfied presuppositions to meet some strategic end (e.g. efficiency).
The availability accommodation is governed by various, often ill-understood factors
like plausibility or uncontroversiality of the proposition needing to be accommodated (to
be discussed further in Chapter 3). Perhaps what is most crucial for present purposes is
the fact that the availability of accommodation seems to differ on the basis of the trigger
involved. Whereas presuppositions associated with possessive pronouns, certain definite
descriptions, certain factive verbs, etc. can be accommodated in the right circumstances,
other triggers like regular personal pronouns or discourse particles such as too seem to resist
accommodation (Kripke 2009; Beaver, Clark, Flemming, Jaeger & Wolters 2007; von Fintel
2008; Roberts 2015). There may be two factors that lead to the resistance of some triggers to
accommodation. The first is identifiability: with certain triggers, the particular proposition
the speaker intends to be accommodated may not be readily figured out. For instance, the
sentence in (4) has a semantic presupposition that some other salient entity had dinner in
New York besides Sue. However, in the absence of sufficient contextual cues, it is not easy
for the listener to identify which other entity the speaker has in mind, and therefore, which
specific proposition should be added to the common ground.
(4) Sue had dinner in New York, too.
The second issue is anaphoricity. Certain presuppositions target not just what is in the com-
mon ground, but the history of the conversation itself. In such cases, accommodation cannot
help, because the type of contextual adjustment required effectively involves a rewriting of
the facts about the conversational record.
The existence of accommodation and the variability across triggers pose a potentially
vexing problem for the child learner. The child's input will be riddled with cases where
the condition in (1) is seemingly violated, and moreover, the rate of such violations will
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be non-uniform across environments. How, then, does the learner converge on the right
pragmatic properties of presupposition as a uniform class? Does she initially ascribe to
presuppositional sentences a different use condition from (1), one which is more straight-
forwardly in line with her input? Is sensitivity to the contextual requirements imposed by
presuppositions acquired piecemeal, in a way that corresponds to their experience with spe-
cific presupposition triggers? In what follows, I report on findings from a set of experiments
designed to address these and related questions. The experiments probe children's implicit
understanding of the principle in (I) using two different presuppositional expressions, too
and definite descriptions, which vary with respect to the ease with which their presupposi-
tions can be accommodated, and in turn, their profile in the child's input.2
2.1.3 Roadmap of the chapter
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I begin in the next section with a discussion
of some of the previous developmental work on presuppositions. Previous developmental
2 There is a second type of situation -presupposition cancellation - which leads to apparent violations
the felicity condition in (1). The examples in (i-a) and (i-b) both involve presupposition triggers: the factive
verb aware in (i-a), which presupposes the truth of its complement; the change-of-state verb stop in (i-b),
which presupposes the existence of a prior time at which some state held. In both cases, the triggers are
embedded under operators (negation, possible) from which the presuppositions usually project. But if these
presuppositions projected, the speaker of these sentences might be judged as having an inconsistent epistemic
state: after all, they had just before stated explicitly their agnosticism about the presupposed proposition. In
actually, however, we do not infer such inconsistency. We feel that the sentences don't presuppose anything.
(i) a. I'm not sure where Sue is. Her personal assistant isn't aware that she is on vacation.
b. I am not sure if Billy has ever played videogames. But it is possible that he stopped playing at
some point.
Following Heim (1983), cases like (i) have been treated as involving what is called a local accommodation
mechanism. Local accommodation involves a process of effectively "canceling" the presupposition by treating
it as as an ordinary entailment of the sentence. Thus, the presuppositional sentences in (i) would be treated as
expressing the (ii).
(ii) a. It is not the case both that Sue is on vacation and her personal assistant is aware of it.
b. It is possible that Billy played videogames in the past but does not play them now.
Such collapsing of presupposition and assertion is thought to be possible only when adding the presupposition
to the global context would lead to a contextual clash, like needing to ascribe to the speaker a contradictory
belief state. Unlike "global" accommodation described above, which involves the conversational context being
enriched so that it will entail the sentence presupposition, local accommodation involves an adjustment of the
sentence to fit the background assumptions up to the point of utterance. I will not be discussing cancellation in
much depth here, but it is worth keeping in mind as still more "noise" present in the child's input.
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work on presuppositions has been item-driven, and almost incidentally about presuppostion.
In this sense, the goals of these studies contrast with mine in this chapter, which is to
systematically investigate presupposition as a class of phenomena. 3 lays out an overview
of the present experiments and predictions about children's behavior. Experimental results
from adult participants are presented in 4. My goal in testing adults is, on the one hand, to
set a baseline against which to compare the child data, and on the other, to adduce empirical
support for some of the theoretical assumptions made. 5 presents findings from 4-to-6-
year-old children. Anticipating the results, we find that children show parallel behavior as
adults across the two presupposition triggers tested, indicating that important aspects of the
architecture of natural language meaning and of language use are in place, at least by the
age of 4. Developmental and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed in 6.
2.2 Pragmatics of presuppositions and child language
Most studies of presuppositions to date have focused on questions relating to lexical acquisi-
tion, probing children's understanding of specific presuppositional expressions. 3 However,
the results and proposals from some of this work have direct bearing on issues of interest
here. Of particular relevance is the long line of developmental research on children's ac-
quisition of the article system. On standard analyses following the Fregean tradition, the
definite and indefinite articles differ in that the definite article introduces presuppositions of
existence and uniqueness. Thus, the NP should be used only if it is known to all parties in
the discourse that there is a unique referent that satisfies the property described by the NP.
It has been repeatedly observed that children, at least up until the age of 6, fail to adhere
to this requirement, over-using the definite article in situations where adults prefer to use
the indefinite (Brown 1973; Maratsos 1976; Karmiloff-Smith 1979; Wexler 2003; Schaef-
fer & Matthewson 2005). For example, Maratsos (1976) attempted to elicit articles from
preschool-aged children by providing them with scenarios and follow-up questions like in
(5).
(5) Once there was a lady. She had lots of girls and boys, about four girls and three
3 Some relevant works include: Karmiloff-Snith (1979); Wexler (2003); Schaeffer & Matthewson (2005);
Munn, Miller & Schmitt (2006) for the definite article; Bergsma (2006); Berger & Hohlie (2012) for additive and
iterative particles like too and again; Hopmann & Maratsos (1978); Abbeduto & Rosenberg (1985); Dudley,
Orita, Hacquard & Lidz (2015); Dudley (2017) for factive predicates.
30
boys. One of them started laughing and giggling. Let's see. Who was laughing and
giggling like that?
Before the age of 6, children responded to the question in (5) with the boy/girl at a rate of
around 40%, although the target (adult) response would have been a boy/girl. The definite
article is infelicitous, as there is no unique girl or boy under discussion. Put differently, the
uniqueness presupposition of the definite description is not met in the common ground be-
tween the speaker (the child) and the addressee (the experimenter). Karmiloff-Smith (1979)
replicates these results in French. In an extensive study of children's production and com-
prehension of articles, she found that children as old as 8 years of age produced definite ar-
ticles in similar indefinite contexts at non-trivial rates (39-63%). A number of studies since,
sometimes with slightly different methodologies, have reproduced these results (Schafer &
de Villiers 2000; Schaeffer & Matthewson 2005; Munn et al. 2006; Modyanova & Wexler
2007; van Hout, Harrigan & de Villiers 2010).
One common line of explanation for this behavior is that children's over-use of the def-
inite article is a result of their communicative "egocentricism", a concept that goes back at
least to Piaget (1955). Egocentrism rests on the idea that young children are fundamentally
incapable of taking the perspective of others and tailoring their communication to their lis-
tener's information state. In proposals about children's non-adult article use, egocentrism
is presented as a pragmatic deficit: children use the when they have a unique, salient refer-
ent in mind, ignoring the state of their addressee's information state (e.g., Maratsos 1976;
Karmiloff-Smith 1979; Schaeffer & Matthewson 2005).
Consider again the story in (5). The fact that needs to be described in the answer is
"one of the four boys/three girls was laughing and giggling". As mentioned above, the sin-
gular definite article comes with the presupposition that the NP restrictor is a singleton set.
This presupposition, moreover, can be assumed to be computed relative to a contextually
given domain, which typically is a proper subset of the universe. An adult speaker will
reject the definite article in this situation because uniqueness is not met in the established
context -the cardinality of the set of boys in the contextually relevant domain is four and
it is three for the set of girls. A child, might, however use privileged information to restrict
the domain further to a subset that would meet the uniqueness requirement. For instance,
the child might imagine a particular boy, a particularly naughty one perhaps, and decides
that this boy is relevant for the story. She then assumes, due to her egocentricity, that her
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hearer shares knowledge of this naughty boy, and uses the.
In its most extreme form, the egocentrism hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with a Stal-
nakarian view of discourse. If the child is egocentric, her epistemic state will be identical to
that of others. There cannot be a coherent notion of the common ground for the child that
is not entirely trivial (the common ground is the body of information known to the child).
On this view, the goal of a conversation for the child cannot be to update the common
ground, as no new information can ever be exchanged. Thus, the egocentrism hypothe-
sis predicts not only that young children lack general conversational principles governing
presupposition use, but also that they lack basic communicative competence. There is in-
dependent evidence that this cannot be the case. Children as young as 2 have been shown
to be able to assess the knowledge of others and adapt their communication accordingly
(Akhtar, Carpenter & Tomasello 1996; O'Neill 1996; Moll & Tomasello 2006). It has also
been suggested that expectations about communicative intent and conversation participants'
information states are central to language acquisition, in particular early word learning (e.g.
Bloom 2002).
Weaker variants of egocentrism have also been put forth. Schaeffer & Matthewson
(2005), for example, propose that children lack what they call the "Concept of Non-Shared
Assumptions", the idea that the information states of the speaker and the hearer are always
presumed to be independent. The independence of speaker and hearer assumptions, in turn,
imposes an obligation for the speaker to consider the hearer's knowledge state every time
they make an utterance. A child who lacks this concept will fail to distinguish between the
information states of the interlocutors at least some of the time. When they are themselves
the speaker, this pragmatic deficit will sometimes result in egocentric behavior.
A full assessment of this account is difficult, as it makes very weak predictions. A child
who lacks the Concept of Non-Shared Assumptions need not behave egocentrically all of
the time, as it does not follow from the account that children always assume that speaker
and hearer assumptions are identical. The only clear empirical prediction is that whereas
adults' language use will be constrained in systematic ways due to a bias to consider the
knowledge state of the addressee, children's language use should be haphazard.
Though these accounts were originally put forth to explain a specific deficit, namely
the misuse of articles, they suggest -even entail - a proposal about presupposition acqui-
sition. If children have a pragmatic deficit rooted in their egocentricity, it would mean that
they do not have an adult-like conception of the common ground and in turn, that they do
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not have an adult-like knowledge of the common ground requirement on presuppositions.
Findings from the studies here, in that case, can contribute to debates in the developmental
literature concerning the source of children's non-adultlike use of definites. 4
2.3 Experimental design and predictions
2.3.1 Sketch of the paradigm
All of the experiments reported here use a novel paradigm, described schematically below,
in which participants rely on properties of an asserted sentence to identify the intended
addressee of that sentence. In a forced-choice inference task, participants are presented
with brief conversational situations involving a speaker and two possible addressees. The
potential addressees differ with respect to their knowledge of some proposition p, such that
the common ground between the speaker and the more knowledgeable addressee entails p,
but the common ground between the speaker and the more ignorant addressee does not.
In the critical condition, the speaker utters a sentence that presupposes p, and the par-
ticipant is tasked with identifying who was being spoken to based on this information. If
participants are sensitive to the condition that p must be common ground prior to a felicitous
assertion of a sentence presupposing p, they should reason that the more likely addressee
is the character who already knew that p. Although the more ignorant addressee can in
principle meet the condition via accommodation, there is some uncertainty as to whether
accommodation is possible or whether the listener will choose to carry it out. On the other
hand, if p has already been accepted into the common ground, the sentence is in fact un-
problematic.
The critical condition is paired with a control condition that exploits participants' knowl-
edge of the principles governing felicitous assertion, in particular, their knowledge that a
successful assertion adds new information to the common ground (thereby reducing the
context set). In this condition, the speaker asserts, rather than presuppose, p. The expecta-
tions about addressee preferences shift accordingly. To felicitously assert p (and only p),
the common ground must be one that does not already entail p. A participant sensitive
41n fact, egocentricity is not the only account for the definite over-use. For instance, Wexler (2003) proposes
that the root of the problem is a non-adult semantics for the definite article, which does not encode a unique-
ness/maximality presupposition. For Munn et al. (2006), the problem lies in children's inability to restrict the
domain of reference in an adult-like manner.
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to this conversational principle should reason that the more likely addressee, i.e. one for
whom the utterance is more likely to lead to successful context update, is the one who did
not already know that p. Child and adult friendly variants of this paradigm were given to
the respective population.
2.3.2 Selection of presupposition triggers
Both groups were tested on two types of presuppositional expressions, which fall on two
ends of the spectrum with respect to the degree to which their uses seemingly bypass the
felicity condition in (1). Experiments IA and 2A uses the presupposition trigger too to
probe adults' and children's knowledge of the requirements imposed on the context by pre-
suppositional sentences. Too triggers an additive presupposition. (6) presupposes, roughly,
that a salient person in addition to Sam plays videogames.
(6) Sam plays videogames, too.
Crucially, too makes a specific demands on its environment beyond the additive presuppo-
sition: it requires an antecedent in the discourse, and in this regard, it is anaphoric (Kripke
2009; Heim 1992; van der Sandt & Huitink 2003).
As briefly mentioned in 2.1.2, the presupposition of too is difficult to accommodate.
This could be due to its anaphoricity -the presupposition is in part about the nature of the
conversational record. Alternatively, or additionally, difficulties with identifiability might
play a role: when no antecedent is available the descriptive content of the trigger may not
be rich enough to signal exactly what is presupposed. Whatever the reason, a consequence
of the difficulties in accommodating the presupposition of too is that a learner's encounters
with the particle will typically be in discourse situations where the condition in (1) is met.
Evidence from child and child-ambient speech confirms this. For instance, Dudley (2017)
finds that the presupposition of too rarely goes unsupported in child-directed speech, and
the cues often come from highly salient aspects of a discourse, e.g. previously uttered
sentences or visual stimuli that is in the scene. Moreover, experimental and corpus findings
suggest that children's earliest presupposition uses involve such triggers. Toddlers show an
understanding of the meaning of anaphoric additive triggers like too and again (Berger &
Pouscoulous 2013); a preliminary examination of child-speech in the corpus (the Brown
Corpus in CHILDES, Brown (1973)) reveals that children use these triggers earlier and
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more frequently than those like stop or know. If the relative lack of noise in the child's
experience plays a critical role in this apparent early acquisition, we might indeed find that
children treat these types of triggers as imposing a common ground requirement before they
do so with triggers that do not resist accommodation
Experiments 2A and 2B investigate the same set of questions as 1A and IB, with the
crucial difference that the critical condition involved presuppositional sentences with the.
Unlike too, the existence and uniqueness presuppositions triggered by definite descriptions
can easily be accommodated. In fact, accommodation is so easy with this trigger that some
researchers have proposed that it is not presuppositional -in the sense of imposing con-
straints on the input context-to begin with (e.g. Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons
2013; Tonhauser 2015). The accommodability of the presuppositions of definite descrip-
tions means that they are likely to show a different profile also in the child's input, as
well. The child is much more likely, in the case of sentences with the, to encounter them
in discourse situations where their presuppositions are not already taken for granted at the
time of utterance. A preliminary examination of Brown's (1973) corpus for Eve shows that
informative uses of this trigger are indeed found in child-directed speech.
(7) Context: Child is asking after her father
Eve: David! [name of father]
Mother: He'll be right here.
Mother: He's just helping the men from Morgan Memorial.
(8) Context: Family is preparing for moving day.
Mother: Eve come here. I'll tell you what's going to happen.
Mother: Papa's going to go to the basement with the movers.
Mother: I'm going to go in here and talk to the insurance man.
A direct comparison of children's behavior with the two triggers therefore serves two pur-
poses. First, it helps us detect variability, if it exists, in rates of adherence to the usage
conditions on presuppositions in development. Second, it can contribute to our theorizing
about the observed non-homogeneity across presupposition triggers with respect to their
"informative" uses.
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2.3.3 Predictions
The critical and control conditions in our task are intended to test participants' sensitivity
to principles of language use governing presupposition and assertion, respectively. On the
common ground approach to discourse, the predicted "target" behavior is as follows. In
the critical condition, in which the target sentences are associated with a presupposition,
participants should show a strong preference for the addressee who already takes the pre-
supposition for granted. If the addressee knows the presupposition already, the condition in
(1) will certainly be met and the utterance will be accepted. The ignorant addressee can in
principle accommodate the unmet presupposition. However, accommodation is not guaran-
teed, so there is the possibility that the utterance goes challenged. Thus the more successful
discourse situation will be one in which the speaker is addressing someone who does not
have to accommodate their presuppositions.
The null hypothesis is that the preference for the "knowledgeable" addressee does not
vary on the basis of the presupposition trigger used. Although accommodation is more
readily available for the compared to too, if the analysis laid out above is right, the better
addressee in either case will be the one who has to accommodate the least. Thus, insofar as
too and the are both associated with presuppositions, the condition governing their use are
identical for the purposes of this task and we expect participants' behavior to be uniform.
The target response on the control conditions is choice of the more ignorant addressee.
Recall that the control condition relies on a very basic conversational principle about in-
formativity of assertions: update of the common ground with an asserted proposition must
be non-vacuous, i.e. it must contribute some new information. In the control conditions,
a proposition q is asserted, and only the more ignorant agent fails to already know that q.
Thus, the common ground between the speaker and the ignorant addressee is one where an
update with the proposition q would be non-vacuous and thus unproblematic.
Children may diverge from the target response patterns in various ways. Children may
indeed go through an egocentric stage in development, where they lack the basic principles
guiding cooperative discourse. In this case, we expect them to show no biases on either
the critical or control conditions. That is, we expect their intended listener choices to be
arbitrary. Alternatively, children may only lack an adult-like understanding of one of the
two principles tested. For instance, they may only lack the principles of language use that
govern presuppositions, in which case they might display target behavior on the control
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condition but simply guess on the critical condition. On the view of presuppositions articu-
lated in 1.1, knowledge of the general principle about informativity of assertions may be
seen as a prerequisite for knowledge of the felicity conditions governing presupposition use.
The requirement that assertions effect a non-trivial update to the context forces speakers to
use partial propositions only when its truth can be deterministically evaluated by the lis-
tener. In addition, sensitivity to the latter presupposes an understanding of the fact that the
presuppositional sentences express partial propositions and an appropriate bridge between
this partial semantics and the pragmatics. In this regard, the child has more opportunities
to go awry in the realm of presuppositions. An asymmetry in the other direction, where
children follow presuppositional biases but not assertive biases for the intended addressee,
is a logical possibility, though inconsistent with the Stalnakerian picture assumed here.
A final possibility is that children show selective sensitivity to the common ground
requirements tied to presuppositions depending on the presupposition trigger. A natural
expectation is that children's response patterns should correspond to the variable rates at
which this usage condition is not met in everyday use of the triggers. If so, children who
show a bias towards the knowledgeable agent when the presuppositional sentences involve
too may show weaker or no such preferences when the sentences involve definite descrip-
tions. Results from the children, which tease apart these possibilities, are presented in 5.
2.4 Adults
My goals in testing adults are two-fold. The first and obvious one is that adult data pro-
vide a baseline against which to compare children's response patterns. The second goal
is to motivate some of my theoretical assumptions and hypotheses about target behavior.
On the common ground theory of presuppositions, presuppositional sentences are formally
associated with a condition that their presuppositions be taken for granted in the conver-
sational common ground prior to utterance. Competent speakers, in turn, are expected to
have implicit knowledge of this requirement. We have already seen, however, that the con-
nection between theory and empirical evidence most readily available to us - our native
speaker intuitions - is not always reliable. There are many situations in which presupposi-
tional sentences whose presuppositions are not already entailed by the common ground are
deemed acceptable. Consequently, we need a different means of evaluating the validity of
the theory. One feature of the experiments reported here may help us accomplish this. The
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task involves evaluating not whether some sentence is acceptable relative to some context,
but rather, which type of context it is more likely to be acceptable in. This could allow us to
tease apart the underlying requirement on the conversational context - that presuppositions
be shared knowledge prior to assertion -from repair mechanisms that allow us to render
an utterance felicitous when it fails to meet some requirement.
2.4.1 Experiment 1A: Too
Participants, Materials and Procedure
Thirty-seven native speakers of English, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, partici-
pated in Experiment IA. Experiment IA and all subsequent experiments used the forced-
choice inference task described in 2.3.1. All materials were presented in written form on a
computer screen using the IbexFarm experiment presentation tool (Drummond 2013). Par-
ticipants read, line by line, brief scenarios all involving three characters. In each scenario,
an event takes place that only a proper subset of the characters bears witness to. For ex-
ample, characters A and B may go together to a pet shelter to get a pet for character A,
while character C stays home. Later, A comes back to get a second pet, unbeknownst to
both B and C. After the event transpires, one of the characters tells another character about
it over the phone. Thus, A is described as reporting to someone - either B or C, we don't
know which- about her pet shelter adventures. Participants are tasked with guessing the
addressee based on what the speaker said.
As mentioned above, there were two critical conditions: In the "Presupposition" condi-
tion, the speaker uses a presuppositional sentence whose presupposition is known to only
one of the two potential addressees. Thus, the presupposition is only common ground be-
tween the speaker and the "knowledgeable" listener. For example, character A might say,
"I got a cat, too". Only character B knows that A had previously adopted another pet.
In the "No-Presupposition" condition, a non-presuppositional sentence is asserted, where
only one of the two potential listeners is ignorant about the content of the assertion. Thus,
the asserted proposition could only effect an update to the common ground between the
speaker and the "ignorant" listener. In this case, A might say, "I got a bird today," in a
situation where character B already knows this information and character C does not. The
two conditions and sample scenarios are given in Table 2.1. Each participant saw 8 items
per condition and 16 filler items. All critical items involved common and uncontroversial
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sets of events, like adopting a pet or procuring household objects. Filler items involved
similar stories, but the questions were about other aspects of the story and did not require
participants to make inferences about speech act participants. An example is given in (9).
(9) Amanda, Erik and Katie were at the beach together. Katie had to go home early,
so then it was just Amanda and Erik. Then Erik told Amanda, "You know, I love
parasailing. But I don't like surfing much." Amanda responded that she didn't like
either. Later on at home, Erik was on the phone with Katie and she told him "Guess
what, I really love surfing".
Question: Which one liked parasailing? Erik Amanda
Expected Choice: Erik
Results
Three participants were excluded due to low performance (<60%) on filler items, as these
participants can be treated as not paying attention to the experiment. Results from thirty-
four participants are described below. All analyses of results from this and subsequent
experiments were conducted in R, using mixed-effects logistic regressions. The model is
maximally specified wherever possible (Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily 2013).
Figure 2-1 plots the rates at which the more knowledgeable character was chosen in
each condition. Recall that we expect participants to choose the more knowledgeable char-
acter in the critical condition, but reject this character on the control condition. The unbi-
ased response pattern, i.e. the pattern we expect if participants saw no reliable way of choos-
ing between the two characters, is choice of the knowledgeable character at a rate of around
50% on both conditions. On the contrary, participants' responses are near-categorical: they
overwhelmingly choose the knowledgeable listener in the critical condition and reject the
knowledgeable listener in the control condition.
To analyze these trends statistically, we fit a mixed-effects logistic regression on the
rates of knowledgeable listener choice, with condition as a fixed effect and random effects
of subject and item. We find a significant effect of condition, with the odds of choosing
the knowledgeable listener being greater in the critical condition compared to the control.
Table 2.2 summarizes results from the regression.
This analysis confirms that participants' behaviors on the two conditions differed, but
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Table 2.1: Conditions, Experiment IA
Condition Scenario Question Expected
Choice
Susie, Jane and Mike were hanging
out together. But Jane had to go and
run some errands so she left. Then
it was just Susie and Mike. The
two of them decided to go to an ani-
mal shelter. At the shelter, Mike got
himself a pet bird. Then, Susie de-
cided to go home. Mike decided to
go back to the shelter and get him-
self a cat! Later, Mike was on the
phone with one of the girls and he
said, "Guess what, I got a cat, too!"
Katie, John and Molly were hang-
ing out. But then, Katie decided to
go to the library to study. Then, it
was just Molly and John and the
two of them decided to go to the
beach instead. At the beach, they
found a seashell and John decided
to keep it. Then, Molly had to
leave too. John stayed at the beach
awhile, and he found a fossil. Later
John was on the phone with one of
the girls and he said, "Hey, guess
what, I found a seashell today!"
Who was Susie
Mike talking
to when he
said, "Guess
what, I got a
cat, too!"?
Who was
John talking
to when he
said, "Guess
what, I
found a
seashell
today!"?
Katie
40
Presupposition
No-Presupposition
we also wanted to see whether the choice of knowledgeable listener in each condition was
different from chance. To examine this, we fit an intercept-only logistic mixed-effect re-
gression. The models, run separately for each condition, included the intercept as a fixed
effect, along with random intercepts for participant and item. We then compared whether
the estimated intercept, after by-subject and by-item random variation was accounted for,
was different from chance, i.e. 50%. The results of the analysis of the control condition
showed intercept to be estimated at -3.3887 (SE-0.60), corresponding to a raw value of 3%
rate of choosing the knowledgeable listener, with 95% CIs of [-4.57, -2.21], corresponding
to raw values of [1.02%, 9.8%]. Chance level, 50%, falls well above this range. For the
critical condition, the intercept was estimated to be at 3.37 (SE=0.65), corresponding to a
raw value of 96.7%. Confidence intervals are [2.10, 4.64], corresponding to raw values of
[89.1%, 99.0%], suggesting that the observed bias towards the knowledgeable listener was
not random. Overall, these results are in line with our expectations and indicate that when
a sentence with too is uttered, adults generate a bias that the addressee is one who already
knew that the additive presupposition holds.
Figure 2-1: Rate of choice of knowledgeable listener, Experiment 1 A
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Table 2.2: Summary of statistical analysis, Experiment IA
P SE z P
Intercept -3.45 0.64 -5.37 <.001
Condition (Critical) 6.78 0.93 7.22 <.001
2.4.2 Experiment 1B: The
Participants, Materials and Procedure
A separate group of thirty adult native speakers, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk,
participated in Experiment 1B. The procedure was identical to Experiment IA, and the
scenarios differed only minimally to better support the different target sentences, which
now involved definite descriptions. Sample scenarios for each condition is given in Table
2.3. As before, participants saw 8 items per condition and 16 filler items, which were
identical to those used in Experiment IA.
Results
Results from twenty-eight participants are included in the analyses, after the exclusion of
two participants whose filler accuracy rates averaged below 60%. Figure 2-2 plots the rates
at which participants chose the knowledgeable addressee by condition. As in Experiment
IA, participants showed a strong bias for the knowledgeable listener in the critical condition
and a strong bias against the same in the control condition. A mixed-effects logistic regres-
sion, results from which are given in Table 2.4, reveals a significant effect of condition on
the rates of choosing the knowledgeable listener.
We again ran intercept-only mixed effects logistic regressions to explore whether the
observed rates are different from chance. The results of the analysis of the control items
showed intercept to be estimated at -2.67 (SE=0.44), corresponding to a raw value of 6.4%
rate of choosing the knowledgeable listener, with 95% CIs of [-3.54, -1.81] (values of
[2.8%, 14.1%]. For the critical condition, the intercept was estimated at 4.08 (SE=1.27)
or 98.3%, with confidence intervals of [1.58, 6.52], corresponding to raw values of [82.9%,
99.8%].
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Table 2.3: Conditions, Experiment lB
Condition Scenario Question Expecte
Choice
Presupposition Who was
Mike talking
to when he
said, "Guess
what, the
bird that
I got flew
away!"?
SusieSusie, Jane and Mike were hang-
ing out together. But Jane had to
go and run some errands so she left.
Then it was just Susie and Mike.
The two of them decided to go to an
animal shelter. At the shelter, Mike
got himself a pet bird. Then, Susie
decided to go home. After she left,
the bird flew right out of its cage!
Later, Mike was on the phone with
one of the girls and he said, "Guess
what, the bird that I got flew away!"
Katie, John and Molly were hang-
ing out. But then Katie decided to
go to the library to study. Then, it
was just Molly and John and the
two of them decided to go to the
beach instead. At the beach, they
found a seashell and John decided
to keep it. Then, Molly had to
leave too. John stayed at the beach
awhile, but the seashell got buried in
the sand somewhere and he couldn't
find it again. Later John was on the
phone with one of the girls and he
said, "Hey, guess what, I found a
seashell today!"
As a final step, we asked if the response patterns observed across the two experiments
differed statistically. To do so, we conducted a between-subjects analysis with Experiment
(IA vs. IB) as an additional fixed effect. If the rates of choosing the knowledgeable listener
in the critical condition varied as a function of the presupposition trigger involved, we
should find an interaction of Experiment and Condition. That is, patterns should be constant
in the control conditions, but different in the critical conditions. Results from the model are
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Who was Katie
John talking
to when he
said, "Guess
what, I
found a
seashell
today!"?
No-Presupposition
summarized in Table 2.5. We find a significant effect of condition, but crucially, there is
no interaction between condition and experiment. This suggests that Experiment 1 B truly
replicates the response patterns observed in Experiment 1A. Thus, the change in trigger
did not seem to affect participants' biases to expect the listener to have already known the
presuppositions of the uttered sentence to be true.
Table 2.4: Summary of
Intercept
Condition (Critical)
statistical
P
-2.64
6.49
analysis, Experiment lB
SE z p
0.45 -5.89 <.001
1.10 5.85 <.001
Figure 2-2: Rate of choice of knowledgeable listener, Experiment lB
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Table 2.5: Comparison of Experiments IA and lB
f SE z p
Intercept -2.49 0.34 -7.28 <.001
Condition (Critical) 5.75 0.68 8.39 <.001
Experiment (ExplA) -0.69 0.52 -1.30 0.20
Condition * Experiment 0.28 0.64 0.44 0.66
2.4.3 Discussion
In this section, I sought to empirically evaluate the predictions of the common ground the-
ory of presuppositions and gather a set of baseline results by probing adults' sensitivity
to the constraints presuppositions impose on the conversational context. Experiment IA,
which used presuppositional sentences involving too, served as the simplest test case. Too
requires that the utterance context makes salient an antecedent that satisfies its additive pre-
supposition. As pointed out earlier, in most cases, it would be inappropriate to use too
out-of-the-blue, in spite of the availability of presupposition accommodation as a general
repair strategy. Our results revealed that when a sentence with too was uttered, adults
overwhelmingly chose as the addressee the agent who already shared with the speaker the
knowledge that the additive presupposition of the sentence holds.
In Experiment IB, the critical items involved a type of presuppositional item, definite
descriptions, that shows greater flexibility with respect to whether its presuppositions can
be accommodated. Results reveal a strikingly similar response pattern as Experiment IA,
with participants showing a strong bias towards the knowledgeable agent when a sentence
with the was uttered. Thus, adult participants, despite being able to produce and evaluate
sentences where the conveys informative presuppositions, nevertheless show a preference
for such sentences to be used against a conversational common ground in which the pre-
supposition is already taken for granted.
In sum, irrespective of the availability of accommodation or the ease with which it can
be called upon, participants in this task assume that a speaker is more likely to presuppose a
proposition when it was already common knowledge between them and the addressee. This
is predicted on a theory that distinguishes between redundant and informative presupposi-
tions, even when the two are identical with respect to felicity. The underlying requirement
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on presupposition will be met with certainty in cases where the presupposition is common
ground prior to utterance. In cases where a sentence with a "missing" presupposition is
uttered, the listener may add that presupposition to the common ground prior to evaluat-
ing the assertion and remedy the situation, but this is not a guaranteed outcome. Thus,
given the choice between two utterance situations -one where the presuppositions of the
uttered sentence is certainly met and one where it is not yet met, but could be accommo-
dated - participants prefer the former.
2.5 Children
We now turn to the experiments with children roughly in the preschool age. In 2.5.1, I
present results from Experiment 2A, which parallels IA and tests children's evaluation of
presuppositional sentences involving too. Experiment 2B, discussed in 2.5.2, is a child-
friendly variant of Experiment lB above and uses sentences involving the.
2.5.1 Experiment 2A: Too
Like with adults, we begin with too. As explained earlier, presuppositional sentences in-
volving too provide an ideal window to assess whether children know what the conversa-
tional context must look like in order for a speaker to presuppose something. Because of
independent difficulties accommodating the presupposition introduced by too, the common
ground requirement will be met in almost all of the circumstances in which the child hears
the trigger used. If children must rely on properties of the input to identify the use condi-
tions on various types of expressions, the learning task will be the easiest for presupposition
triggers like too. Thus, if a child has converged on something like (1) as the principle gov-
erning the use of sentences involving too, we expect this knowledge to reveal itself in that
child's biases about the addressee of such sentences.
Participants
Thirty-four children between the ages of 4 and 6 (ranging from 4;0 to 6;9; Mean Age=5;1)
were recruited from preschools and museums in the Boston area. Pilot testing showed that
children younger than 4 were unable to handle the demands of the task, which resulted in
4;0 being the lower bound of our age range. However, a considerable number of previous
46
studies on children's pragmatic development, including the work on definite descriptions
discussed in 2, have included 4-to-6-year-olds and report non-adult behavior and devel-
opmental shifts over the course of this age range (among others, Karmiloff-Smith 1979;
Modyanova & Wexler 2007 for definite descriptions; Noveck 2001; Katsos & Bishop 2011
for scalar implicatures; Nadig & Sedivy 2002 for referential communication). This makes
it a suitable age range to begin investigations into the development of the pragmatics of
presuppositions. The dominant language of all participating children was English.
Materials and Procedure
Experiments with children preserve the underlying logic of Experiments IA and 1B in
that the task involves reasoning about the addressee of a sentence given what is common
knowledge among the speaker and two other agents. However, the task in the child studies
was modified to make it less demanding and more child-friendly. The experiment was
presented as a game, in which the child helped the experimenter figure out the identity of
an occluded character. Children heard a series of stories about an animal character, a Hippo,
and his two friends, Cat and Fox. They were told that Hippo lived in the woods, where the
friends visit him. The friends sometimes like to hide behind bushes and trees, making it
difficult for the experimenter to see who is visiting him in the various stories. However,
Hippo himself can always see the friends and it is possible to figure out who is there based
on what Hippo says to them. The child is asked to help the experimenter figure out which of
the two friends is visiting Hippo in each story. In all of the stories, the Hippo was shown to
eat a number of familiar food stuffs. The Hippo ate at least one of the food items in front of
a friend. After that friend leaves, the Hippo eats something else. The Hippo later on reports
to the occluded visitor either that he ate food item #2, too (critical condition) or that he ate
food item #1 (control condition).
Children first saw 2 training items designed to familiarize them with the idea that what
Hippo says serves as the sole clue to the visitor's identity. They then saw 12 experimental
items in a pseudo-randomized order. As in the adult variant, Experiment 2A included both
critical and control conditions, exemplified in Table 2.6 (visual support omitted). There
were 4 items per condition. In addition, they saw 4 filler items, which involved situations
as in (10) and relied on their knowledge of constraints on the use of the second person
indexical pronoun and proper names. The purpose of these filler items was to ensure that
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children understood the goals of the game and took into consideration the linguistic cues in
making their judgments.
Table 2.6: Conditions, Experiment 2A
Condition Scenario Expected
Choice
Presupposition In this story, Hippo and Cat were playing together, Cat
when Hippo got very hungry. He said to Cat, "Cat, let's
take a break from our games because I am hungry and
I'm going to eat an apple." And he ate an apple. But
then, Cat heard his mom calling him so he went home.
After Cat left, Hippo realized he was still hungry, so he
ate an orange. Then, one of his friends came to see him.
But, we can't tell who's there -they're hidden behind
that big rock! I don't know if it is Cat or Fox behind
the rock, but Hippo said to them, "Guess what, I ate an
orange, too, today!" Does that give us a clue about who
is with Hippo?
No-Presupposition In this story, Hippo and Cat were playing together, Fox
when Hippo got very hungry. He said to Cat, "Cat,
let's take a break from our games because I am hun-
gry and I'm going to eat a watermelon." And he ate a
watermelon. Then, Cat was feeling sleepy so he went
home to take a nap. After Cat left, Hippo realized he
was still hungry, so he ate a pineapple. Then, one of
his friends came to see him. But, we can't tell who's
there -they're hidden behind the blueberry bush! I
don't know if it is Cat or Fox behind the blueberry bush,
but Hippo said to them, "Guess what, I ate a water-
melon today!" Does that give us a clue about who is
with Hippo?
(10) In this story, Cat visited Hippo and told him, "Look! I brought you this ice cream!"
But then, Cat had to go home and do some chores, so he left. After Cat left, Hippo
said to himself, "I am very hungry, I'm going to eat this ice cream right away." And
he ate it up. Later on, one of his friends came to see him. But, we can't tell who's
there - they're hidden behind that tree! I don't know if it's Cat or Fox, but Hippo
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said to them, "Guess what, I ate the ice cream that you/Cat gave me."
Figure 2-3: Choice of knowledgeable listener, Experiment 2A
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Table 2.7: Summary of statistical analysis, Experiment 2A
P SE z p
Intercept 9.66 5.20 1.86 0.06
Condition (Critical) -9.892 5.40 -1.83 0.07
Age -2.51 1.09 -2.31 0.02
Condition * Age 2.84 1.27 -2.53 0.11
As with adults, we fit an intercept-only mixed effects regression to ensure reliability of
the observed biases towards the knowledgeable listener in the critical condition and against
this agent in the control condition. The results of the analysis of the control items showed
intercept to be estimated at -7.150 (SE=2.44), corresponding to a raw value of 0.07% rate of
choosing the knowledgeable listener, with 95% CIs of [-11.95, -2.35] (values of [0.006%,
8.67%]. For the critical condition, the intercept was estimated at 1.54 (SE=1.27) or 82.3%,
with confidence intervals of [0.48, 2.59], corresponding to raw values of [61.7%, 93.5%].
Overall, our results indicate that children prefer an addressee who knows the presuppo-
sitions of an uttered sentence and one who does not already know the asserted information.
In this respect, their biases were the same as those of adults. Although children at the
youngest age groups tested showed these biases, the younger children's response patterns
were less categorical than those of adults with a steady climb across the tested age range
towards adult-likeness.
2.5.2 Experiment 2B: The
With adults, we observed identical preferences for the knowledgeable addressee irrespec-
tive of whether the presuppositional sentence uttered involved too or a definite description.
Thus, the variability in ease of accommodation across the two triggers did not seem to af-
fect adults' biases. However, it is an open question whether this variability has an impact
on acquisition. The noise in the input contributed by informative presuppositions with the
could lead to various forms of erroneous behavior. For example, if children assume -as
they appear to do with too - that presuppositions are always entailed by the context, they
may treat informative uses of the as indicating that the presuppositions associated with the
article are in fact run of the mill entailments. Alternatively, they may treat the as presuppo-
sitional, but subject to a different felicity condition from presuppositional expressions like
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too. For instance, they would be well within reason, given their experience with the trigger,
to assume that sentences with the are assertable in a conversational context so long as the
presupposition is compatible with that context (i.e. not false in all worlds in the context set).
With these possibilities in mind, we now turn to children's response patterns on sentences
involving the.
Participants, Materials and Procedure
Thirty-six children in the same age range (4;0-6;7, Mean Age=5;2) as Experiment 2A were
recruited to participate in Experiment 2B. The "game" was very similar to that in Experi-
ment lB. Children heard a series of stories about an animal character, this time a Panda, and
his two friends, Cat and Fox. In each story, Panda has an "adventure" with one of the two
friends, over the course of which he comes into possession of something. After the friend
leaves, however, something happens to that entity. Later on, one of the two friends visits
Panda, but is hidden behind some object in the scene, and the child's task is to figure out
which of the two friends it is based on what Panda says to them. As before, children saw
4 critical items, 4 control items and 4 fillers. Sample scenarios from critical and control
conditions are given in Table 2.8 (visual support omitted); the filler items were the same as
in Experiment 2A.
Results
Results from 30 children, after excluding those who incorrectly answered two or more filler
items out of four (n = 6), are described here. Figure 2-5 represents the rates at which the
knowledgeable listener was chosen. A mixed-effects logistic regression, summarized in
Table 2.9, reveals a significant interaction of age and condition, as in Experiment 2A. Once
again, while there is improvement with age in both conditions, the observed biases to be
stable even in the youngest age group (Figure 2-6).
The preferences we observe in Figure 5 were found to be reliable. The estimated inter-
cept from a mixed-effects regression after taking into account item and subject variance was
-1.92 (SE=0.47) or 12% (CIs [-2.85, -0.99] corresponding to raw values of [5.4%, 27.1%])
for the control items and 2.4 (SE=0.55) or 91.7% for the critical items (CIs [1.32, 3.50]
corresponding to raw values of [78.9%, 97.1%]). Thus, the results from Experiment 2B
replicates the patterns observed with children in Experiment 2A.
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Table 2.8: Conditions, Experiment 2B
Condition Scenario Expected
Choice
Presupposition
No-Presupposition
In this story, Panda and Cat were playing together, and
Panda said to Cat, "Cat, let's go to the animal shelter."
The two of them went to the animal shelter, and Panda
found a bird he really liked, so he decided to adopt it.
Afterwards, Cat had to go home so he left. Right after
Cat left, the bird flew right out of his cage - oh no!
And Panda was very sad. Later on he was at home,
and one of his friends came to see him. But, we can't
tell who's there -they're hidden behind that big rock!
I don't know if it is Cat or Fox behind the rock, but
Panda said to them, "Guess what, the bird that I got
flew away!" Does that give us a clue about who is with
Panda?
In this story, Panda and Cat were playing together, and
Hippo said to Cat, "Cat, I wanna go to the beach today."
So they went to the beach. At the beach, the two of
them found a very pretty seashell and Panda decided
that he would keep it. After a while, Cat was feeling
tired so he went home early. Panda stayed at the beach.
But it was really windy, and the seashell got buried in
the sand and Panda couldn't find it anymore - oh no!
Later on, he was at home and one of his friends came to
see him. But, we can't tell who's there - they're hidden
behind the blueberry bush! I don't know if it is Cat or
Fox behind the blueberry bush, but Panda said to them,
"Guess what, I found a seashell earlier today!" Does
that give us a clue about who is with Panda?
52
Cat
Fox
Figure 2-5: Choice of knowledgeable listener, Experiment 2B
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Figure 2-6: Results from 4-year-olds (n=13), Experiment 2B
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Table 2.9: Summary of statistical analysis, Experiment 2B
/ SE z p
Intercept 1.98 2.01 0.99 0.32
Condition (Critical) -6.6 2.79 -2.37 0.01
Age -0.76 0.42 -1.82 0.07
Condition * Age 2.15 0.6 3.57 <0.001
2.5.3 Discussion
My goal in Experiments 2A and 2B was to probe children's implicit understanding of when
presuppositions can be used by examining their expectations about the listener, given the
use of a presuppositional sentence. The results show children's response patterns to be es-
sentially identical to those of adults. Children, like adults, showed a preference for conver-
sational situations where the presuppositions of an uttered sentence were mutually known
by the speaker and the addressee. Moreover, children, like adults, showed the same pref-
erences irrespective of the presupposition trigger involved. Overall, these results show that
by the age of 4, children have acquired the use condition in (1) that presuppositions must
be taken for granted in the common ground prior to utterance.
In Experiment 2A, we looked at children's reasoning about uses of sentences with too.
Children consistently chose the knowledgeable character as the listener of such sentences.
This behavior parallels that of adults in IA. Moreover, even the youngest age groups seemed
to show these preferences, suggesting that the relevant pragmatic principles are in place at
the earliest ages tested. Their performance on the control conditions are also significant
and informative. In the control condition, they were adult-like in choosing the listener for
whom the proposition expressed by the asserted sentence would be new information; in
the scenarios, this would always be the more ignorant character. This shows that children
understand a fundamental property of cooperative discourse - that assertions should aim
to update the extant body of shared knowledge. On a more methodological front, children's
choice of the ignorant character in the control condition makes it clear that their choice
of the knowledgeable character in the critical condition was due to their sensitivity to the
presuppositionality of the sentences, and not due to an across-the-board preference for this
character.
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In Experiment 2B, I asked what happens when children are presented with sentences
with lexical items like the in this task. Convergence on the right usage conditions on such
triggers is primafacie more complicated, as their presuppositions can be easily accommo-
dated. However, children showed the same biases as in Experiment 2A, a uniformity that
parallels adult behaviors in Experiments IA vs. 1B. Thus, the felicity condition governing
presupposition use is in place, not only with those triggers whose uses almost always meet
the condition, like too, but even with those triggers for which failing to meet the felicity
condition is, at least on the surface, a logical possibility in adult language use.
2.6 General Discussion
2.6.1 Summary
This chapter set out to explore children's understanding of the use conditions on presup-
positions. To this end, I carried out a series of experiments in which children (and adults)
reasoned about the more plausible addressee given the utterance of a presuppositional sen-
tence. Biases about the more likely addressee served as a proxy for expectations about the
state of the common ground given an utterance. Using two presupposition triggers with
importantly divergent properties, too and the, these studies demonstrated that 4-to-6-year-
olds, just like adults, generated a default expectation that the addressee of presuppositional
sentence is someone who already knows that the presupposed proposition holds. Put dif-
ferently, they treated a presuppositional utterance as more acceptable against a common
ground that entails its presupposition compared to one that is neutral with respect to it. I
suggested that this bias -in both adults and children -is a behavioral signature of a fun-
damental conceptual distinction between redundant and informative presuppositions. Only
the former are guaranteed to meet the contextual requirements presuppositions impose on
the common ground.
On this view, then, a broad conclusion that follows from our experimental results is that
preschool-aged children are sensitive to the felicity condition governing presuppositions.
A second important finding is that children generate the same expectations about uses of
sentences involving too and the despite their diverging experiences with the two triggers.
This acquisition trajectory suggests that the same underlying pragmatic condition governs
the use of all presupposition triggers, and that this condition is not acquired piecemeal,
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either by lexical item or by class. In turn, the result points to presuppositions being a
uniform phenomenon. The acquisition task can instead be characterized as identifying the
various independent factors that lead to the observed differences in accommodability across
triggers.
Children's sensitivity to the felicity condition on presupposition use informs us also
of their semantic and pragmatic competence, more generally. Recall that on the theoreti-
cal view adopted here, the common ground requirement imposed by presuppositions falls
out as a consequence of the partial semantics of presuppositional sentences in conjunction
with general principles governing when a sentence is assertable. The goal of assertions is
to update the common ground with the meaning of the sentence asserted. Because pre-
suppositional sentences are neither true nor false at worlds where the presupposition is not
true, such sentences can deterministically effect an update only if every world in the con-
text is one where the presupposition is true. If this is the case, then children's apparent
sensitivity to the common ground requirement reveals sophistication in at least two other
respects. First, it tells us that they have a distinction between presupposition and assertion
in their grammar and treat presuppositional sentences as expressing partial functions. Sec-
ond, it demonstrates knowledge of a fundamental tenet of information-gathering discourse,
namely that the goal of an assertive discourse move is to update, in a deterministic way,
the extant body of shared information. Independent evidence for competence in this regard
comes from the control condition in our experiments, which directly tested sensitivity to the
conversational principle that asserted propositions must be informative. Our results reveal
early sensitivity to this principle, as well.
The overall picture that emerges is one where important aspects of natural language
meaning and the dynamics of discourse are in place in development at least as early as age
4. These findings have several implications, both developmental and theoretical, which I
discuss below.
2.6.2 Communicative (non-)egocentrism
As discussed in 2.2, a well-known phenomenon in early child language use is children's
overuse of the definite article in situations where its presuppositions are not shared knowl-
edge (Maratsos 1976; Karmiloff-Smith 1979 and many others). This behavior suggests,
prima facie, that children are not sensitive to the felicity condition on presupposition use.
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In fact, this behavior has been taken to be emblematic of a broader form of cognitive deficit,
"egocentricity" or an inability or unwillingness to take the information states of others into
account.
These ideas are incompatible with the findings in this chapter. At a very basic level,
the task was designed in such a way that even rudimentary success at it involved taking
others' perspectives into account. The information state of the participant was always dif-
ferent from the information states of the characters in the stories, and to successfully make
a decision in the task, one needed to reason about these other agents' knowledge states.
Success on any condition, even fillers, would constitute evidence against a simple-minded
egocentrism hypothesis, on which children are presumed to be unable to consider other per-
spectives in their language use. Given children's success across-the-board, we can conclude
that this variant of the egocentrism hypothesis is untenable.
Schaeffer and Matthewson's (2005) variant of egocentrism posits that children some-
times fail to distinguish between speaker and hearer perspectives. But this is also inconsis-
tent with the present results. Let us consider first what the account predicts for children's
assessment of presuppositional sentences. If the speaker and hearer perspectives are not
reliably distinguished, then in any given situation, information that is known to the speaker
may very well be available to the hearer as well. If so, the two potential addressees in our
task cannot be distinguished on the basis of their prior knowledge of the presupposition of
the uttered sentence. What is predicted then is random choice between the two possible
listeners, a prediction that is inconsistent with our findings. More problematic is what the
account predicts for assertion. The proposal makes the prediction that the child will some-
times assert p or take someone else as asserting p all the while assuming that the listener of
p knows that already. Assume that a speaker who asserts q believes q.5 Again, suppose that
the child makes the erroneous assumption that the listener shares the presumptions of the
speaker and thus that the listener believes q. If they make this assumption, and we follow a
Stalnakerian model of discourse, the speaker should not be able to felicitously assert q - it
would violate the essential requirement that assertive content contribute new information.
Thus, proponents of this theory, minimally, need a model of discourse that explains the mo-
tivations of a child who chooses to say anything in circumstances where their assumption is
that the addressee shares their belief state. Now, the control condition in the present studies
5 This is Hintikka's (1962) Epistemic Implication. It also follows from the Gricean Maxim of Quality (Grice
1975).
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demonstrates that children, like adults, are sensitive to the crucial distinction between the
information states of the two possible listeners regarding the asserted proposition. Thus,
the proposal is not only conceptually problematic, but empirically unsupported.
Having thus argued that egocentrism, on any conception, is untenable, I want to now
turn to the more concrete results from these previous studies. Specifically, findings from
previous studies suggest that children do not know the use conditions on the, i.e. that the
existence and uniqueness presupposition be satisfied in the common ground. However,
findings from Experiment 2B in this chapter points to a fairly sophisticated understanding
of when sentences with the are appropriate. Like adults, preschoolers expected sentences
with the to be addressed to someone who already knows the sentence presuppositions. How
might these two findings be reconciled?
One possibility is that the observed over-use of the definite does not arise from a lack of
understanding of the use conditions on presuppositions, but rather, miscoordination about
what is common ground. The conversational context on the Stalnakerian picture is an in-
formation state determined by the interlocutors in a conversation, but the content of that
information state is rarely made explicit. Sometimes, what is a shared assumption is mani-
festly clear, e.g. when it has been established over the course of the preceding conversation,
but more often than not, it must be inferred. In this sense, we have here a coordination
problem: all parties must make a reasonable guess about what is known and accepted by all
others, with the goal of converging on the right set of relevant information that is common
knowledge. On this picture, it is inevitable that two people's beliefs about what is shared
knowledge differ from time to time. Such cases may be more frequent with children, who
may be less adept at reasoning about their interlocutors epistemic states and converging on
the optimal solution to this coordination problem. They may over- or under-estimate knowl-
edge, and when they are mistaken in this way, they may over- or under-use presuppositional
expressions. 6
This type of coordination issue is less of a problem in the experimental task here. Be-
yond the fact that the common grounds among the various characters are delimited and
made fairly explicit in the stories, the task involves making decisions about who is a better
6An important observation by Wexler (2003) is that children do not seem under-use the definite article. Put
differently, there is no "overuse of the indefinite" counterpart. This does not follow straightforwardly if at the
core of children's problems with presupposition use is a difficulty finding optimal solutions to a coordination
problem. This issue is taken up and discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5.
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addressee. Even if the child is uncertain about what is shared knowledge between different
pairs of characters, they can be certain that the more likely person to know the presupposi-
tion of a sentence like The bird that I got flew away is the one who was co-present during
the bird-getting event.
2.6.3 Uniformity across triggers
A notable result from our studies is the uniformity of participants' response patterns across
the two presupposition triggers used, too vs. the. Too and the differ in the ease with which
their presuppositions can be accommodated and fall into distinct classes with respect to
presupposition suspension. Our rationale for comparing the two triggers was to ascertain to
what extent these differences affect adults' expectations about the addressee of sentences
containing these triggers, as well as children's assumptions about how their use is con-
strained. However, neither group's preferences varied based on presupposition trigger: for
both too- and the-sentences, adults and children preferred an addressee who was knowl-
edgeable about their presuppositions prior to utterance.
With respect to development, this uniformity suggests that rate at which some pre-
supposition can be accommodated probably does not play a critical role in the acquisition
trajectory of the trigger in question. That is, to the extent that too is acquired by children
earlier than the, the resistance of too to informative uses cannot be at the heart of it.
This result also has significance for our theorizing about presuppositions and in par-
ticular for differentiating between classes of presupposition triggers, as has become a re-
cent focus of theoretic interest. The felicity of e.g. sentences with definite descriptions
in contexts where a unique referent has not been established - in violation, thereby, of
the common ground requirement on presupposition use -has been met with two types of
critical responses. One type of response has been to take the common ground view of pre-
suppositions to be on the wrong track (Gazdar 1979; Soames 1982; Burton-Roberts 1989;
Gauker 1998; Simons 2001; Abbott 2006). For instance, Gazdar (1979) weakens the com-
mon ground requirement by arguing that presuppositions need only be consistent with the
common ground, not entailed by it. What is shared among these various proposals, which
distinguishes them from the common ground theory, is that the beliefs of the addressee no
longer play a critical role. On these accounts, presuppositional sentences may be uttered so
long as its presuppositions are background beliefs of the speaker; they do not need to be
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background beliefs that the speaker is presumed to share with the addressee. Our experi-
mental results, however, show that adults and children have strong biases about the infor-
mation state of the addressee given presupposition use and are therefore more in line with
the common ground view. These biases persisted even for the presuppositions of definite
descriptions, whose everyday uses are better described using a weaker felicity condition on
presuppositions as in Gazdar (1979). But if presuppositional sentences were in fact subject
to this weaker set of use conditions, the speaker of a presuppositional sentence in our exper-
iments would have had equal grounds to address either listener. We therefore do not expect
to find a reliable preference for the knowledgeable listener over the ignorant one. These
findings point to an underlying conversational principle that speakers rely on, even if they
are sometimes able to bypass it: as a rule of thumb, presuppositions must be presupposed
in the common ground prior to utterance.
A second type of response to informative uses of triggers like the has been to say that
they do not impose a felicity condition on the common ground to begin with, perhaps be-
cause they are not presuppositional in the traditional sense (e.g. Abusch 2002; Simons,
Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts 2010; Tonhauser et al. 2013; Romoli 2015; Tonhauser 2015).
On this line of thinking, whereas triggers like too lexically encode a presupposition and
are thus associated with the relevant usage conditions, triggers like the may give rise to
presupposition-like inferences via pragmatic processes (Abusch 2002; Simons et al. 2010;
Romoli 2015) or be associated with a different set of contextual expectations (Tonhauser
et al. 2013; Tonhauser 2015). The striking uniformity we find across triggers in our exper-
iments argues against this view. These results are unexpected on a view where the presup-
positions associated with the and too derive from fundamentally different mechanisms or
are tied to fundamentally different felicity conditions.
Overall, our results lend support to the view that presuppositions of a sentence are re-
quired to be common knowledge prior to its utterance. Moreover, these findings suggest
that this requirement governs the use of all presupposition triggers irrespective of availabil-
ity of informative uses, and call into question attempts at classifying triggers into distinct
classes based on rates of such uses.
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2.6.4 Learning the felicity condition?
Given the use of a presuppositional sentence, children in our studies, like adults, assume that
the addressee already takes the presuppositions for granted. This is so even for sentences
involving definite descriptions, which are often used in situations where the presuppositions
are not previously known by the addressee. The implication here is that children in the
tested age range have the same underlying semantic and pragmatic knowledge as adults.
They know the meaning of the presupposition triggers tested and understand how their
pre suppositional meanings constrain the context of utterance.
However, the felicity condition on presupposition use, repeated here from (1), is more
restrictive than what is warranted given children's likely experience with triggers like the.
(2) Felicity condition on presupposition use: A sentence S with presupposition p may
be used in a conversational context c if c entails p at the time that S is uttered.
This raises the question of how they nevertheless converge on this principle. In fact, our
experimental results suggest that this variability in experience does not have a significant
impact: children's treatment of the and too were the same, despite their experience with
two triggers being quite different.
My view is that this felicity condition is not learned. Rather, it emerges from compo-
nents of grammar and cognition that children come in already equipped with. understanding
of the semantics of presuppositions and of the rules of cooperative communication. On the
theory of presuppositions adopted here, the sub-components that give rise to the felicity
condition above are the following:
i. that the truth of certain propositions are indeterminate at certain worlds
ii. that a valid assertive move should allow for a narrowing of the context to only those
worlds compatible with the information conveyed, and
iii. that the use of a proposition whose truth is indeterminate at a world in the context is
an invalid move, as it will fail to accomplish the goal in (ii).
The components in (i) and (ii) above may be primitives, respectively, of natural language
and social cognition. The child, on this picture, may never need to figure out that presup-
positions exist as a component of natural language meaning, or what the general goals of
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communication are. The last of the three pieces above, of course, is the bridging principle.
In principle, a child who knows (iii) and has the adult-like semantic representation of a
presuppositional sentence S presupposing p should be able to deduce that a context cannot
be updated with its meaning unless p holds in every world in that context.
The argument I am making here is a familiar one, the Poverty of the Stimulus: the child
develops a piece of grammar for presuppositions that strongly disagrees with the input.
Therefore it must be that these properties of the grammar are built-in, innate. In this case,
the semantic and pragmatic distinctions between presupposed and asserted content make up
part of their cognitive set-up that they never need to learn from experience. The bulk of the
child's learning task consists, instead, of a mapping problem: figuring out which forms in
her lexicon are conventionally associated with a presupposition.
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Chapter 3
Knowing when to accommodate
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we showed that children, like adults, have strong expectations that
the presuppositions of an asserted sentence be previously known to all parties in the conver-
sation. We took this as evidence of early sensitivity to the felicity condition on presuppo-
sitions in (1), which mandates that presuppositions be common knowledge to the speaker
and addressee(s) prior to assertion.
(1) Felicity condition on presupposition use: A sentence S with presupposition p may
be used in a conversational context c if c entails p at the time that S is uttered.
Children's early command of this use condition is perhaps surprising. Their experience
with presuppositions overall fails to be in line with this principle. Adult speakers use
presuppositions to introduce new information to the common ground, complicating sig-
nificantly the acquisition task: how would the learner ever converge on (1) if there is so
much noise - informative presuppositions - in the input? In answering this question, I
conjectured that (1) is not in fact learned. Rather, it falls out from innate components of
the grammar of presuppositions and language use, i.e. primitives that the child never has to
rely on experience to master.
The fact remains, however, that competent speakers felicitously use presuppositions
informatively and know what to do when a required sentence presupposition is "missing"
from the context. Full command of presupposition use then includes not just the mastery
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of redundant presuppositions, which meet the condition in (1), but also informative presup-
positions, which over-ride the condition. The main goal of this chapter is to investigate the
developmental trajectory of informative presuppositions. To carry out this objective, I once
again use as a probe children's expectations about the possible addressee of a presuppo-
sitional sentence. In the studies presented here, unlike those in the preceding chapter, the
adult-like choice of listener would be the one who did not have prior knowledge about the
sentence presupposition. That is, adults were expected to a show a bias towards a conver-
sational situation where the utterance introduced new information via its presuppositions.
A secondary goal is to use the child data to inform our theories of presupposition. The
developmental findings from the previous chapter was taken to be evidence in favor of the
Stalnakerian picture, where presuppositional sentences are conventionally tied to the use
condition in (1). However, those findings, while arguably best explained on the common
ground theory, are not necessarily inconsistent with alternative approaches that eschew with
the aforementioned felicity condition. The developmental path of informative presupposi-
tions, on the other hand, has the potential to bring in more decisive evidence regarding the
status of the felicity condition in (1). The status of informative presuppositions is a criti-
cal point of disagreement among theories of presupposition. The common ground theories
distinguish two different systems: (i) the formal demands that presuppositions impose on
the context, i.e. the requirement in (1), and (ii) a system of accommodation that allows for
the recognition and tacit fixing of an otherwise "defective" context. When it becomes clear
over the course of a conversation that the context needs to be a certain way, e.g. because
the speaker has presupposed something that wasn't mutually presupposed, cooperative lis-
teners can change their beliefs so that what the speaker takes to be common ground is in
fact common ground. On the other hand, critics of the common ground theory take the
very existence of informative presuppositions to be evidence against the requirement that
presuppositions must be entailed by the common ground. The approach, instead, is to adopt
different constraints that impose weaker requirements on the context compared to (1).
Child data can be helpful in arbitrating between these two perspectives. The common
ground theory allows for the possibility that the two systems - the formal condition and
the system for accommodation - develop independently. More specifically, a plausible
trajectory on this view is one in which children acquire the rule in (1)-something that
falls out from primitives, as argued earlier -before they come to understand that the rule
can be broken, when the rule can be broken and how the resulting circumstances can be
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fixed in a manner that avoids a conversation breakdown. In other words, the common
ground theory is consistent with - arguably predicts - a developmental asymmetry. On
the alternative accounts, on the other hand, the pragmatic rule governing presuppositions
is taken to be flexible enough to cover both redundant and informative presuppositions.
Consequently, adult-like competence with presuppositions entails knowing that they can be
used informatively. Thus, a developmental asymmetry is not expected on these theories.
I begin in the next section by spelling out the crux of the theoretical debate. In 3, I
introduce the experimental paradigm and the predictions for adults and children. Experi-
mental findings, from adult controls and children, are presented in 4 and 5 respectively.
Unlike in the studies reported in the previous chapter, we find a clear disconnect between
adult and child behavior in the present study: children do not share with adults the expec-
tation that presuppositions can be used to introduce new information. We have, therefore, a
developmental asymmetry: there is a stage in development where children show stricter ad-
herence to the felicity condition in (1) than adults, suggesting that they do not yet know that
presuppositions can be used informatively. I take these results as strong evidence in favor
of the common ground theory. I conclude with a discussion of what it takes to eventually
master the skills required to deal with informative presuppositions.
3.2 The theoretical debate
Sentences like (2) are, at least on the surface, problematic on views of presuppositions as
conveying old information already known to speaker and addressee prior to utterance.
(2) Sorry I am late! The car that I rented broke down.
The second sentence in (2) contains the definite determiner the which presupposes existence
and uniqueness of an entity matching the descriptive content of the NP it combines with.
Given the requirement in (1), for (2) to be acceptable, the context must entail the existence
of a unique car that the speaker rented. However, the intuition is that the sentence would
be acceptable even when the context did not already entail that presupposition. That is, the
sentence could be felicitously uttered in a situation where the audience does not know that
the speaker has rented exactly one car.
These kinds of examples have engendered two main camps of responses. One is to
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say that the requirement in (1), while an idealization, is basically right. It is a require-
ment that falls out from the formal properties of the structure in question. However, there
is in addition a process -prompted by the very utterance that would otherwise not be ac-
ceptable - whereby the addressee simply adds to the common ground the presupposed
proposition and thus make it common ground.
An alternative response is to take these sorts of cases to constitute empirical evidence
that we need a weaker - or perhaps different altogether -rule from (1). In what follows, I
outline in some detail both of these types of approaches, and point out how data from child
language can serve as an arbitrator in this debate.
3.2.1 Accommodation
The felicity of sentences like (2) is prima facie a problem for theories that rest on a con-
dition requiring presuppositions to be already entailed by the common ground of conver-
sation. Such apparent counter-examples to the use condition in (1) have been noticed and
acknowledged from the earliest days of the common ground theories. In fact, Stalnaker
(1974) himself discusses the following scenario:
I am asked by someone who I have just met, 'Are you going to lunch?' I
reply, 'No, I've got to pick up my sister.' Here I seem to presuppose that I
have a sister even though I do not assume that the speaker knows this. Yet the
statement is clearly acceptable, and it does not seem right to explain this in
terms of pretense, or exploitation.
The solution to this problem has been to appeal to a process of presupposition ac-
commodation, whereby listeners adjust their contextual assumptions so as to satisfy the
presuppositional requirements of a sentence uttered by an otherwise cooperative speaker.
Karttunen (1974) describes the process as follows:
If the current conversational context does not suffice [in satisfying the presup-
position of an uttered sentence], the listener is entitled and expected to extend
it as required. He must determine for himself what context he is supposed to
be in on the basis of what is said and, if he is willing to go along with it, make
the same tacit extension that his interlocutor appears to have made.
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On this view, not only is accommodation an available repair strategy for violations of the use
condition on presupposition, it is part and parcel of the dynamics of cooperative discourse.
So long as the speaker is deemed cooperative, listeners are expected to accommodate them
by tacitly adjusting their beliefs in a matter that meets the requirements imposed of the ut-
tered sentence. Accommodation, in other words, an adaptation on the part of a cooperative
hearer in the face of an intention that the speaker has communicated. Assuming that such
adaptations happen, a number of further questions arise. For starters, when does accommo-
dation happen, and what is accommodated? The answers to these questions are far from
obvious, but I will briefly discuss some possible ways of thinking about them. For a more
in-depth discussion, the reader is referred to Beaver (2004) and von Fintel (2008).
Is accommodation is unconstrained? That is, is it the case that, as David Lewis put it,
you presuppose something that is not already presupposed and "that presupposition springs
into existence, making what you have said acceptable after all" (Lewis 1979)? This does
not seem to be the case. Accommodation seems to be subject to various constraints. In the
previous chapter, we discussed trigger-specific constraints on accommodation. Specifically,
triggers that are anaphoric, or whose descriptive content is insufficient to signal what must
be accommodated, resist informative uses. There are also other, more general conditions
that modulate the availability of accommodation. For instance, presupposing something
that contradicts what is already common ground won't help change the state of the com-
mon ground; the relevant proposition will simply never be accommodated (Beaver 2004).
Consequently, the same sentence in (2) will be judged as quite odd in the situation in (3),
as the presupposition we would need to accommodate - that there is a unique car that the
speaker rented - contradicts what is part of our world knowledge, namely that 7-year-olds
cannot rent cars.
(3) [Spoken by a 7-year-old who is late to class]
I'm sorry I'm late! The car that I rented broke down!
Yet another generalization, due to Heim (2014), is that questions cannot be answered by an
accommodated presupposition, as evidenced by the oddness of (4-a).
(4) A: Do you drive a rental car?
a. B: #The car that I rented broke down.
67
b. B': /I do drive a rental car. But, it broke down this morning.
Heim's analysis of this constraint is as follows. Every assertion is made against a context
c (a set of worlds), relative to a question or issue Q (a partition of the set of worlds'). The
goal of assertion is not just to update the common ground with the asserted proposition, but
to update it so as to eliminate at least one cell in the partition set by Q. A proposition is
informative relative to c and Q iff p eliminates at least one cell in the partition of c given
Q. In the example above, the original context contains worlds in which B drives a rental
car and those in which she does not. A's question can partition that context into two cells.
but as it is, c does not admit B's utterance in (4-a) because it doesn't already entail that
the speaker has a rental car. Now, suppose A were to accommodate that presupposition,
shifting c to c' which contains only worlds in which B has rented a car. Doing so would
mean that the partition of c' relative to A's question would result in a singleton set, which
entails the positive answer to that question. A further update is now trivial: the requirement
that at least one cell in the partition be eliminated cannot be met because there is only one
cell.
Things that are "controversial" or high on the scale of "noteworthiness", nebulous as
those terms are, also seem to be impossible, or at least very difficult, to accommodate. By
way of illustration, consider (5). Irrespective of whether the situation described is in fact
true, we find the sentence odd. This is likely because the presupposition we are expected
to accommodate - that there is a unique zeppelin that the speaker rented - is an unusual
enough occurrence that we are not prepared to add it to the common ground without fuss or
further inquiry.
(5) I'm sorry I'm late! The zeppelin that I rented broke down!
Given such constraints on when accommodation will take place, a speaker, in deciding
whether or not to introduce new information via presupposition, must carry out a cost-
benefit analysis. In circumstances where they can be fairly confident that the listener will
accommodate the relevant presupposition, using a sentence S with presupposition p (no-
tated SP henceforth) might be the rational movie -e.g., it would incur less cost and pro-
1Given a context set c and question Q, we can say that Q induces a partition of c as follows:
(i) Partition(Q, c) = {PART C c: PART # 0 & Vp E Q . Vw,w' E PART. p(w) = p(w'))
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duce the same intended outcome as asserting p and S. In other cases, however, using SP in
a context that does not entail p could simply lead to a conversation breakdown because the
listener is unwilling to accommodate.
The second question is this: what does a listener who has made a decision to accommo-
date the speaker actually accommodate? The simplest answer is the following (formulated
from the perspective of the hearer):
(6) Minimal Accommodation:
If you want to compute c + SP, but c does not admit S because c does not entail its
presupposition p, then change c minimally to a context c' such that c does admit Sp
and update c' with S.
Minimal accommodation amounts to an accommodation of the semantic presupposition of
the sentence in question and nothing more. But this does not always yield the right results.
Compare the following examples:
(7) If Mary is a scuba diver, she will bring her wet suit on vacation.
(8) If Mary is a scuba diver, she will bring her husband on vacation.
Both sentences semantically presuppose a conditional statement, namely if Mary is a scuba
diver, she has a {wet suit/husband}. If minimal accommodation is what speakers actually
do, the prediction for such sentences, when presented out-of-the-blue as we do here, is that
we take the speaker to be taking such a conditional statement for granted. This is indeed the
case in (7), but this is not so in (8), where we take the speaker to be assuming that Mary has
a husband, simpliciter. Contrasts such as these, often referred to as the "proviso problem",
has received much attention in the literature (see e.g. Geurts 1996; Beaver & Krahmer 2001;
Beaver & Zeevat 2007; Heim 2006; Singh 2008; P'rez-Carballo 2009; Fox 2012), but what
these examples may be telling is this: The listener's task is more complicated than the ac-
commodation of the minimal proposition semantically presupposed by an uttered sentence;
rather, the listener instead accommodates what they believe the speaker might be plausibly
taking for granted. On this view, the accommodation of a stronger proposition - that Mary
has a husband -in (8) is necessitated by the fact that it would be implausible, given what
we know about scuba divers and spouses, that the speaker believes that Mary's having a
husband depends in some way on her being a scuba diver.
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If this is right, then an important take-away is that accommodation (and interpretation
more generally, as suggested in the previous chapter) involves a complicated coordination
problem. The speaker and listener must make rational inferences about the information
state and expectations of their interlocutor. A speaker using informative presuppositions
must decide whether or not they are likely to be accommodated by their addressee. A
listener accommodating informative presuppositions must decide on the accommodation
target that most plausibly reflects the information state of the speaker.
3.2.2 Criticism and alternatives
The introduction of accommodation into the system fixes a problem for the common ground
theorist: the problem of informative presuppositions. However, a different approach to the
problem has been to take it seriously as an argument against the use condition in (1). On
the view described above, accommodation is treated as a complex form of inference that
implicate semantics, general principles of pragmatics, and specific calculations of the joint
goals of discourse participants. Not only that, once you consider what coordinating about
the common ground involves, contextual adjustments like accommodation seems like a
general and necessary feature of any communicative activity. However, the introduction
of such a "rule" as a remedy for missing presuppositions has been seen by many critics as
merely an add-on pragmatic fix designed to deal with a single problematic case. This is
made plain in Gazdar's (1979) criticisms of the enriched picture, which he claims treats
"the bulk of the data [i.e. ordinary conversation] as something special... [and] circumvent
any possibility of counterexamples." Gazdar's own solution to the problem was to weaken
the common ground requirement on presuppositions. Presuppositions do not need to be
entailed by the context, simply consistent with it (9).
(9) Felicity condition on presupposition use, Gazdar's version: A sentence S with
presupposition p may be used in a conversational context c if c does not entail -,p
at the time that S is uttered.
The condition in (9) accounts for the fact that informatively used presuppositions are un-
acceptable when it conflicts with what we already know, as we saw in (3). However, it is
arguably too weak. As we saw earlier, not everything that is potentially consistent with the
common ground can be presupposed, e.g. (5).
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A more nuanced condition, which is nevertheless weaker than the felicity condition in
(1), is proposed in Soames (1982). Soames defines the felicity condition on presupposition
as involving the concept of a proposition being "uncontroversial", as in (10).
(10) Felicity condition on presupposition use, Soames's version: A sentence S with
presupposition p may be used in a conversational context c if the speaker may take
p to be uncontroversial at the time that S is uttered.
Concerning the circumstances that render a proposition uncontroversial, Soames has the
following to say:
(11) A speaker S takes a proposition P to be uncontroversial at t (or, equivalently, takes
P for granted at t) iff at t, S accepts P and thinks:
a. that P is already part of the conversational context at t; or
b. that the other members of the conversation are prepared to add P to the context
without objection.
This conception of the use condition on presupposition makes it possible for there to be mis-
matches between the set of assumptions that the speaker and hearer are taking for granted,
thus leaving room for informative presuppositions. However, the "uncontroversiality" pro-
viso - i.e the requirement that the information be added to the common ground "without
objection" -is intended to ensure that cases like (5) are still ruled out.
More recently, there have been approaches that aim at developing a unified account of
a range of phenomena, including presuppositions, conventional implicatures (Potts 2005),
and other linguistic environments that display 'projective behavior' (Simons 2001, 2006;
Simons et al. 2010; Simons, Beaver, Roberts & Tonhauser 2016; Beaver, Roberts, Simons
& Tonhauser 2017). "Projective content", on their definition, is any implication that re-
mains unchanged in the scope of entailment-canceling operators. As discussed in Chapter
1, projection is generally taken to be a definitional feature of presuppositions, but the crucial
observation these authors make is that the class of phenomena that exhibit such projective
behavior is heterogeneous. Moreover, even within the class of presuppositional items, pro-
jection behavior is non-uniform.
This observation is taken as motivation for developing theory that does not rely on
conventionalized distinctions between presupposed and asserted content. More concretely,
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rather than thinking of presuppositional sentences as being undefined or having a stigma-
tized third truth-value, a classical bivalent logic is assumed (i.e. sentences are either true or
false). Whether or not an implication is construed as 'taken for granted' or 'to be taken for
granted' depends on the discourse structure. The main hypothesis on these accounts is that
projective behavior derives from the property of at-issueness relative to the Question Under
Discussion (QUD), where at-issueness is defined as in (12). Intuitively, at-issue content is
everything entailed by the main proposition the speaker wants to communicate, given the
topic of inquiry. Not-at-issue content is simply the complement set of those entailments
that satisfies (12).
(12) At-issueness: A proposition conveyed by a constituent is at-issue if it contributes
to the ordinary semantics of the clause in which it is located and entails that some
possible answer to the QUD is false; otherwise the proposition is not-at-issue.
(Beaver et al. 2017)
An implication conveyed by an utterance projects if and only if it is not-at-issue:
(13) Projection Principle: If content C is expressed by a constituent embedded under
an entailment-canceling operator, then C projects if and only if C is not-at-issue.
In this regard, presuppositions - and any projective content, for that matter - can be thought
of as a subsidiary commitment on the part of the speaker, that isn't relevant for resolving
the question of interest at that point in conversation. The fact that projective content is often
common knowledge is explained in the following way. The interlocutors agree jointly on a
QUD, an answer to which must refine the common ground by narrowing the context set (so
far, the account is much the same as the Stalnakerian picture). For this to happen, the set of
alternative propositions represented by the QUD must contain at least one proposition that
is compatible with, but not entailed, by the common ground. If some content is entailed by
the context, it is either (i) independent of the QUD or (ii) then every alternative in the QUD
entails it. It follows from the definition of at-issueness in (12) that such content will not be
at-issue, and by the Projection Principle that it projects.
Though the theories described above represent three alternative approaches to presup-
positions which potentially make different importantly predictions about presupposition
use, my goal here is not to evaluate all of them. Rather, I will gloss over these differences
72
in the rest of the chapter, instead treating these various accounts as a single class based on
their uniform rejection of the principle in (1) as the formal condition governing presuppo-
sition use. The main advantage in doing so is greater empirical coverage: there is no need,
on any of these accounts, to appeal to a process of accommodation to deal with informative
presuppositions.
3.2.3 The role of child language
We can thus draw a broad split among the various theories discussed above on the basis
of their treatment of informative presuppositions. On the common ground approaches, in-
formative and redundant presuppositions follow from two separate systems. The formal
requirement presuppositions impose on the context is that they be entailed prior to asser-
tion. But speakers may violate this formal requirement and use presuppositions informa-
tively precisely because cooperative listeners have the ability to accommodate them. On
this view, the redundant uses of presuppositions can be thought of as the more "basic" case,
where the formal requirements are satisfied. In contrast, all of the other approaches dis-
cussed take informative presuppositions as falling within the purview of any good theory of
presuppositions. The critical point of divergence, therefore, concerns the cognitive status
and in turn, the theoretical relevance of informative presuppositions.
We can translate this point of debate into predictions about child language develop-
ment. On the common ground approach, speakers who have underlying knowledge of a
formal rule like (1) may nevertheless choose to bend that rule to meet some strategic end.
Knowledge of the rule is a prerequisite for knowledge of how to break it, and a developmen-
tal trajectory where the learner initially knows only the rule is consistent with such theories.
On the alternative approaches, knowing the pragmatics of presupposition entails knowing
that they can be used informatively (at least for some triggers). Thus, an asymmetry is not
obviously consistent with these approaches. This chapter sets out to test these predictions.
To do so, I conduct a variant of the listener identification task introduced in the previous
chapter. As explicated in more detail in the following section, the preferred listener of a
presuppositional sentence in this variant, for adults, will be the more ignorant listener, to
whom the presupposed content introduces new information.
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3.3 Logic of the paradigm
The studies reported in Chapter 2 aimed at examining participants' sensitivity to the fe-
licity condition in (1). In contrast, the studies presented in this chapter is interested in
participants' willingness to violate it. To do so, we once again examined biases about
the common ground given the use of a presuppositional sentence. The presuppositional
expression employed was a definite description, which readily permit informative uses.
Participants were presented with conversational situations with a speaker and two possible
addresses in a variant of the listener-identification task. However, in this task, choosing a
more knowledgeable listener for a presuppositional sentence -i.e. the choice that would
indicate adherence to the common ground requirement- would be in violation of some
other conversational principle. The rationale was that this conflict situation should lead to
an increase in rates of choosing the more ignorant listener.
More concretely, in the critical condition, the speaker utters a sentence, Spq, presup-
posing p and asserting q. The more knowledgeable listener, Li for short, already knows
that both p and q hold. The less knowledgeable listener, L2, is ignorant about the truth
of both propositions. In other words, both the asserted and presupposed content is com-
mon ground between LI and the speaker, whereas neither is common ground between L2
and the speaker. The critical condition in this experiment, therefore, pits the felicity condi-
tion on presupposition use against the fundamental pragmatic principle governing assertion,
namely that successful assertion must add new information to the common ground.
As before, the task comes down to identifying the more successful conversational situa-
tion. We expected that adult participants in this study will choose the more ignorant listener,
L2, in the critical condition. This is the rational move on both types of approaches discussed
in 2. On the common ground theory, the speaker in the above conversational situation is
always in violation of one pragmatic principle or other. In asserting Spq to Li, they would
be violating the felicity condition on assertion. Asserting the same sentence to L2 would
violate the felicity condition on presupposition use in (1). However, violation of the latter is
resolvable -it can be repaired via accommodation. Consequently, the ignorant addressee
L2 would be more likely to accept the utterance compared to the knowledgeable one in
this situation. On the alternative approaches, by default, presupposition uses may introduce
new information to the common ground. Thus, asserting Spq violates no rule. On the other
hand, these theories also take as a fundamental principle the informativity requirement on
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asserted content. Because the speaker would be violating a cooperative rule of discourse
only when addressing Li, L2 should be judged the one more likely to accept the utterance.
Findings from children, on the other hand, can be more revealing. We already showed
in Chapter 2 that children prefer the presuppositions of an asserted sentence to be common
knowledge and the asserted content not to be common knowledge. What will they do when
the two preferences conflict? One possibility, of course, is that they behave just like adults,
choosing L2 and allowing for the possibility that presuppositions may be informative. This
result cannot help us adjudicate between the two classes of theories under consideration.
Their adult-like behavior may be because, in a manner consistent with the common ground
approach, children at this stage have not only mastered the rule-of-thumb that presuppo-
sitions be common knowledge, but also how speakers may strategically violate that rule.
Alternatively, the adult-like behavior could be because knowing the pragmatics of presup-
position entails knowing that they can be used informatively, as is the expectation on the
alternative approaches. Thus, while such a result would provide a description of the devel-
opmental stage, it does not tease apart the two theories of interest.
Another possibility is that children are not adult-like. They may choose the knowledge-
able listener more often than adults. Given that the previous chapter had already demon-
strated children's (i) ability to keep track of the common ground, and (ii) sensitivity to
conditions governing assertion, if they are non-adultlike in this way, that points to specific
difficulties with informative presuppositions. The resulting asymmetry between redundant
and informative presuppositions is only consistent with common ground theories, which
allow for the possibility of a stage where children know the rule but not the repair.
Keep in mind, however, that the novel data introduced in the previous chapter are more
amenable to the common ground theory and already pose a challenge for the alternative ac-
counts. In all of the alternative approaches, the speaker of a presuppositional sentence in our
experimental paradigm is perfectly licensed to utter that sentence to either the knowledge-
able or the ignorant listener. The fact that we find a strong bias towards the knowledgeable
listener in both adult and child population is mysterious on these accounts. In the last
chapter, I took these findings to be evidence in favor of the common ground theory. This
interpretation of these earlier findings align my expectations about the present study with
that of the common ground theory.
In what follows, I will first present results from adult participants, which conforms to
our expectation. I will then turn to the child data in 5.
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3.4 Adults
Experiment IA probes adult participants' understanding of the fact that presuppositions
may add new information to the common ground. As before, my goal in testing adults is to
establish a baseline against which children's response patterns can be evaluated. Again, the
expectation for adults on either class of theories is that they take the presupposed content
of the uttered sentence to be new information to the listener.
3.4.1 Participants, Materials and Procedure
Thirty-five native speakers of English, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated
in Experiment IA. All materials were presented in written form on a computer screen using
the IbexFarm experiment presentation tool (Drummond 2013). As in the studies reported
in Chapter 2, participants in this experiment read about conversational scenarios involving
three characters, and had to make a guess about who was the intended listener for a speech
act based on the knowledge states of the various characters.
There were two experimental conditions, where the items were either identical to or
minimal modifications of the items from Experiment lB in Chapter 2. Items in the "No-
Presupposition" condition was identical to those used in Experiment 1B. A non- presuppo-
sitional sentence is asserted, where only one of the two potential listeners is ignorant about
the content of the assertion. Thus, the asserted proposition could only effect an update to
the common ground between the speaker and the "ignorant" listener. In this case, A might
say, "I got a bird today," in a situation where character B already knows this information
and character C does not. We expected to replicate the results from Chapter 2, Experiment
1B, where character C was reliably chosen by participants.
In the "Presupposition" condition, the speaker uses a presuppositional sentence involv-
ing definite description. Its presuppositions were known to only one of the two potential
addressees, making the relevant information common ground only between the speaker and
the "knowledgeable" listener. For example, character A might say, "The bird that I got
flew away", when only some character B knows that A had procured exactly one bird to
begin with. Unlike in its counterpart in Chapter 2, in this experimental condition, charac-
ter B would also know that A's bird had flown away. In other words, the asserted content
of the utterance would also be part of the common ground between the speaker and the
knowledgeable listener. In contrast, neither the presupposed nor asserted contents would
76
be shared knowledge between character C, the more "ignorant" listener, and the speaker.
As mentioned earlier, the expectation here - unlike in Chapter 2, Experiment lB - is that
character C should once again be chosen. The two conditions and sample scenarios are
given in Table 3.1. Each participant saw 8 items per condition and 16 filler items.
Table 3.1: Conditions, Experiment IA
Condition Scenario Question Expected
Choice
Presupposition Susie, Jane and Mike were hanging out Who was Mike Jane
together. But Jane had to go and run some talking to when
errands so she left. Then it was just Susie he said, "Guess
and Mike. The two of them decided to go what, the bird
to an animal shelter. At the shelter, Mike that I got flew
got himself a pet bird. Right afterwards, away!"?
the bird flew right out of its cage! Then
she had to go home, too. Later, Mike was
on the phone with one of the girls and he
said, "Guess what, the bird that I got flew
away!"
No-Presupposition Katie, John and Molly were hanging out. Who was John Katie
But then Katie decided to go to the li- talking to when
brary to study. Then, it was just Molly and he said, "Guess
John and the two of them decided to go what, I found
to the beach instead. At the beach, they a seashell to-
found a seashell and John decided to keep day!"?
it. Then, Molly had to leave too, John
stayed at the beach awhile, but the seashell
got buried in the sand somewhere and he
couldn't find it again. Later John was on
the phone with one of the girls and he said,
"Hey, guess what, I found a seashell to-
day!"
3.4.2 Results and discussion
Four participants were excluded from the analysis due to low performance (<60%) on the
filler items. Results from the remaining thirty-one participants are described below.
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Figure 3-1 plots the rates at which the more knowledgeable character was chosen in
each condition. Recall that in this study, we expected participants to choose the more ig-
norant character on both the critical condition and control conditions. These predictions
are borne out in our results: participants did overwhelmingly choose the ignorant listener
in both conditions. To analyze these trends statistically, we fit a mixed-effects logistic re-
gression on the rates of knowledgeable listener choice, with condition as a fixed effect and
random effects of subject and item. We found no effect of condition, with the odds of
choosing the knowledgeable listener being comparable - and comparably low - for both
conditions. Table 3.2 summarizes results from the regression.
Table 3.2: Summary of statistical analysis, Experiment 1
P SE z p
Intercept -3.1553 0.58 -5.44 <.001
Condition (Critical) 0.98 0.75 1.30 0.194
Figure 3-1: Rate of choice of knowledgeable listener, Experiment 1
0.75
0
0.254
0.00
Control critical
Condition
The goal of this section was to evaluate adults' underlying knowledge of the fact that
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presuppositions can be used informatively. I asked whether in the right circumstances,
adults expect sentences involving definite descriptions to be uttered to an audience that
does not already take for granted the relevant presuppositions. In the experimental sce-
narios, the speaker's utterance of the presuppositional sentence to the more knowledgeable
addressee, i.e. the one who already shared with the speaker the knowledge that the ad-
ditive presupposition holds, would have been in violation of the conversational principle
mandating informative assertions. In such cases, adults showed a reliable bias towards the
more ignorant addressee. Thus, as expected, adults are tolerant of uses of presuppositional
sentences against a context that does not already entail the presuppositions.
While these findings serve as the baseline against which children's biases can be com-
pared, as pointed out earlier, they do not themselves help adjudicate between the two types
of theories of informative presuppositions. On accommodation-based accounts, a listener
who did not already know that p can make the necessary contextual adjustments to accom-
modate a speaker who has presupposed p. On approaches that do not involve such a repair
strategy, presupposing p, by default, has the potential to introduce new information. Thus,
both theories predict a choice of the ignorant listener to be the appropriate response in our
paradigm. We now turn to the experiment with children, which can be more informative in
this regard.
3.5 Children
3.5.1 Predictions
The theoretical debates about informative presuppositions and the validity of the felicity
condition in (1) can be translated into predictions about the developmental trajectory of pre-
suppositions. On the common ground approach, the partial semantics of presuppositional
sentences and the principles governing cooperative discourse deliver the felicity condition
in (1), and any child who knows these two ingredients should arrive at the conclusion that
presuppositions must be presupposed prior to utterance. If the semantic and pragmatic in-
gredients resulting in this felicity requirement are primitives, then the expectation on the
common ground theories is that children know, at a very young age, when a speaker has
grounds to utter a presuppositional sentence. The findings from the previous chapter are
consistent with this idea.
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This system is supplemented with a second component, accommodation: when a pre-
suppositional sentence is used against a defective context, listeners can add a failed pre-
supposition to it to make things works; competent speakers can exploit this ability, and use
presuppositions informatively when it is more efficient to do so. Though accommodation
is part and parcel of our cooperative tendencies, it falls outside of the formal requirements
on presupposition use. Consequently, on the common ground theories, knowing how to
presuppose does not entail knowing how to accommodate presuppositions and they are not
undermined by potential asymmetries in development. Children may very well acquire the
ability to use and comprehend redundant presuppositions, i.e. those in keeping with the fe-
licity condition, before they are able to handle informative presuppositions. Put differently,
they may acquire the rule before they are able to strategically violate that rule or understand
how their interlocutor could do the same.
There may also be independent reasons for expecting developmental delays with in-
formative presuppositions if accommodation is indeed involved. Accommodation, as de-
scribed earler, involves a non-trivial coordination problem. Many things must be settled
implicitly. What, for instance, is the nature of the context that a user of an informative
presupposition want the listener to shift to? Will the speaker's informatively used presup-
position be compatible with the listener's beliefs and thus accommodated by them? In
these respects, the ability to deal with informative presuppositions in an adult-like manner
requires the ability to reason in sophisticated ways about one's interlocutor's mental states.
Such social-cognitive abilities have been argued to show rather protracted development. It
is only around ages of 4 or 5 years that children begin to fully appreciate the role of beliefs
in guiding action (Astington 1993; Wellman 1992) and even later that they master recur-
sive mental reasoning (Perner & Wimmer 1985; Sullivan, Winner & Hopfield 1995; Miller
2009). If accommodation is the way we deal with informative presuppositions, we might
expect that children have difficulties with this aspect of presupposition use.
On the alternative approaches, on the other hand, informative presuppositions need not
impose such demands on speakers or listeners. Knowing the pragmatics of presuppositions
entails knowing that they can be used informatively. Thus, we have no reason to expect
asymmetrically non-adultlike performance in this study compared to those discussed in
Chapter 2.
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3.5.2 Participants, Materials and Procedure
Thirty-seven between the ages of 4 and 6 (ranging from 4;0 to 6;9; Mean Age=5;4) were
recruited from preschools and museums in the Boston area. Results from thirty-one are
reported here, after the exclusion of 6 participants who were unable to perform accurately
on the fillers. As with adults, the child study was only minimally different from the study
involving definite descriptions in Chapter 2 (Experiment 2B). Children participated in a
"game", where they were told a series of stories about an animal charactera Panda, and his
two friends, Cat and Fox. In the critical items, Panda has an "adventure" with one of the two
friends, over the course of which he comes into possession of something. The portion that
differs crucially from Experiment 2B is that while the friend is present, something happens
to the object or entity that Panda had just procured. Later on, one of the two friends visits
Panda, but is hidden behind some object in the scene, and the child's task is to figure out
which of the two friends it is based on what Panda says to them. As before, children saw
4 critical items, 4 control items and 4 fillers. Sample scenarios from critical and control
conditions are given in Table 3.3 (visual support omitted). In addition, children saw 2
training items at the beginning of the game and 4 fillers. The controls, fillers and training
items were identical to Experiment 2B from the previous chapter.
3.5.3 Results and discussion
The overall rates at which the more knowledgeable addressee was chosen in each condition
are plotted in Figure 3-2. The rates at which children choose the knowledgeable listener
in the critical condition are indeed greater than the rates of choosing the knowledgeable
listener in the control condition. However, though children chose the knowledgeable lis-
tener more often than adults', the patterns are also quite different from those in the studies
in Chapter 2. In those studies, the preference for the knowledgeable listener was near-
categorical. So it is reasonable to ask whether these results are simply a noisier version of
the adult patterns.
A closer look at the data split by age, however, tells us that this is not so. As Figure
3-3 demonstrates, in the critical condition, there is clear growth towards adult-like behavior
across the tested age range. Children start out doing something strikingly different from
adults - they choose the knowledgeable listener more than half of the time - but this be-
havior shows a steady decline over time. In contrast, children basically start out like adults
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in the control condition. There is improvement over time, but it is by no means as radical
as the behavioral shifts seen in the critical condition.
Table 3.3: Conditions, Experiment 2
Condition Scenario Expected
Choice
Presupposition
No-Presupposition
In this story, Panda and Cat were playing together, and
Panda said to Cat, "Cat, let's go to the animal shelter."
The two of them went to the animal shelter, and Panda
found a bird he really liked, so he decided to adopt it.
As the two of them were watching, the bird flew right
out of his cage -oh no! And Panda was very sad.
Then, Cat had to go home so he left. Later on Panda
was at home, and one of his friends came to see him.
But, we can't tell who's there -they're hidden behind
that big rock! I don't know if it is Cat or Fox behind the
rock, but Panda said to them, "Guess what, the bird that
I got flew away!" Does that give us a clue about who is
with Panda?
In this story, Panda and Cat were playing together, and
Hippo said to Cat, "Cat, I wanna go to the beach today."
So they went to the beach. At the beach, the two of
them found a very pretty seashell and Panda decided
that he would keep it. After a while, Cat was feeling
tired so he went home early. Panda stayed at the beach.
But it was really windy, and the seashell got buried in
the sand and Panda couldn't find it anymore - oh no!
Later on, he was at home and one of his friends came to
see him. But, we can't tell who's there - they're hidden
behind the blueberry bush! I don't know if it is Cat or
Fox behind the blueberry bush, but Panda said to them,
"Guess what, I found a seashell earlier today!" Does
that give us a clue about who is with Panda?
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We fit two models to analyze these trends. In the initial analysis, we ran a mixed-effects
logistic regression predicting knowledgeable-listener choice as an interaction of condition
and age (measured in years and months), with random effects of participant and item. Age
was initially treated as a continuous variable, but post-hoc analyses were performed making
reference to age bins (4, 5, 6). Results from the omnibus test is summarized in Table 3.4. We
find a significant interaction of condition and age. Recall that we also found an interaction
in Experiments 2A and 2B in the previous chapter, but the directionality was different.
In those experiments, adult-like behavior on the two conditions involved opposite choices
and the interaction demonstrated an improvement with age in the strength of the pull in
divergent directions. In contrast, in this experiment, the rates at which the knowledgeable
listener is chosen become more similar across the two conditions as the children get older.
Table 3.4: Summary of omnibus test, Experiment 2
P SE z p
Intercept 4.42 2.67 1.65 0.10
Condition (Critical) 13.84 5.73 2.42 0.02
Age -1.35 0.54 -2.50 0.01
Condition * Age -2.21 1.10 -2.01 0.04
We then conducted a second analysis to explore the effect of age on performance. We
grouped children into three age bins, 4-year-olds (n= 11), 5-year-olds (n= 10) and 6-year-olds
(n- 10), and fit a second mixed effects logistic regression now with condition and age-group
as interacting fixed factors. We then used the Ismeans package (Lenth 2016) to conduct
post-hoc comparisons of the relevant interaction with Tukey adjustments for multiple com-
parisons. The results from this analysis is summarized in Table 3.5. We find a significant
effect of condition in the 4-year-old group, but not in the 5- or -6-year-old groups. There
was a significant effect of age group within the critical condition: the 4-year-old group dif-
fered both from 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds, and the 5-year-olds from the 6-year-olds. In
contrast, there was no significant changes across age groups within the control condition.
Thus, there is genuine improvement with age only in the critical condition.
To summarize, then, children's behavior in this experiment, especially at the younger
age groups, was radically different from that of adults. Whereas adults were shown to re-
liably choose the ignorant listener in the critical conditions, children at ages 4 and 5 did
not show such a bias. Moreover, we find a clear developmental progression, with children
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Table 3.5: Pairwise comparisons from post-hoc analysis
Contrast z p
4-yr-olds, Control vs. Critical -3.65 0.004*
5-yr-olds, Control vs. Critical -1.79 0.47
6-yr-olds, Control vs. Critical -0.064 0.99
4-yr-olds vs. 5-yr-olds, Control -0.25 0.99
4-yr-olds vs. 6-yr-olds, Control 0.76 0.99
5-yr-olds vs. 6-yr-olds, Control 0.077 1.00
4-yr-olds vs. 5-yr-olds, Critical 1.64 0.57
4-yr-olds vs. 6-yr-olds, Critical 3.51 0.006*
5-yr-olds vs. 6-yr-olds, Critical 2.84 0.05*
become increasingly adult-like between ages 4 and 6. This points to a developmental tra-
jectory on which children start out unable to deal with informative presuppositions in an
adult-like manner.
3.6 General Discussion
3.6.1 Summary
The main goal of this chapter has been to investigate's children's knowledge of informative
presuppositions. To do so, I devised a variant of the listener-identification task from the
preceding chapter, in which the possible listener who knew that the presupposition was
true also knew the asserted content of the sentence to be true. Because of this, adults
in this task showed a preference for the listener for whom the presupposition -and the
assertion, for that matter- constituted new information. Children, on the other hand, did
not reliably choose the more ignorant listener. Especially at the younger ages, they did not
seem to understand that presuppositions might sometimes represent new information. This
knowledge seems to emerge slowly, with children's behavior approximating that of adults
only at around age 6.
This is the first instance thus far where we see a departure from adult-likeness. The find-
ing is noteworthy for both our theories of presuppositions and for our theories of pragmatic
development. With regards to the former, these data add an important data-point -a de-
velopmental asymmetry between redundant and informative uses of presuppositions - that
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an adequate theory of presupposition must account for. In 3.6.2, we scrutinize the extent
to which extant theories can account for these new facts. From the point of view of the
developmentalist, the main question is this: what is it about informative presuppositions
that make them difficult for the child to the master? This issue is the topic of discussion in
3.6.3.
3.6.2 Theoretical implications
On the common ground approach to presuppositions, the formal condition on using a pre-
suppositional sentence is that the presuppositions must already be shared knowledge among
all parties in the discourse. This is the common ground requirement, repeated from (1)
above.
(14) Felicity condition on presupposition use: A sentence S with presupposition p
may be used in a conversational context c if c entails p at the time that S is uttered.
This condition has been argued to be too strong, as speakers often successfully use pre-
suppositions to introduce new information to the common ground. Proponents of the com-
mon ground theory maintain that (14) is nevertheless the underlying principle, violations
of which are permitted because cooperative listeners are flexible and can accommodate a
speaker's presuppositions. Thus, to explain the whole range of presuppositional phenom-
ena, one needs to make reference to two different systems: (i) one that follows from formal
and compositional properties of a given structure, and (ii) a repair strategy, part and parcel
of cooperative communicative behavior, for when the formal requirements have not been
met in a given context. There is thus an inherent asymmetry on this view. Informative
presuppositions do not have the same cognitive or theoretical status as presuppositions that
meet the felicity condition in (14).
I argued above that this asymmetric view of presupposition use might translate to an
asymmetric view of the acquisition of presuppositions, where the categorical principle is
figured out before the repair strategy is mastered. The experimental findings in this chapter,
taken together with those in the previous one, offer support for such an asymmetry. Results
from the previous chapter demonstrate that children show the same biases as adults in hav-
ing a default expectation that presuppositions express common ground information. That
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is, whatever principle is at work in adult grammar that leads to this bias, children by age
4 have acquired this principle. However, children do not make the same assumptions as
adults when it comes to informative presuppositions: even in environments where adults let
go of their bias to treat presuppositions as needing to be common knowledge, children are
hesitant to do the same. Before the age of 6, children were split between the two listeners in
the critical condition, which suggests that they do not yet know that the principle governing
presupposition can be violated and these violations repaired.
Could these findings be explained by any of the alternative theories? Consider first
Gazdar's consistency account, which imposes the weakest requirement on presupposition
use among all of the alternatives. The presupposed proposition in each of the critical item is
compatible with the information states of both of the potential addressees (i.e. the ignorant
and the knowledgeable addressees). Thus the choice of the addressee in the experiment,
on this account, cannot hinge on the presuppositional component. The asserted content, in
contrast, differentiates between the two addressees, as it is informative and thus felicitously
uttered only to the ignorant one. Now, children's adult-like performance on the control con-
ditions, even at the youngest age group, shows us that they are sensitive to the informativity
requirement on assertions. If the choice of listener in the critical condition hinged solely
on this aspect, we would not expect children's performance to differ so drastically between
critical and control conditions at age 4. Thus, the developmental patterns do not have a
straightforward explanation on this account.
On Soames's approach, the utterance of a presuppositional sentence is appropriate so
long as the presupposed content can be taken to be uncontroversial, where uncontroversial-
ity is defined disjunctively as follows (repeated from (11-b) above):
(15) A speaker S takes a proposition P to be uncontroversial at t (or, equivalently, takes
P for granted at t) iff at t, S accepts P and thinks:
a. that P is already part of the conversational context at t; or
b. that the other members of the conversation are prepared to add P to the context
without objection.
Recall that adult participants in this experiment chose the more ignorant addressee -i.e.
one who does not share with the speaker the knowledge that the presupposition holds -in
the critical condition. In these situations, the felicity of the relevant utterances rested on
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condition (b) in (15). That is, adult participants who chose the ignorant listener believed that
this listener was prepared to add the unmet presupposition to the context without objection.
Now, why do children fail to make the same assumptions? One possibility is that the
ability to decide when a member of a conversation is "prepared to add P to the context
without objection" is itself late-developing, requiring perhaps a lot more communicative
experience and social-cognitive maturity than what a 4-year-old is equipped with. This idea
offers a plausible explanation for the present results. The problem with this explanation is
that it makes the wrong predictions elsewhere. Of particular relevance are the findings from
Experiment 2B in the previous chapter. The critical sentences used were exactly the same
as the experiment here; the two experiments differed only in that the choice of the knowl-
edgeable listener was unproblematic in Chapter 2, Experiment 2B. With this difference in
mind, suppose it is indeed the case that children get better as they get older at recogniz-
ing that some presuppositions will be added to the common ground by the listener without
argument, and moreover, that a sentence like "The bird that I got flew away" falls in this
category (after all, it is the kind of information that the speaker and only the speaker would
be the authority on). If so, we not only expect that the rates of choosing the ignorant listener
increase with age in the present experiment - an expectation that is met - we also expect a
corresponding increase in ignorant-listener choices in Chapter 2, Experiment 2B. However,
what we find in that experiment is the reverse trend: as children get older, they were less
likely to the choose the ignorant listener. Thus, weakening of (1)/(14) in the terms pro-
posed by Soames would also fail to cover the full developmental path of presuppositional
as discussed in this and the previous chapter. 2
Finally, consider the QUD approach (Simons 2001; Simons et al. 2010, 2016; Beaver
et al. 2017). On these accounts. presuppositions fall under a broader umbrella of phenom-
ena that share the property of being not-at-issue, i.e. not directly pertinent to the QUD.
The speaker and hearer mutually agree on the QUD and both parties commit to resolv-
ing it. However, there are no further conditions mandating what additional or subsidiary
2 A second possibility is that the two ways of being uncontroversial listed in (15) are inherently asymmetric,
and the condition in (15-a) is more basic. After all, the most sure-fire way of ensuring uncontroversiality is
to ensure that the relevant piece of information has already been accepted by the listener and added to the
common ground. The developmental asymmetry may in turn be taken to reflect this. Note, however, that this
would make Soames's approach a mere description of the facts - that speakers prefer to presuppose something
when it is common ground, but they sometimes deviate from this - and empirically indistinguishable from the
common ground + accommodation theory.
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information, beyond what is necessary to resolve the QUD, the speaker is allowed to put
forth.
Let us first consider how this approach might explain our adult data. Recall that when
the uttered sentence was something like, "The bird that I got flew away", adults preferred
a listener who did not already know that the speaker had a bird that flew away. One way
to explain this behavior is as follows. The situation makes salient a very plausible QUD:
"What happened since I last saw you?" This QUD will either be unacceptable or unresolved
were the speaker addressing a listener who already knew that there was a bird and that it
flew away. Consequently, this listener is not a viable option, and adults go for the ignorant
listener. What might this account say about children nevertheless choosing the knowledge-
able listener? One possibility is their difficulty lies in identifying the right QUD and in turn,
what content is (not-)at-issue. But if this were the crucial deficit at the heart of their failures
in this study, we should expect it to generalize to other similar environments. For example,
we might expect to find similar problems identifying the right QUD, and similar confused
behavior, in the studies reported in Chapter 2. In those experiments, however, children were
uniformly successful. The selective nature of their difficulties in this experiment, therefore,
fails to receive a straightforward explanation on a QUD-based account.
The upshot of this discussion is the following: approaches to presupposition that aim
to develop a unified account of presupposition that treats informative and redundant pre-
suppositions as having the same cognitive and theoretical status have no explanation for
the fact that the two come apart in development. On the other hand, such a developmental
asymmetry is consistent with the common ground theory, on which there are two indepen-
dent systems, which may very well develop independently. The formal rule governing all
presuppositions is that the use of a presupposition is appropriate only if it is already presup-
posed in the common ground. As already demonstrated in the previous chapter, children
know this rule by atleast age 4. This rule is not always met in everyday conversation, be-
cause speakers exploit listeners' ability to accommodate presuppositions. Findings from
the present chapter demonstrate that children initially do not have command of this system
for accommodating presuppositions.
In the case of adults, when faced with a choice of violating the use conditions on asser-
tion and presupposition, violation of the latter is preferred. Thus, they show a robust bias
that in these circumstances, the use of presuppositions can be informative. Children's lack
of a similar bias is telling. Initially, they seem to take the rule in (14) to be as inviolable
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as the rule about informativity of assertion. Neither violation is tolerated, leading to the
chance behavior observed. This suggests that the formal requirements associated with sen-
tence - whether presupposition or assertion related - are privileged in the child grammar
and moreover, placed on an equal plane.
3.6.3 Learning how to accommodate
We have thus identified a component of presupposition use where adults and children ini-
tially look strikingly different: the ability to handle informative presuppositions. Assuming
at this point in our discussion that the common ground + accommodation theory is basically
right, we are left with the question as to how children eventually become adult-like. I would
like to suggest that the development of the skills needed to use and accommodate informa-
tive presuppositions is intimately linked to the development of aspects of social cognition.
To see this more clearly, let us take a closer look at what the process entails.
To use and accommodate novel presuppositions, participants in a conversation must
make rapid inferences about each other's beliefs, intentions, desires and goals. For exam-
ple, the speaker must reason about whether or not the presupposition is likely to be accom-
modated by the listener, such that the context can be updated as needed for the conversation
to proceed. The listener, who must shift to a new context to accommodate the speaker's
utterance, must also make a decision about which candidate context c, among many pos-
sible contexts in which the utterance might be felicitous, the speaker is likely to have in
mind. What is more, the necessary actions on the interlocutors' parts are inter-dependent:
each person's best decision depends on what the other does, and vice versa. And, in the
vast majority of cases, they must do all of this without explicit communication. Accom-
modation thus involves a situation in which multiple individuals have a common goal and
must converge on one of multiple possible solutions to achieve this goal by relying solely
on inferential and implicit assumptions about each other.
The task necessarily implicates sophisticated mentalizing and reasoning abilities. This
type of ability to represent and reason about others' mental states is a central topic in de-
velopmental psychology, often referred to as 'Theory of Mind' (ToM). ToM is an umbrella
term for a broad constellation of skills that include the ability to ascribe mental states of
various flavors (e.g. beliefs, desires, goals, knowledge) to oneself and others, the ability
to recognize the potential for discrepancies between one's own and others' mental states,
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and the ability to reason about others' mental states to interpret and make predictions about
behavior, a set of skills that show a steady progression between late infancy and 6 years of
age (see Perner (1999) for a review). For instance, 18-month-olds show sensitivity to the
intentions and goals of an agent (Meltzoff 1995), and understand that different agents may
have different desires and preferences (Repacholi & Gopnik 1997). On the other hand, the
ability to predict or explain behavior based on an agent's potentially false beliefs appears
to a later acquired skill (Perner & Wimmer 1985; Perner 1991; Wellman, Cross & Watson
2001).
Clearly, very many of these skills are prerequisites for being able to deal with informa-
tive presupposition, and presupposition simpliciter. Necessary for any kind of presupposi-
tion use is the ability to represent another's belief states (which is a needed for modeling the
common ground). The fact that children generally succeeded in our listener identification
tasks (that is, so long as informative presuppositions are not involved) tells us that by 4,
these abilities are stably in place. However, accommodation goes beyond this; it requires
representing others' information states, integrating these representations with contextual
and historical information and plausibility considerations, and reasoning about these rep-
resentations to make a rational decision. The process may just be beyond the mentalizing
capabilities of younger children, resulting in the observed delay in the mastery of informa-
tive presuppositions. The fact that over the course of approximately two years, children
become proficient users of informative presupposition also fits in well with the timeline
that developmental psychology has independently established for the maturation of more
complex aspects of ToM.
The hypothesis that aspects of the acquisition of presupposition causally depend on the
development of other components of the mind would benefit both from further development
and refinement, and more empirical work. A pre-requisite for this, however, is a set of
more nuanced and detailed theories on the relationship between aspects of language use
and ToM than what is currently available. The mapping out of the developmental path of
presupposition - or any other pragmatic phenomena, for that matter - must go hand-in-
hand with the mapping out of the developmental path of the intellectual achievements in
social cognition.
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Chapter 4
Maximizing presuppositions
4.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters focused on one of the requirements presuppositional sentences im-
pose on the conversational context: that the proposition presupposed be part of the common
ground prior to assertion. We determined that at least by age 4, children are sensitive to this
requirement, and in fact, less tolerant than adults of prima facie violations of it (i.e. in-
formative presuppositions). Having thus shown that children have an understanding of the
formal condition determining when speakers can use presuppositional sentences, we now
turn to the question of whether they know when a speaker must use them.
Consider the sentences in (1)-(3). These sentences seem to impose the requirement that
some proposition not be entailed by the conversational context - they anti-presuppose that
proposition. For example, the sentence in (1) would be odd if used against a conversational
background in which it has already been established that a single woman attended the party.
(1) A woman that attended the party is an MIT graduate.
Anti-presupposes that there is exactly one woman that attended the party
(2) All of her children are MIT graduates.
Anti-presupposes that she has exactly two children
(3) Dana thinks that MIT has a swimming requirement.
Anti-presupposes that MIT has a swimming requirement
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Compare these structures to the presuppositional variants in (4)-(6).
(4) The woman that attended the party is an MIT graduate.
Presupposes that there is exactly one woman that attended the party
(5) Both of her children are MIT graduates.
Presupposes that she has exactly two children
(6) Dana knows that MIT has a swimming requirement.
Presupposes that MIT has a swimming requirement
The sentences in (4)-(6) presuppose precisely what their counterparts in (1)-(3) anti- presup-
pose. In this regard, the two variants seem to be in complementary distribution. Sentences
like (1)-(3) seem to be designed for contexts in which sentences in (4)-(6) would be ill-
formed, and vice versa. Are the two types of effects computed by the same kind of process,
then? That is, analogously to how the formal properties of presuppositional sentences lead
to restrictions on the contexts in which they can be used, formal properties of sentences like
(1)-(3) may lead to other types of restrictions on the contexts in which they can be used.
A closer examination of the phenomenon shows otherwise. If e.g. (4) requires unique-
ness of the woman who attended the party and (1) requires non-uniqueness, neither would
be appropriate for use whenever the number of female attendees at the party has not yet been
established. However, our intuitions tell us that (1) would be used in such circumstances.
It is now generally thought that the anti-presuppositional requirements imposed by (1)-(3)
arise due to competition with the variants in (4)-(6) (Hawkins 1991; Heim 1991; Sauerland
2003; Percus 2006). In cases where e.g. (1) is unusable, this is because it is blocked by the
possibility of using (4).
The empirical generalization, then, is that we avoid making claims based on struc-
tures with a, all, and think in situations where we can felicitously make claims based on
parallel structures with the, both, and know. The part of the grammar that determines anti-
presuppositional constraints does not merely look at a single structure (the one that is tied
to an anti-presupposition), but compares that structure with a competitor and determines
its usability based on the felicity of that competitor. What is the principle of grammar that
leads to such effects? A standard answer, due to Heim (1991), is that a principle, Max-
imize Presupposition! (MP henceforth), is responsible. Informally, MP dictates that in
conversational situations where two competing sentences are both in principle felicitous
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and both would effect the same change upon the context, one must use the sentence that
carries the stronger presupposition. On the assumption that cooperative speakers abide by
this principle, use of the presuppositionally weaker variant licenses the inference that the
presuppositionally stronger sentence is not usable in the context. This inference is, in effect,
the anti-presupposition triggered by the weaker sentence, as exemplified by (l)-(3).
In this chapter, we ask whether children are sensitive to the anti-presuppositional re-
quirements imposed by sentences like (1)-(3), and in doing so, probe their underlying
knowledge of MP. While anti-presuppositional requirements are not computed in the same
fashion as those imposed by presuppositions, knowledge of the latter is a pre-requisite for
deriving anti-presuppositions. In order to assess the appropriateness of a presuppositionally
weaker sentence in a given context, one must establish whether that context would make
the presuppositionally stronger competitor felicitous. In this regard, the ability to compute
anti-presuppositions is a more sophisticated skill, and a natural next step in our investiga-
tions into children's developing abilities with presupposition use. A pair of studies explore
the following questions: (i) Do preschool-aged children avoid producing presuppositionally
weaker structures when a stronger competitor is felicitous and would convey the same new
information? (ii) Do they judge as more appropriate those structures that carry stronger
presuppositions compared to an otherwise equivalent parallel structure?
As before, I use two different presupposition triggers (and their presuppositionally
weaker competitors) to probe children's knowledge of MP: both (vs. all) and another (vs.
a). As we have already seen, adult speakers show a preference for both over all in a sit-
uation where it is clear that the cardinality of the quantificational domain is exactly two.
Similarly, adults show a preference for another over a when the context makes salient some
other entity that satisfies the restrictor NP. As we will see shortly, both types of effects may
be derived via MP-based competition. A child who knows MP and the meanings of the rel-
evant expressions should show an adult-like preference for the presuppositionally stronger
variant whenever it is felicitous. Moreover, modulo differences in lexical-semantic knowl-
edge, application of MP should be uniform across the two types of test environments. Our
results, however, reveal an unexpected asymmetry: children show a reliable preference for
another when its presuppositions are met; however, they show no such preference for both
over all in contexts where adults strongly prefer both. I take the non-uniformity in devel-
opmental trajectories to signal non-uniformity in the underlying phenomena. Specifically,
I argue that unlike all, oddity of which can be attributed to an anti-presupposition, the odd-
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ness of a in certain environments does not arise from MP-competition with another. Given
this, children's behavior with both/all, the genuine indicator of competence with MP, leads
to the conclusion that MP is not yet stably in place in preschool-aged children.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Theoretical background
MP forces a speaker to use the structure associated with the strongest presuppositions com-
patible with the conversational context. The principle was originally proposed by Heim
(1991) to account for speakers' preference for the definite article over the indefinite in cer-
tain circumstances, e.g. (7).
(7) Context: We know that there is a unique sun
a. The sun is shining.
b. #A sun is shining.
The definite article, unlike the indefinite, presupposes the existence of a unique referent.
Whenever a sentence containing the definite, as in (7-a), is true and felicitous, a parallel
sentence with the indefinite, as in (7-b), will be just as truthful a description of the relevant
state of affairs - that is, the two sentences are equally informative. Nevertheless, replacing
the definite with the indefinite leads to infelicity. MP explains this infelicity as the result
of failing to abide by the conversational maxim to presuppose as much as possible. The
principle has since been developed and refined. (see e.g. Sauerland 2003, Percus 2006). For
the moment, I adopt a fairly standard characterization of MP, with the following properties.
Following Percus (2006), I take MP to be triggered by lexical items, which have a pre-
determined set of presuppositional alternatives, e.g. {the, a}, {both, all}, {know, believe}.
MP-competitors for a structure S are those structures S' obtained by replacing one or more
lexical item in S with its presuppositional alternatives. (This assumption will be revised
later.) Additionally, MP is assumed to compare structures that are contextually equivalent,
i.e. they contribute the same amount of new information relative to the context. Contextual
equivalence is defined as in (8), following Schlenker (2012).
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(8) Contextual Equivalence
Let 4 and yi be two sentences whose presuppositions are satisfied in the context c.
0 and V are contextually equivalent relative to c if the following holds:
{w E c: 0 is true in w} = {w E c: y is true in w}
An argument for contextual equivalence, rather than e.g. context-independent equivalence
of non-presuppositional content, comes from MP-competition between think and know. As
has been discussed at length in the philosophical and linguistic literature, there is more
to the meaning of know than the doxastic entailment it shares with think and the factive
presupposition. The belief must be justified to count as 'knowledge'. This means that the
assertive contributions of know and think are not the same. Schlenker (2012) points out
that only when think and know can be assumed to nevertheless have the same assertive
component in the context does MP apply. Thus we have the contrast in (9).
(9) a. Context: Speaker is talking to a friend
John believes that I have a sister.
-- >Anti-presupposition: It's not the case that the speaker has a sister
b. Context: A defendant is talking to a journalist
My lawyer believes that I am innocent.
^-*Absent anti-presupposition: It's not the case that the speaker is innocent
In the context in (9-b), it is not reasonable to assume that someone's belief of the defendant's
innocence is justified, even if happens to be true. In other words, the assertive contribution
of the sentences My lawyer believes that I am innocent and My lawyer knows that I am
innocent cannot be taken to be the same in this context. In turn, MP does not apply.
Finally, among contextually-equivalent structures that are competitors for MP, i.e. those
derived via substitution of presuppositional alternatives, MP demands that the speaker
choose the one carrying the strongest presuppositions. Presuppositional strength, in turn,
can be defined as in (10). A sentence is presuppositionally stronger than another if it is
undefined (or receives a stigmatized third-value) at more worlds.
(10) Presuppositional Strength
0 is presuppositionally stronger than yi iff {w: yf(w) = #} C {w: 0 (w) = #
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These assumptions are summarized more succinctly in (11).1
(11) For two sentences 0 and y whose presuppositions are satisfied in a context c:
(i) If 4 and ig are competitors for MP, and
(ii) 0 and V are contextually equivalent relative to c, and
(iii) 0 carries stronger presuppositions than yp, then
# should be preferred to yf in c
We now have the necessary ingredients to derive the infelicity of the indefinite in (7). By
stipulation, the and a are presuppositional alternatives. Parallel structures involving the
definite and indefinite articles thus compete for MP. Since the sentence with the definite
entails the corresponding indefinite sentence, whenever the presuppositions of the definite
are met, the two sentences will be true in all the same worlds. Contextual equivalence is thus
met. Finally, the sentence with the definite is presuppositionally stronger than the indefinite
variant, by the definition of presuppositional strength above: the indefinite presupposes
1I am taking several simplifying steps here. While the complicating factors are not relevant for present
purposes, they are worth noting. For instance, I am characterizing MP as a global constraint, operative at
the root, but as Percus (2006) first observed, this cannot be; MP-effects arise even when globally, the two
competitors have the same presuppositions (i). These types of data suggest that competition for MP must be
allowed to take place sub-sententially, perhaps at each local context (Singh 2011).
(i) a. If John has exactly two students and he assigned the same exercise to both of his students, then
I'm sure he will be happy.
b. #If John has exactly two students and he assigned the same exercise to all of his students, then I'm
sure he will be happy.
Our assumptions about about presuppositional strength in (iii) of (11) also likely need emendation. As men-
tioned earlier, Marty (2017) shows that formal alternatives of a sentence with logically independent presupposi-
tions also enter into competition for MP. To illustrate, consider the pair in (ii). Intuitively, (i-b) is odd because
it suggests that the speaker does not believe that Sue has a unique mother, although this information is common
knowledge. However, the uniqueness presupposition of (ii-a) is not logically stronger than the presupposition
of (ii-b), which is that Sue has a unique mother who speaks German.
(ii) a. Sue's mother arrived. -+Presupposition: Sue has exactly one mother.
b. #Sue's mother who speaks German arrived.
-*Presupposition: Sue has exactly one mother who speaks German.
-. ?Anti-presupposition: It's not the case that Sue has exactly one mother.
Marty (2017) take these data to suggest that the generation of MP-effects is not restricted to presuppositionally
stronger alternatives; rather, MP can in fact be activated by any alternative whose presuppositions are logically
non-weaker than the uttered sentence.
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nothing, so the set of worlds in which an indefinite-sentence receives the third-value is the
null set, which is a subset of the worlds in which the definite counterpart is #. We are
required by MP, then, to use the structure with the definite in contexts like in (7) where it is
usable.
Beyond the definite/indefinite competition and the other cases we have already seen,
MP has been invoked to explain a number of grammatical phenomena including the multi-
plicity inference of plurals (Sauerland 2005b, 2008) (12), person feature preferences with
pronouns (Heim 2008) (13), the obligatoriness of additive particles (Amsili & Beyssade
2009; Chemla 2008; Singh 2011) (14).
(12) Context: The speaker has exactly one child
a. I am going to bring my child to the party.
b. #1 am going to bring my children to the party.
(13) Speaker points to herself
a. I am a linguist.
b. #She is a linguist.
(14) Dana came to the party.
a. Sue did, too.
b. #Sue did.
At the same time, there have been debates about whether an MP-based analysis is right for
these types of phenomena. It has been argued, for example, that the multiplicity inference
in plurals is an implicature and not an anti-presupposition (Spector 2007, a.o.). The additive
and additive-less variants in (14) have been argued not to compete in the first place. Instead,
the obligatoriness of the additive is taken to be a rescue mechanism to circumvent unwanted
exhaustivity implicatures that would arise otherwise (Bade 2016). Such debates highlight
the difficulty of ascertaining what is and isn't a genuine MP-effect. The lack of clarity
comes from the fact there are no independent criteria to help us diagnose an MP-effect. For
the most part, we are left to reason based on the availability of a presuppositionally stronger
sentence and the oddness of a weaker one in contexts supporting the stronger sentence. As
we will see later on, some of the initial commitments in this chapter about MP-competition
environments will need revising, in part motivated by our experimental findings. Given this
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state of affairs, the present investigation should be seen as having two parallel aims: first,
to investigate the developmental trajectory of MP as a principle governing utterance choice,
and second, to use the developmental trajectory as an independent gauge for determining
what is and isn't an MP-effect.
4.2.2 Developmental background
Very little is presently known about the actual developmental trajectory of MP. To my
knowledge, the first discussion of the principle as relates to acquisition is found in Wexler
(2003), where the author makes a case that MP is place in child grammar early based on
patterns of errors in children's article use. The main thrust of his argument is the following.
Young children over-produce the singular definite article when its uniqueness presupposi-
tion is not met in the context of utterance (see discussion in Chapter 2). Crucially, chil-
dren do not over-produce the definite when existence of a referent is not already taken for
granted, and moreover, they do not ever over-produce contextually equivalent indefinites.
Wexler takes these patterns as evidence that: (i) children do not initially treat the definite
article as encoding a uniqueness presupposition, although they know it comes with an ex-
istence presupposition, and (ii) their knowledge of MP ensures that whenever the context
supports the existence presupposition, children will prefer the definite over the indefinite.
In comprehension studies, however, children do not always behave as if they have full
command of MP. There have been two studies thus far that examine MP-effects in com-
prehension. Yatsushiro (2008) examined the acquisition of the German universal quantifier
jeder 'every', which is taken to trigger a non-uniqueness inference by competition with der
'the'. In the study, 6-to-9-year-old children were first introduced to a scenario and a charac-
ter in the scene who is depicted to be saying something (by means of a speech bubble). The
task was to evaluate whether or not a given utterance can be something that the character
would say in the relevant situation. In the MP condition, the child was shown a situation
where it is established that the character has a unique mother, and asked whether a sentence
like (15) would be appropriate for him to say.
(15) Jeder Mutter von mir sitzt hier auf einem Stuhl.
every mother of mine sits here on a chair
'Every mother of mine is sitting on a chair here.'
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Adults rejected this sentence 90% of the time, whereas 6-year-olds rejected it only 34%
of the time. From these results, the author concludes that anti-presuppositional effects are
mastered late in development. It is important to note, however, that calculation of MP-
effects in this study relied on a differential presupposition of uniqueness between jeder and
der. If Wexler's (2003) proposal is correct that children initially don't associate the definite
article with a uniqueness presupposition, the non-adult performance here could be due to a
non-adult semantics for the definite article, rather than a lack of MP.
A second study by Legendre, Barriere, Goyet & Nazzi (2011) tested a much younger
age group - 30-month-olds - on their comprehension of French personal pronouns. It
has been claimed that 1st and 2nd pronouns encode the relevant person features as pre-
suppositions. By contrast, 3rd person pronouns do not encode person as a lexical presup-
position; rather, the relevant inference comes about as an anti-presupposition, via compe-
tition with the presuppositionally stronger lst/2nd pronouns (Sauerland 2008). Legendre
and colleagues found that 30-month-olds had more difficulties comprehending 3rd-person
pronouns than lst/2nd, which they took to indicate that anti-presuppositional effects are
mastered later than lexically encoded presuppositions.
The disparity in age-ranges across the two studies discussed above and possible acqui-
sition problems with the specific expressions tested makes it difficult to ascertain what the
findings mean in relation to the development of MP. If we put aside this issue, a tentative
conclusion we might draw from these studies may be that children have difficulties with
MP. But Wexler's observations about children's apparent adherence to MP in their article
production would still require an explanation. Thus, while these studies lay the groundwork
for work on the acquisition of MP, the core questions still remain open.
4.2.3 Test environments
As mentioned above, beyond the core cases, identifying environments where MP is at play
is non-trivial. Investigating children's knowledge of MP-effects comes with a further chal-
lenge: we cannot take for granted that children have learned the adult-like lexical meanings
for expressions involved, a precondition for being able to apply MP in an adult-like way.
For instance, although MP is most frequently discussed in relation to the competition be-
tween the and a, this would be a less-than-ideal environment to test children's knowledge
of MP if Wexler is right that their representation of the is non-adult. The present studies,
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therefore, employ expressions for which similar patterns of non-adult use have not been
observed. Specifically, we look at competition between both and all and between another
and a, expressions which are produced early and in a more or less adult-like manner. Com-
prehension studies provide further evidence that these expressions are acquired at least by
the early preschool years (see Brooks & Braine (1996); Hurewitz, Papafragou, Gleitman
& Gelman (2006) for comprehension evidence on all; Barner, Chow & Yang (2009); Tieu
(2015) for evidence regarding all and both; Modyanova (2009) for another and a).
Before turning to the experiments, let us consider in more detail how the anti- presup-
positional effects in question arise. I begin with both and all. In circumstances where both
is felicitous, all is odd:
(16) a. I broke both of my legs.
b. #1 broke all of my legs.
I assume a fairly standard analysis of both and all as universal quantifiers, where the crucial
difference between the two lies in the fact that both carries a duality presupposition. Lexical
entries for the two quantifiers are given in (17); the differential presupposition is underlined.
(17) a. both = 11P(e,t): P = 2. XQ(e,,)- Vy[P(y) - Q(y)l
b. all = XP(e,t). 'Qe,t). Vy[P(y) 
-* Q(y)]
Given these lexical entries and the particular formalization of MP above, repeated in (18),
the oddness of the all-statement in (16-b) can be derived as resulting from competition.
(18) For two sentences 0 and yp whose presuppositions are satisfied in a context c:
(i) If 4 and yf are competitors for MP, and
(ii) 0 and yp are contextually equivalent relative to c, and
(iii) 4 carries stronger presuppositions than y', then
4 should be preferred to yi in c
Our world knowledge tells us that humans have two legs. In most normal contexts, the
presupposition of (16-a) will be met. The presuppositions of all are trivially met, as the
expression, on the definition above, is presupposition-less. Once you make the assumption
that both and all are presuppositional alternatives, the pair of structures will be competitors:
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they differ only with respect to the choice of the quantifier. In other words, condition (i) of
(18) is met. The condition in (ii) regarding contextual equivalence is also met. On the lexical
entries above, both and all are Strawson-equivalent. That is, it is impossible for a sentence
with one to be true and an otherwise identical sentence with the other be false (rather than
undefined). Thus, whenever the presupposition of both is met, the two sentences will convey
the same new information. 2 Because the both-variant carries stronger presuppositions than
the all counterpart, MP demands that (I 6-a) should be preferred to (16-b).
Let us now turn to another vs. a. In contexts like in (19) where another is felicitous,
the plain indefinite a is odd:
(19) I had a coffee.
a. Then I had another coffee.
b. #Then I had a coffee.
The entries for the two expressions are given in (20). I assume that both a and another
are indefinites that denote existential quantifiers. As suggested by its morphological make-
up, another is taken to be composed of the indefinite an, plus the expression other, which
contributes its presupposition. This presupposition is anaphoric: another P Q requires that
the context makes salient an antecedent that is P. This anaphoricity is represented by means
of a referential index i on other. The second contribution of other, at the level of assertion,
is the removal from the domain of quantification the witness of the presupposition.
2Many analyses of both assume further that it is strongly distributive, unlike all (Ladusaw 1982; Roberts
1987; Landman 1989). Thus, unlike all, both is unhappy in collective environments (i).
(i) a. All of the students work well together.
b. #Both of the students work well together.
One way of capturing this contrast might be to hard-wire distributivity into the meaning of both, as in (ii). An
alternative would be to say that both, unlike all, obligatorily selects for an operator DIST, which contributes
distributivity.
(ii) [both P Q] presupposes that there are exactly two individuals that are P
When its presupposition is true, [both P Q] = 1 iff Vy[P(y) A atom(y) -+ Q(y)]
Either way, if distributivity is always a contribution of a sentence involving both, there will be some states of
affairs where contextual equivalence between both and all sentences will not be met. While this is important to
keep in mind, it will not matter for present purposes: the experimental scenarios are set-up in a way such that
the two competitors would be contextually equivalent.
103
(20) a. an[other;]j& = AP(e,t): P(g(i)). AQ~e,t). ]y[y 7 g(i) A P(y) A Q(y)]
b. a' = 2LP(e,t)- AXQ~e,t). ]y[P(y) A Q(y)]
This latter component means that the two expressions differ also in their truth-conditions. In
a situation where I met with the same student, say Mary, in the morning and in the evening
and I met with no other student, a sentence like in (21-a) below would be true, but (21-b)
would be false. This is because the domain of quantification for another is strictly smaller
than that of a. The utterance of the first sentence makes salient an entity, Mary, who is a
student that I met with in the morning, and the contextually-supplied assignment function
would map the index on other to Mary. Mary would, in turn, be excluded from the domain
of quantification of another.
(21) I met with a student in the morning.
a. I met with a student in the evening.
b. I met with another student in the evening.
Because of the truth-conditional difference between a and another, there will be circum-
stances where parallel structures involving the two expressions do not compete for MP.
However, in special cases, the possibility of the claim being about the same individual as
before, as in (21), is independently ruled out. For instance, consumption predicates like
have coffee (20) can be true of an individual only once. In such circumstances, a and an-
other are contextually equivalent and MP-competition becomes visible.
Here is how one might derive the oddness of (19-b) based on competition with (19-a).
The speaker's preceding utterance that they had a coffee ensures that the presupposition of
another is satisfied: an individual x such that x is a coffee, namely the witness of the preced-
ing existential claim, is made contextually salient. The plain indefinite is presupposition-
less, so its presuppositions are trivially satisfied. By stipulation, a and another are pre-
suppositional alternatives, making (19-b) and (19-a) competitors, satisfying condition (i) of
(18). Whenever the presupposition of another is met, and it is common knowledge that the
VP cannot be true of the same individual in the domain of quantification twice, another
P Q and a P Q convey the same information: that there is a coffee different from the one
consumed before such that the speaker had that coffee. Condition (ii) of (18) is also met.
The sentence in (19-a) is presuppositionally stronger than (19-b), so MP requires the use of
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another-good over (19-b). In the experiments that follow, we will restrict our attention to
environments where contextual equivalence between a and another obtains.
We now turn to the experiments. I examine the competition between both and all in
4.3. Competition between another and a will be the focus of 4.4.
4.3 Both vs. all
4.3.1 Experiment 1A: Elicited Production
Experiment IA examines whether children use knowledge of MP to avoid using all when
both is usable. We use an Elicited Production Task, where the dependent measure is a
free-form response elicited in carefully controlled contexts. The elicitation prompts were
preceded by brief stories involving interactions between two characters, A and B, about var-
ious foodstuff. For example, the topic of conversation may be the cupcakes that A brought
for a snack. B leaves for a little while, during which time A eats the entirety of the set of
cupcakes. B returns and asks A what happened to the cupcakes. Participants are tasked
with stating how A will respond. Suppose A had exactly two cupcakes. In this situation,
A might say "I ate both of the cupcakes", but not "I ate all of the cupcakes". On the other
hand, if A had three cupcakes, the opposite is the case: "I ate all of the cupcakes" is now a
licensed response, but the variant with both is not.
The elicited production task was chosen for two reasons. First, a child's ability to plan
and produce an utterance is a direct indicator of her grammatical competence. Second,
unlike tasks that require judgments of truth or acceptability of someone else's statement,
the elicited production environment is a natural and familiar one to most children. As such,
the task is suitable for young children who may have task-related trouble with judgment
tasks.
The main downside to the task, however, is that there are many more degrees of free-
dom. That is, there might not be a scenario or context that is uniquely appropriate for the
construction or phenomenon of interest. For instance, in the scenario sketched above, there
is a range of possible utterances that could felicitously describe what A did with the cup-
cakes. We address this potential worry in two ways. First, to delimit the space of possible
responses, there was always an explicit prompt question. For instance, B might ask A:
"Which of your two/three cupcakes did you eat?". Second, the target expressions (both or
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all) were mentioned in the preceding stories to prime the use of the quantifiers of interest.
With child participants, the validity of this methodological move rests on a crucial assump-
tion: that such priming has a facilitative effect if and only if the child can give a syntactic and
semantic representation for the form in question. Priming effects have been observed with
preschool-aged children in a variety of environments in previous research (Huttenlocher,
Vasilyeva & Shimpi 2004; Savage, Lieven, Theakston & Tomasello 2006; Thothathiri &
Snedeker 2008; Rowland, Chang, Ambridge, Pine & Lieven 2012). Moreover, a long line
of research using imitation paradigms tells us that children repeat morpho-syntactic forms
(see Lust, Chien, Chiang & Eisele (1996) and references therein) and lexical items (Kidd,
Lieven & Tomasello 2006) only when they are capable of giving grammatical/semantic
representations for them. Given these findings, we expect the manipulation in our task to
facilitate, but not artificially inflate, the rate of quantifier responses by children. Despite
these measures, there is likely still a range of allowed responses. Given this, the directly
interpretable measure in this study will be the difference between rates of using both vs. all,
and not whether they are used in the first place.
Participants
Participants in Experiment 1 were forty adults and thirty-eight 3-to-5-year-olds. Adults
were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Children were recruited from preschools
and museums in the Boston area. English was the dominant language for all participants.
The aim in testing adults was to establish baselines. As mentioned earlier, the elicited
production method is one where the form of the response is often underdetermined by the
context. Since our main focus is on the relative rates of productions of all vs. both by
children, it is important to have an estimate of the rates at which adults use these quantifiers
in the relevant environments.
Materials and procedure
Both populations saw items belonging to two experimental conditions. The critical condi-
tion probed sensitivity to MP: it was made clear in the context that the presuppositions of
the stronger alternative - both - was met, and therefore, its use was made obligatory by
MP. The aim of the control condition was to assess knowledge of the lexical meaning of
the relevant expressions. The cardinality presupposition of both was satisfied in the con-
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trol scenarios, so a participant who knows the meaning of both should never use it in this
condition.
Adults saw all experimental materials in written form on a computer screen. The
elicited production method was adapted for adults by turning it into a "Fill-in-the-blanks"
task. Participants first read brief scenarios as the one described earlier in 4.1. The last
sentence in each scenario was a question posed by the second character (e.g. "Which of
your two/three cupcakes did you eat?"). After reading the scenarios, participants clicked
through to a second display with the prompt, "How did A respond?" followed by a partial
response plus a blank, e.g. "I ate ." Participants were asked to fill in the blank using
the information they had gathered reading the preceding scenario. Sample scenarios for
each condition are provided in Table 4.3.1. Each participant saw 8 items per condition and
16 filler items, in fully randomized order. There was a unique correct response for the filler
items, as shown by the example item in (22). Accuracy on fillers was used as an exclusion
criteria; this resulted in the exclusion of 1 participant whose accuracy rates was below 60%.
(22) Example filler
Seth and Sally were cooking together for a potluck and they made a pasta salad.
Seth then left to go to the gym, but Sally continued with the cooking. She decided
to make a quiche, too. Later on when Seth came home, he asked her: "What did
you make while I was away?"
How did Sally respond?
I made . Expected Response: a quiche.
The child variant of the task was similar in structure and logic to the adult experiment.
However, we made certain design modifications to ensure that the task was accessible to
children as young as 3 years of age. First, the stories were narrated to the child partici-
pant by the experiment; they responded orally, as well. Second, there were fewer items
in each condition: each child saw 3 items per condition, plus 3 fillers. Finally, we used a
blocked design, where children saw each trials in each condition in a homogeneous block.
We created two such blocked lists varying in order of presentation of the experimental con-
ditions. In the "Critical-Ist" Order, the critical condition appeared first, followed eventually
by the control; in the "Control-lst" Order, the order was reversed. In both orders, the two
experimental conditions were separated by a block of filler items.
Children were told that they were going to listen to some stories with the experimenter,
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Table 4.1: Conditions, Adults
Condition Scenario Question Expected
Response
Lucy and Byron were shopping to-
gether. Lucy planned to buy a dress
and showed Byron two dresses she
really liked, a black one and a
red one. Then Byron had to head
home early, so he left Lucy at the
store. After he left, Lucy decided
to get both of the dresses. The next
day, she saw Byron and he asked:
"Which of the two dresses did you
buy?"
Control Jack and Stella were at a bakery
buying dessert for a party. Jack
showed Stella three pies he really
liked, an apple pie, a pecan pie and
a pumpkin pie. Then, Stella got
called into work and left Jack at the
bakery. After she left, Jack ended
up buying all of the pies. Later that
day, Stella came home and asked
him: "Which of the three pies did
you buy?"
How did Lucy re-
spond?
I bought both of them
How did Jack respond?
I bought
and tasked with helping the experimenter when she got stuck in telling the stories. All of
the stories revolved around a Hungry Hippo and his various animal friends. In each story,
Hippo tells a friend about the snack he brought with him, which may involve two or three
of some type of foodstuff, and after the friend leaves, eats everything he had brought. Later,
the character returns and asks Hippo a question of the form: "Which of your two/three NPs
did you eat?" The child is then prompted with, "What did Hippo say then?". Examples of
critical and control items are given in Table 4.3.1. The filler items involved situations where
neither both nor all would be appropriate; an example is given in (23).
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Critical
all of them
Table 4.2: Conditions, Children
Expected Response
I ate both of them
I ate all of them
(23) Example filler
In this story, Hippo was playing with Tiger, but then Tiger got a tummy-ache and
he said, "I need to go home and rest". After Tiger left, Hippo decided to have
a snack. But his lunch-box was empty, oh no! But then, Hippo got very lucky
because he spotted an ice cream truck! He got an ice cream from the ice cream
truck and ate it right up. Later on Tiger was feeling better so he came back. He
asked Hippo, "What did you do while I was gone?" What did Hippo say to Tiger?
Expected Response: I ate an ice cream.
Results
Participants' responses in the experimental conditions were categorized into one of three
response types: "quantifier" (responses involving both or all), "conjunction", and "other"
109
Condition Scenario
Critical Hippo and Raccoon were playing together,
but then Hippo got hungry. He told Raccoon,
"I'm going to have a snack now" and showed
him what he brought. He had brought some
apples! Racoon said, "Have a good snack"
and he went home. After Raccoon left, Hippo
couldn't decide which apple to eat, so he de-
cided to eat both of them. Later on Raccoon
came back and asked Hippo, "Which of your
two apples did you eat?" What did Hippo say
to Raccoon?
Control Hippo and Penguin were playing together, but
then Hippo got hungry. He told Penguin,
"I'm going to have a snack now" and showed
him what he brought. He had brought some
donuts! Penguin said, "Have a good snack"
and she went home. After Penguin left, Hippo
couldn't decide which donut to eat, so he de-
cided to eat all of them. Later on Penguin
came back and asked Hippo, "Which of your
three donuts did you eat?" What did Hippo
say to Penguin?
(includes no-response as well as those involving bare plurals or indefinites). In addition,
responses were coded for whether or not they matched the expected response. Thus, if the
participant produced a statement with both in the critical condition, that response would
be categorized as a "quantifier" response and coded as a match. If they produced an all-
statement in the control condition, that would also be considered "quantifier" response that
was a match to our expectations. However, if a participant produced all in the critical
condition, that would be categorized as a "quantifier" response but not as a match to the
expected response. All other types of responses, even when potentially felicitous, were
coded as not a match.
Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 plot the proportions of the different response types in each
condition for adults and children respectively. We see that while both populations preferred
responses involving quantifiers, these were not the only types of responses produced. The
other major response category involved a conjunctive statement. For instance, for the crit-
ical scenario in 4.3.1, a participant may respond: "I ate a red apple and a green apple".
Crucially, the proportions of quantifier-responses vs. conjunction-responses did not vary
across condition for either group. This was analyzed using a chi-squared test of homo-
geneity, which compared the distribution of response types across condition. There was no
significant difference in the distribution of responses between critical and control conditions
for either group (X2=0.18, p=0.91 for adults; X2=4.22, p=O.l14 for children).
4-1: Response Types by Condition,
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4-2: Response Types by Condition,
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Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 plot rates at which participants responded in the expected
manner in each condition. Recall that the expected response for the control condition was
a description involving the quantifier all. For the critical condition, the expectation was a
both-sentence. The majority of adult responses (Figure 4-3) matched the expected response.
Most relevantly for our purposes, both was never produced in the control condition and all
was never produced in the critical condition.
Figure 4-3: Expected Response Rates, Figure 4-4: Expected Response Rates, Chil-
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Children, like adults, responded as expected on the control condition. By contrast, they
produced the expected response at a considerably lower rate in the critical condition (Figure
4-4). Moreover, as shown in Figures 4-5 and 4-6, the patterns of responses differed across
the two orders. In the Critical-Ist order, children produced both at a rate of 72%, which is
comparable to the adult expected response rates. In contrast, in the Control-ist order, both
was produced only at a rate of 32% in the critical condition. Instead, they produced all over
half of the time. This over-production of all was specific to the Control-Ist order. Though
children in the Critical-Ist order did sometimes erroneously produce all instead of both,
this rate was negligible (<5%).
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Figure 4-5: Children's Expected Response Rates, Split by Order
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To analyze these trends statistically, we fit a pair of mixed-effects logistics regressions.
The adult and child data were analyzed separately. We fit a model on the adult data predict-
ing Expected Response Rate as a function of Condition, with random slopes for Participant
and Item by Condition. Results from the analysis, summarized in Table 4.3, reveal no effect
of condition on the rates of expected responses.
Table 4.3: Summary of statistical analysis, Experiment IA, Adults
# SE z p
Intercept 2.25 0.60 3.73 <.001
Condition (Critical) -0.12 0.46 -0.26 0.78
The model fit on the child data predicted Expected Response Rate as a function of
Condition, Order and their interactions, with random slopes by Participant and random
intercepts by Item (the maximal model with by-item random slopes did not converge). In
addition, Age (in years and months; a continuous variable) was included as a covariate.
Table 4.4 summarizes the results from this model. The interaction of Condition and Order
was significant, with the odds of producing the expected response being much lower for
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Figure 4-6: Children's Quantifier Responses by Order
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critical items in the Control-Ist order. We did not find a significant effect of Age: 5-year-
olds were equally likely to over-produce all as 3-year-olds.
Table 4.4: Summary of statistical analysis, Experiment IA, Children
f SE z P
Intercept 9.09 5.30 1.72 0.09
Condition (Critical) -0.08 3.59 -0.02 0.98
Order (Control-1st) 0.82 3.31 0.25 0.80
Condition * Order -19.51 5.50 -3.55 < .001
Age 0.97 1.27 0.76 0.45
Discussion
Besides the lexical choice between both and all, adults in this experiment did not behave
differently across the two conditions. Though participants did not always respond using
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a quantifier, when they did produce a quantifier response, their preferences were categori-
cal-the quantifier chosen was always all in the control condition and both in the critical
condition. The fact that adults do not use both in the control condition is unsurprising and
indicates knowledge of the meaning of the quantifier -the duality presupposition of both
makes the quantifier infelicitous in the control scenarios. The fact that they never use all
shows us that adults not only abide by MP, but they do so seemingly without exception.
Children, however, diverge asymmetrically from adults. Though they were adult-like
in the control condition, children did not reliably produce MP-compliant responses in the
critical condition. Around half of their productions involved an all-sentence, even though
both would have been acceptable and preferred. If all is blocked in both-environments via
MP-competition, children's tolerance of the weaker expression gives first indication that
they are not applying MP here in an adult-like way.
All else being equal, a lack of sensitivity to MP should lead to both and all being used
interchangeably, each around half of the time. While the overall patterns are consistent with
this expectation, our results are in fact richer: there is a significant interaction of Condition
and Order. More specifically, children's non-adult uses of all varied across the two orders.
In the Critical-Ist order, children rarely over-used all, producing both at more or less adult-
like rates. However, in the Control-ist order, all made up over half of the responses. It is
likely that certain properties of our task are behind this order effect. Beyond the grammati-
cal factors of relevance, there are at least two additional factors that could have influenced
children's utterance choices. The first is the fact that the relevant quantifier was always
primed in the corresponding stories. If this design choice had the intended effect, uses of
the primed quantifier should have increased. The second is a more generalized tendency for
young children to perseverate, i.e. continue to adopt in the same pattern of behavior across
trials. This tendency may lead to an artificial inflation of certain response types, as the child
may simply continue producing the same type of structures as they produced in the first
trial. The order effect we observe could result from an interaction between the item-level
priming effect and the experiment-level perseveration effect.
Let us consider how this interaction might play out. Starting with the Control- 1st order,
the first (relevant) trial they encounter is one where all is primed, facilitating the production
of an utterance involving this quantifier. For the rest of the control block, priming and
perseveration factors align to favor an all-response. This situation changes when they reach
the critical block. Here, the item-level prime is of both, but children may prefer to continue
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using all, in keeping with their previous productions. Indeed, the over-use of all in this
order indicates that the tendency to perseverate is strong enough to over-ride any effect of
the item-level prime.
Children's behavior in the Critical-Ist order shows us that perseveration effects can, in
turn, be over-riden by linguistic knowledge. In Critical-ist order, the first (relevant) trial
they encounter is one where both is primed, facilitating the production of a both-response.
But rather than continuing to produce both once they reach the control block, children re-
liably switch to all. Thus, the threat of presupposition failure (recall that the cardinality
presupposition of both is not met in the control contexts) is sufficient to suppress the ten-
dency to perseverate. Children's response patterns in the Critical-ist order, especially in
light of their behavior in the Control-1st order, thus provide strong evidence that they un-
derstand the duality requirement of both.
The fact that children switch from both to all responses as needed tells us that the
threat of infelicity is sufficient to over-ride a bias to perseverate. But all, for adults at
least, is infelicitous in the critical condition. Why is this infelicity insufficient to trigger an
analogous switch from all to both? On the hypothesis that children do not have command
of MP, this failure is predicted. Unlike adults, there would then be no principle of governing
the choice between parallel structures involving both vs. all when both is felicitous. In such
cases, children's utterance choices may be exclusively determined by extraneous factor like
perseveration.
This is, of course, not the only possibility compatible with our data. A weaker conclu-
sion might be that children's abilities with the application of MP is more fragile than their
knowledge of principles governing semantic presuppositions. This asymmetry may relate to
the inherent differences in how presuppositions and anti-presuppositions are derived: one is
a consequence of the linguistic structure of a given sentence, whereas the other is the result
of competition with an alternative. As a consequence of this fragility, deployment of MP in
a given environment may be more susceptible to interference by orthogonal pressures like
perseveration. If this is the case, no conclusions about underlying competence can be drawn
from children's failures in this task; rather, their adult-like behavior in the Critical-Ist order
should be taken as reflecting their knowledge of MP.
A final possibility is that they have adult-like command of all aspects of MP, but have
localized problems with the competition between both and all. This failure could be be-
cause, despite what we see in the control condition, children do not have an adult-like
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representation of both. Children's adult-like behavior in the control condition demonstrate
some knowledge of the duality requirement of both. However, it could be that they treat
both as akin to exactly two. Such a lexical entry would preclude the use of both in the
control condition as there were always exactly three food items eaten. At the same time, if
children are working such a representation of both, we would not expect them to treat it as
a presuppositional alternative to all, since it would be neither contextually equivalent to nor
presuppositionally stronger than all.
4.3.2 Experiment 1B: Felicity Judgment
Experiment lB aims to address certain shortcomings of the previous experiment. To ensure
that children's non-adult behavior was not due to orthogonal factors like perseveration, we
shift away from production tasks to a Felicity Judgment task. In a Felicity Judgment task,
participants are asked to directly compare alternative sentences that vary in acceptability.
Previous studies on scalar implicatures have shown this task to be more sensitive than others
(e.g. picture-selection, Truth-Value Judgment) in detecting children's underlying command
of pragmatic phenomena. For instance, when children in these tasks were presented with
logically true scalar alternatives (e.g. sentences with some vs. all), preschoolers reliably
chose the stronger or more informative one, whereas in other types of tasks, children in this
age range did not exhibit a contrast. In light of the worry about non-adult representations
for both, this experiment also includes a different type of control from Experiment 1A. The
control items require an understanding that both requires a domain of quantification with
two elements. This helps to rule out the possibility that children's non-adult behavior is the
result of their treating both on par with exactly two.
Participants, materials and procedures
Thirty-two native English speaking adults, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, and
thirty-two 4-to-6-year-olds, recruited from local area preschools, participated in this study.
The age range for children were raised from the previous study after the task was found to
be too demanding for younger children during piloting.
Participants in this task are first shown a pictured situation (a sequence of two related
images) and presented with two alternative descriptions of that situation. One description
might differ from the other in truth, grammaticality or felicity. They were tasked with
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choosing the better alternative in a binary forced-choice.
Both children and adults saw the same visual and linguistic stimuli, but the mode of
presentation of the materials as well as the instructions varied. The stimuli were presented
to adults using the IbexFarm experiment presentation tool. They saw a sequence of two
images depicting an event, followed by a screen with a pair of sentences intended to describe
what happened in the event. Participants were instructed to choose the better description by
clicking on it. The order of presentation of the sentences in the pair was counterbalanced
across two lists. Children were presented the stimuli as part of a PowerPoint presentation.
Two cartoon characters, one male, one female, were displayed on either side of the scene,
and children were told that these characters were looking at the pictures along with them.
After each sequence, the two characters produced a pre-recorded sentence describing the
event. The child was asked to reward the one who said the better sentence with a sticker. The
speaker of the target sentence was counter-balanced across two lists. Because the character
on the left side of the display always spoke first, this manipulation also meant that recency
of the target sentence was also counter-balanced. Adults were explicitly instructed that one
sentence may be worse than the other because it is false, ungrammatical or simply odd-
sounding. For children, we included a brief training session at the beginning of the task,
during which they received feedback. The training items involved comparisons between
pairs of sentences that diverged in truth, as well as pairs of sentences that were both true,
but differed in grammaticality. The latter type of training item was included to make sure
that the child understood not to rely only on truth when making their choices.
There were two experimental conditions. In the critical condition, participants saw
a two-sequence event involving exactly two objects. For example, the first image may
depict two balloons, which the experimenter explicitly calls attention to (e.g. "Look, two
balloons!"); the second would then show that both of them have popped. This scene would
be accompanied by two alternative descriptions, "Both of the balloons popped" vs. "All of
the balloons popped" (Figure 4-7). We expected adults to choose the both-variant. However,
a child who is not sensitive to MP should performance at chance in this condition, rewarding
both speakers at around the same rate. On the other hand, if children's difficulties applying
MP in the previous experiment was an artifact of competing pressures like perseveration,
we should find an improvement here, where analogous pressures do not arise.
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Figure 4-7: Example critical item, Experiment 1B
Look! Two balloons! Look what happened!
Both of the balloons popped.
All of the balloons popped.
The control condition was designed to rule out the possibility that children assign a
meaning for both that corresponds to exactly two. The scenarios all involved exactly three
objects, but something happens to just two of them. For example, there might be three
balloons, only two of which pop. The two alternate descriptions would be "Both of the
balloons popped" vs. "Two of the balloons popped". If the child understands that both
requires the domain of quantification to contain exactly two elements, then they should
choose the numeral-variant in this condition. If, however, the child assigns to both an
exactly two meaning, they should pick at random.
In addition to the experimental items, participants also saw filler items which involved
pairs of sentences where one was simply false. For instance, children may see a sequence
with three balloons, two of which popped; they would then be asked to choose the better of
two sentences like, "One/two of the balloons popped". Adults saw 16 such items; children
saw 4. Accuracy on the fillers were used as exclusion criteria for both populations.
Results
Adult participants whose filler accuracy was lower than 60% accuracy were excluded from
the analyses, as were child participants who got more than 2 fillers wrong. This resulted in
the exclusion of 1 adult and 1 child participant. Results from the remaining 31 adults and
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31 children are described below.
The rates at which adults and children chose the more appropriate sentence by condition
are represented in Figure 4-8 Figure 4-9. Adults performed at ceiling on both conditions.
However, child performance on critical vs. control conditions was asymmetric, in a manner
parallel to Experiment IA. Children's accuracy was considerably lower in the critical con-
dition, where they rewarded the character who uttered an all-statement nearly half of the
time. Accuracy on control trials, by contrast, was above chance and comparable to that of
adults.3
Figure 4-8: Accuracy, Adults
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Figure 4-9: Accuracy, Children
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We ran two separate mixed-effects logistic regressions to analyze these trends. We
first analyzed the child data separately, predicting Accuracy by Condition, with Age (mea-
sured in years and months) as a covariate. A summary of the model is given in Table 4.5.
The model revealed a significant effect of Condition, with the odds of making the accurate
choice being lower on the critical trials. There was also a marginal effect of Age, which
we did not find in Experiment IA. The main reason for this cross-experimental difference
seems to be the inclusion of the 6-year-old group in Experiment 1B. 6-year-olds' perfor-
3To be sure that the errors on the critical condition are not disproportionately made by children who also get
the control items wrong and thus may simply not know the meaning of both, we examined the data from the
subset of 22 children who made no errors on the control condition. Accuracy on critical items for this subset
was still only 52.4%.
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mance on the critical items was adult-like, at 93.7% accuracy, in stark contrast with 4- and
5-year-olds, whose accuracy rates hovered around chance, at 51% and 42% respectively.
Next, we fit a second mixed-effects model to probe for significant differences in per-
formance between the two populations. Accuracy was the response variable, and Condition
and Group (child vs. adult) and their interactions were included as fixed factors. As sum-
marized in Table 4.6, the interaction between Condition and Group was significant, with
the accuracy rates of the two groups diverging only on the critical condition.
Table 4.5: Child Performance by Condition
P SE z p
Intercept 2.14 3.09 0.69 0.49
Condition (Critical) -5.38 2.63 -2.05 0.04
Age 0.76 0.39 1.95 0.052
Table 4.6: Performance by Group and Condition
P SE z P
Intercept 5.44 1.89 2.88 0.004
Condition (Critical) -1.34 2.03 -0.66 0.51
Group (Child) -0.90 1.15 -0.78 0.43
Condition * Group -2.88 1.38 -2.09 0.036
Discussion
Findings from Experiment lB replicate in comprehension the patterns of non-adult behav-
ior found in Experiment IA. We were able to establish in the control condition that children
know that both requires a two-membered domain, unlike exactly two. Despite this knowl-
edge, when sentences with both and all were presented as alternative descriptions of a situ-
ation where the cardinality presupposition of both was met, children did not show a reliable
preference for the both-sentence. In this regard, they were different from adults, who chose
the presuppositionally stronger sentence whenever it was felicitous. Our choice of exper-
imental method, furthermore, allows us to rule out the possibility that genuine sensitivity
to MP is masked by third factors. In previous work on children's developing abilities to
compute scalar implicatures, the Felicity Judgment task has been found to facilitate access
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to strengthened meanings, with children showing a reliable preference for (true) sentences
with the stronger scalar terms. Clearly, children's behavior in Experiment 1B tells us that
there is no such facilitative effect in computing MP-effects with both and all. Even when the
competing structures are presented side-by-side, children do not show a preference from the
presuppositionally stronger alternative. Their apparent lack of a contrast between both and
all sentences in the critical condition lends support to the hypothesis that their command of
MP is non-adult-like. 4
4.3.3 Discussion of Experiments 1A and 1B
Experiments IA and 1B examine children's sensitivity to MP using competition between
both and all as a case study. In two experiments, we find a striking child-adult difference.
Children found both and all equally acceptable in environments where, for adults, the felic-
ity of both blocks the use of all. That is, children, unlike adults, did not seem to associate
all with the anti-presupposition that it is not common knowledge that the domain is a two-
membered set. It is only at around age 6 that children begin to look adult-like.
Children's performance on the control conditions was also significant. Though they are
found all acceptable in a both environment, the permissiveness was not bidirectional. Chil-
dren did not find both acceptable in what would be an all-environment for adults, namely
when the cardinality of the domain is three or more. This tells us that they assign an adult-
like meaning representation for both. We can in turn rule out some possible explanations
for why children diverge from adults in the critical conditions, e.g. a non-adult lexical entry
for both that precludes it from entering into competition with all. I take these results to
4One possibility we cannot yet rule out is that children treat the cardinality requirement of both as part of
its asserted component. Thus, the hypothesized child lexical entry for both would be as in (i).
(i) Hypothesized child representation
[both P Qj = I iff IP]jI = 2 A Vy[P(y) - Q(y)]
If so, both and all would fail to satisfy the contextual equivalence condition because now, the asserted contribu-
tion of both is stronger, and moreover, the two quantifiers would have identical presuppositions. So, MP would
not be expected to apply.
We must first ask whether it is reasonable for a learner to hypothesize a meaning as in (i) to begin with,
There are no simplex quantifiers that I know of, which encode similar meanings. But suppose this were the
meaning the child initially posits for both. If so, a both sentence would have stronger entailments than the
all counterparts and in upward entailing contexts, would be more informative. Thus, there should still be a
preference for both given informativity considerations.
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show that the component of grammar responsible for rendering all-sentences infelicitous in
both environments, namely MP, is not stably in place before the age of 6.
If command of MP is lacking or fragile before 6, we should find it across environments
where MP might apply. In the next section, I examine whether children show analogous
difficulties with MP with another set of putative MP-competitors: another vs. a.
4.4 Another vs. a
In this section, we expand our investigations into the development of MP by examining
the competition between the plain indefinite a and the presuppositionally stronger another.
In parallel to the earlier test environment, we conduct two experiments. Experiment 2A
attempts to elicit the relevant forms in a production task similar to Experiment IA above;
Experiment 2B utilizes a Felicity Judgment task, where participants choose the better of
two parallel structures with a and another.
4.4.1 Experiment 2A: Elicited Production
Participants, materials and procedure
Thirty-six children ages 3-to-5 (mean age = 4;2) and forty adults participated in the task.
English was the dominant language of all participants. As before, adults saw a "Fill-in-the-
blanks" variant of the task, presented in written form via IbexFarm. Children heard brief
stories from the experimenter while watching a PowerPoint with the visual materials.
The paradigm was very similar to that of Experiment IA. Participants were first in-
troduced to a conversational situation involving two characters. In the critical scenarios,
character A would do something, e.g. eat an apple, in the presence of character B. Later, in
the absence of B, A does the same thing again. For instance, they might eat another apple.
B returns and asks A a question of the form, "What did you do after you ate an apple?".
The participant is asked to say how A would respond to B's question. By virtue of it being
mentioned in B's question, there is a contextually salient apple. The presupposition of an-
other is thus supported and we find that an answer of the form, "I ate another apple" is both
felicitous and required in this environment. The control scenarios are minimally different
in the following way: though A takes part, once more, in two identical events, e.g. of apple-
eating, B does not bear witness to either of those events. The question posed by B would
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also differ accordingly. Crucially, the presupposition triggered by another is not satisfied in
this context, blocking its use and mandating the choice of a non-presuppositional indefinite
instead.
Sample scenarios from the child variant of the study are given in Table 4.7. Adults
saw 8 items per condition, along with 16 fillers. Children saw 3 items per condition in a
blocked design with counterbalanced order. As before, they were randomly assigned to two
orders: Critical- 1st and Control-2nd. The filler items were exactly the same across the two
experiments.
There is one point of non-parallelism between Experiments IA and 2A that is worth
noting. Because of the nature of the stories and the expressions involved, it was not possible
to exclusively prime the target response in the stories (i.e. use another, but not a in the
critical stories, and vice versa). Instead, both expressions are primed in both conditions.
Results
Participants' responses were categorized into the following Response Types: 'another', 'in-
definite', 'numeral' (specifically two), 'bare-plural' and 'other', where the 'other' category
includes irrelevant responses or no response. In addition, the responses were coded for
whether or not they matched our expectations about the acceptable response. The expecta-
tion for the critical condition was a statement involving another. There were more degrees
of freedom in the control condition: various types of indefinite NPs, including the plain
indefinite, numerical expressions, bare-plurals, were all coded as a "match".
Figures 4-10 and 4-11 plot the proportion of different types of responses produced by
adults and children in each condition. The notable finding here is the uniformity across
groups in their responses on the critical items: both populations overwhelmingly produced
utterances with another. The pattern of responses on the control condition, in contrast,
is not the same across population. One key difference is in the proportion of indefinite vs.
numeral responses, with children showing a strong preference for numerals over indefinites.
However, given that both indefinites and numerals are equally acceptable in the control
condition, this difference is not directly relevant for our purposes. Figures 4-12 and 4-13
therefore collapse across these differences and plot the rates of expected response. Finally,
as Figure 4-14 shows, children's rates of production of another did not vary by order.
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Table 4.7: Conditions, Children
Expected Response
I ate another apple
I ate a/two/some donuts
Figure 4-10: Response Types, Adults Figure 4-11: Response Types, Children
control critical
condition
Response Type
another
indefinite
numeral1
other
plural
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Condition Scenario
Critical Hippo was playing with his friend Raccoon.
But he got a little hungry. So he got an orange
from his basket and ate it right up. But he was
still hungry, so he got an apple from his bas-
ket and ate that up, too! He was so hungry
so he didn't even share with Raccoon! Then
Raccoon had to go home. After he left, Hippo
was still hungry, so he then ate another apple!
Then, Raccoon came back to play and asked
Hippo: "What did you do after you ate an ap-
ple?". What did Hippo say to Raccoon?
Control Hippo was playing with his friend Penguin.
But he got a little hungry. So he got a bar of
chocolate from his basket and ate it right up.
He was so hungry so he didn't even share with
Penguin! Then Penguin had to go home. Af-
ter she left, Hippo was still hungry so he took
out a donut and he ate that up, too. Hippo
was still hungry, so he then ate another donut!
Then, Penguin came back to play and asked
Hippo: "What did you do after you ate a
chocolate bar?" What did Hippo say to Pen-
guin?
Figure 4-12: Expected Response Rates, Figure 4-13: Expected Response Rates,
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We analyze the adult and child data separately. In both cases, we fit mixed-effects logis-
tic regressions on Expected Response Rates. The adult model predicted Expected Response
Rates as a function of Condition (control vs. critical), with random effects of participant
and item. As the model summary in Table 4.8 shows, we find no significant difference
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across conditions. For the child data, Expected Response Rates was again the dependent
variable, but we include Condition and Order and their interaction as fixed factors, and Age
as a covariate. Table 4.9 summarizes the results from this model. As with adults, we find
no effect of condition. There was, furthermore, no effect of order or of age.
Table 4.8: Summary of statistical analysis,
P SE
Intercept 3.43 0.61
Condition (Critical) -0.99 0.75
Experiment 2A, Adults
z p
5.62 <.001
-1.32 0.19
Table 4.9: Summary of statistical analysis, Experiment 2A, Children
P SE z p
Intercept 12.79 6.28 2.04 0.04
Condition (Critical) -1.67 6.88 -0.24 0.81
Order (Control-Ist) -0.54 5.30 -0.10 0.92
Condition * Order -1.65 6.11 -0.27 0.79
Age 1.48 1.91 0.78 0.44
The main result of this experiment, then, is that preschoolers display adult-like prefer-
ences when choosing between alternative sentences involving a and another. They did not
over-produce the presuppositionally stronger expression when the context failed to support
its presuppositions. This pattern is the same as in Experiment lA, where both was never
over-used, and suggests that children have an adult-like semantic representation for another.
Moreover, children never over-produced the presuppositionally weaker a when the stronger
another was felicitous. That is, to the extent that a is blocked in the critical condition due to
MP-based competition with another, children seem to be applying the principle to correctly
rule out the plain indefinite. In this respect, children's behavior in Experiment 2A diverge
drastically from that in Experiment IA, where they were seemingly insensitive to MP and
over-used the weaker expression all.
In the next subsection, we carry out a felicity judgment task, which aims at gathering
converging evidence for these patterns in comprehension.
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4.4.2 Experiment 2B: Felicity Judgment
Participants, materials and procedure
Participants in this study were 35 children ages 4-to-6-years-old and 40 adult native speak-
ers of English. The design of the experiment was parallel to Experiment 1B. Participants
first saw a pictured event in a two-image sequence and were given two possible descriptions
of that situation. The task was to choose the better description. As before, there were two
experimental conditions. The critical condition depicted two identical events that took place
in sequence, e.g. a balloon popping, followed immediately by another one. The first scene
was introduced using a sentence with the indefinite, e.g. "Look! A balloon has popped!",
so as to make salient an entity that could serve as the witness to the presupposition of an-
other. The next scene displayed a second balloon also having popped, and participants
were given a pair of competing descriptions of that event involving the plain indefinite and
another. Figure 4-15 illustrates. We expected participants to prefer the another-variant in
this environment, as mandated by MP.
Figure 4-15: Example critical item, Experiment 2B
Look! A balloon has popped! Look what happened!
Another balloon has popped.
A balloon has popped.
The control condition was intended to assess knowledge of the presupposition of another.
The scenarios set up a context where its presupposition was not met. For instance, partic-
ipants would see a minimally different scenario from the critical condition involving, e.g.,
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a single balloon-popping event. They would then be presented with the same pair of sen-
tences as in the critical condition, involving the plain indefinite vs. another. Crucially, this
time, the another sentence is infelicitous and the indefinite should be preferred.
Results
As before, adult participants whose accuracy rates on fillers were below 60% and child
participants who made more than 2 errors on fillers were excluded from the analyses. This
resulted in the exclusion of data from 1 adult and 2 child participants. Results from the rest
are represented in Figures 4-16 (Adults) and 4-17 (Children). Unsurprisingly, adults were
at ceiling on both conditions. More notably, children were also at ceiling on both critical
and control conditions.
Figure 4-16: Accuracy, Adults Figure 4-17: Accuracy, Children
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We first fit a mixed-effects logistic regression on the child data, predicting Accuracy as a
function of Condition, with Age as covariate. Results from the model, summarized in Table
4.10, reveal no significant effect of Condition or Age. We then fit a separate mixed-effects
logistic regression on the adult and child data combined. The predictors in this model were
Condition, Group (adult vs. child) and the interaction of these factors. Results from the
model suggest that children are worse performers overall compared to adults. However,
there were no other significant effects (Table 4. 11).
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Table 4.10: Child Performance by Condition
1 SE z p
Intercept -0.41 1.44 -0.28 0.78
Condition (Critical) 0.49 0.58 0.86 0.39
Age 0.43 0.27 1.60 0.11
Table 4.11: Performance by Group and Condition
P SE z P
Intercept 3.55 0.49 7.20 < .001
Condition (Critical) -0.47 0.69 -0.69 0.48
Group (Child) -1.77 0.53 -3.36 < .001
Condition * Group 1.05 0.69 1.52 0.13
In sum, these results both corroborate the findings from Experiment 2A and stand in
stark contrast with Experiment 1B, where children were choosing randomly between both
and all sentences in the critical condition.
4.4.3 Discussion of Experiments 2A and 2B
The main objective in Experiments 2A and 2B was to ascertain whether children's apparent
lack of sensitivity to MP observed in Experiments lA/IB is general in nature. To this end,
we tested their sensitivity to MP with another pair of expressions commonly taken to be MP-
competitors, another and a. The results from these studies sharply contrast with those from
the previous pair. Children were found to be entirely adult-like in their uses of another and
a, reliably using the presuppositionally stronger another whenever felicitous and rejecting
weaker sentences with the plain indefinite. Given our assumptions thus far, successfully
ruling out the plain indefinite in favor of another requires knowledge of MP and the ability
to deploy this knowledge in an adult-like manner. The findings from Experiments 2A and
2B then indicate that MP is in place by the preschool years.
In other words, the two sets of results seem to be pulling us towards opposite conclu-
sions regarding children's competence with MP. In what follows, I discuss a possible way of
reconciling these findings, which involves eschewing with some of our starting theoretical
assumptions.
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4.5 General Discussion
4.5.1 Non-uniformity across test environments
This chapter set out to examine children's knowledge of MP as a principle governing utter-
ance choice. I adopted a fairly standard formulation of MP, repeated below in (24), along
with the assumption that competition is triggered by specific lexical items with presup-
positional alternatives. Children's sensitivity to MP was assessed using two such sets of
alternatives, {both, all} and {another, a}.
(24) For two sentences 0 and yf whose presuppositions are satisfied in a context c:
(i) If 4 and yf are competitors for MP, and
(ii) $ and V are contextually equivalent relative to c, and
(iii) 4 carries stronger presuppositions than yf, then
4 should be preferred to yi in c
Independent measures were taken to ensure that children knew the meanings of the expres-
sions involved. The expectation, then, was that if children have MP in place as a principle
governing utterance choice, they should never use a presuppositionally weaker form when
the stronger alternative was contextually felicitous.
What is striking about our findings, however, is that we find what looks to be non-
uniform success in applying MP. With the competitors a and another, children displayed
adult-like behavior, favoring the presuppositionally stronger another whenever it was us-
able. However, with both and all, they did not show a similar bias. Children found the
two forms equally acceptable in contexts where the cardinality presupposition of both was
satisfied. Taking these results at face value, we are left to draw conclusions in opposing
directions: children's adult-likeness with another/a points to underlying knowledge of MP,
whereas their non-adultlike behavior with both/all point to a lack of command of the prin-
ciple.
How can we reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings? One possibility is that
even after the principle itself is in place, there might be additional learning of when the
principle should apply. Children might need to identify, in a piecemeal fashion, different
sets of presuppositional alternatives. That is, in addition to knowing the lexical meanings
of competing expressions and the algorithm for computing anti-presuppositional effects,
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there might be a separate layer of learning, figuring out which lexical items belong on a
scale of presuppositional strength. The idea that there is an additional step of learning of
alternative sets was originally proposed by Barner, Brooks & Bale (2011) in the domain
of scalar implicatures, another pragmatic phenomena where we observe non-uniformity
across environments in the rates at which children compute the relevant inferences. On this
view, our results can be taken as evidence that children have command of MP as a general
principle, though the two sets of presuppositional alternatives are identified at different
points in development.
The explananda on this approach are two-fold. First, why are certain alternative sets
earlier-acquired than others? Second, how are they learned to begin with? With respect
to the cases of interest here, we might ask: why do children associate a and another as
scale-mates, but not both and all, and moreover, how do they eventually learn that the latter
pair are indeed scale-mates? One answer to the first question is that the morphological
make-up of another makes its ties to the plain indefinite transparent. No such cues are
available with both and all. That said, it is less obvious what evidence the child might use
to learn that both and all are presuppositional alternatives. In the case of scales involved in
implicature-calculation, Barner et al. (2011) suggests that explicit contrasts like 'some but
not all' could be highly informative pieces of evidence. However, the same strategy will not
work for both and all, where the crucial difference lies in the presuppositional component
of meaning. Rarely, if ever, do we make explicit the falsity of the presuppositions of an
alternative when using a weaker term.
A different avenue, which I will pursue here, involves abandoning the goal of recon-
ciliation, and instead taking the child data to inform us about the underlying phenomena.
On our current assumptions, the oddness effects associated with a and all sentences are
both treated as the result of problematic anti-presuppositions. However, what the observed
developmental asymmetry might be telling us is that the two test environments do not im-
plicate the same type of process, i.e. they are not both MP-effects. If this is the case, we
will need to revise our initial assumptions in such a way that the two environments may be
distinguished. I will show below that once we eschew with reliance on lexically-stipulated
sets of presuppositional alternatives and adopt instead an intensional characterization of
what constitutes a competitor, the core difference between the two test environments be-
comes visible. Specifically, we find that the oddness effect associated with indefinites can
no longer be attributed to MP-competition.
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4.5.2 Competition and complexity
So far in this chapter, we have been assuming that alternatives for MP are specified in terms
of scales (Percus 2006; Chemla 2008; Schlenker 2012), much like alternatives for scalar
implicatures (Horn 1972; Gazdar 1979). A scale is a set of lexical items, such that two
structures will be considered alternatives of each other if they differ only in the substitu-
tion of one scale-mate for another. This seems necessary to capture the fact that not all
structures that otherwise meet the other criteria for MP-competition give rise to MP-effects.
By way of illustration, consider the two pairs in (25) and (26). The competition between
the former pair is familiar to us by now. The presuppositionally weaker sentence with the
indefinite (25-b) leads to the anti-presupposition that the stronger variant with the definite
is infelicitous in the context. Now, the sentence in (26-a) is equivalent to (26-b) modulo
its stronger presupposition. However, the presuppositionally weaker (26-b) is not tied to an
anti-presupposition that it is not common belief that there are exactly two guests. What this
contrast tells us is that a theory of MP must come with a formal condition on competitors,
and that this condition should ensure that the pair in (26) are not generated as competing
alternatives. On a scale-based account as we have been working with, we would rule out
competition between (26-a) and (26-b) by stipulating the non-existence of the scale { the,
the two }.
(25) a. The guest left. --*Presupposition: There is exactly 1 guest.
b. A guest left. -Anti-presupposition: It's not common ground that there is
exactly 1 guest.
(26) a. The two guests left. -- Presuppositon: There are exactly 2 guests.
b. The guests left. -Absent anti-presupposition: It's not common ground that
there are exactly 2 guests.
However, positing the existence or non-existence of such scales is not without problems,
both conceptual and empirical. As pointed out in 4.2.1, determining what structures enter
into MP-competition is a non-trivial task, and there are debates surrounding whether or not
certain types of oddness effects should be characterized as anti-presuppositional effects.
The stipulative nature of scales exacerbates the difficulty, as it fails to offer independent
constraints on what structures can compete. Any two expressions can, in principle, be
treated as scale-mates, and sometimes, scales stipulated to account for some phenomena
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may lead to the wrong solution.
There are also empirical reasons for eschewing with such lexical stipulations. Consider
the pairs of sentences in (27) and (28). The (a) and (b) sentences in the two examples are
contextually equivalent (modulo certain implicatures) but differ crucially in that the (a)-
variants carry stronger presuppositions. For instance, (27-a) would be felicitous whenever
it is common knowledge that there were exactly two points scored by John; (27-b) would
be felicitous so long as it is known that there were two or three such points. What is of
interest to us is the fact that whenever the (a)-variant is assertable, the structure in (b) is
judged odd. This clearly has the markings of an anti-presuppositional effect, though it is
far from obvious how to generate the competing structures via substitution of lexical items
from a scale. In order to subsume cases like (27) and (28) under the umbrella of MP, we
must allow for competition to take place between structures on the whole.
(27) Context: It is common knowledge that John scored two points
a. The two points John scored impressed Mary.
b. #The two or three points John scored impressed Mary.
(Rouillard & Schwarz 2017))
(28) Context: It is common knowledge that every boy has a bike.
a. Every boy rode his bike to school.
b. #Every boy who has a bike rode his bike to school.
A promising solution, originally proposed within the domain of scalar implicatures by
(Katzir 2007) and extended to MP in e.g. Rouillard & Schwarz (2017), is to replace scales
with a structure-sensitive algorithm for generating alternatives (Katzir 2007). On this ap-
proach, a structure or Logical Form S' counts as an alternative to a sentence S only if: (i)
S' is at most as complex at S and (ii) S' is derivable from S through successive steps of (a)
substitutions (i.e. replacing an element in S with an element of the lexicon) or (b) deletions
(i.e. removing subconstituents of S). Notice that the complexity-based algorithm would im-
mediately rule out competition between (26-a) and (26-b) as desired (the former is strictly
more complex). It also rightly rules in competition between the pairs in (27) and (28) (the
stronger alternative is generated via deletion of a subconstituent).
Does a complexity-based approach predict competition between sentences involving
both/all and another/a? Let us take both and all first. The expressions are both quantifi-
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cational determiners, which I take to head a DP in the syntax. The structure in (29-a) may
be derived from (29-b) via a single replacement of the terminal node Do, a licit operation.
Thus, (29-a) would be generated as an alternative to (29-b).
(29) a. Phillip broke both of his hands.
b. #Phillip broke all of his hands.
On the other hand, competition between an and another no longer goes through. Although
both another and a are standalone words in English, another is structurally more complex
than the plain indefinite: it decomposes into an indefinite and the adjectival morpheme
other, in a structure like (30).
(30) DP
D AdjP
an Adj NP
other N 0
Further evidence for such a decomposition comes from the fact that its sub-parts can be
accessed independently. For instance, is possible to replace an- in another with another
article, e.g. the, to form the other, and the meaning changes accordingly from indefinite
to definite. Crucially, because of this complexity, the algorithm for deriving alternatives
cannot generate a sentence like (31-a) as a competitor to (31-b). The former cannot be
derived from (31-b) via substitution or deletion of constituents; addition of structure would
be necessary.
(31) a. I had another coffee.
b. I had a coffee.
The upshot, then, is that while we can maintain our initial assumption that all-sentences
are blocked in certain environments due to MP-competition with both, we can no longer
call upon MP to derive the oddness of sentences with indefinites in another-environments;
the two structures are not alternatives. Moreover, the experimental findings suggest that
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whatever is responsible for blocking indefinites is acquired early on by children. The true
representative of the MP-class, on this revised outlook, is competition between both and
all. Children's apparent tolerance of all in both environments tell us that MP is not a stable
part of young children's grammar.
4.5.3 Excursion: Both vs. all and the French problem
Unlike another, which decomposes into two separate morphemes, both was assumed to be
monomorphic. Consequently, a structure with both can be straightforwardly derived as an
alternative to the all-variant, as all it involves is the substitution of a single node in the
structure. This line of thinking would make the following prediction: if a language does not
have a lexeme with a meaning expressed by English both, the expression corresponding to
English all would be felicitous in a sentence of the form I talked to all of my students even
when it is common believe that I have only two students. This prediction follows from the
facts that anti-presuppositional effects are derived via competition and that competition is
limited to a certain types of alternatives. At first blush, however, this prediction does not
seem to be met. As noted by Chemla (2007), French tous 'all' is associated with an anti-
presuppositional effect of non-duality, despite the fact that French lacks a counterpart to
both (32-a). The corresponding meaning is expressed periphrastically, with the expression
tous les doux 'all the two' (32-b).
(32) a. #Philippe c'est cass6 tous les bras
Philippe has broken all the hands
'Philippe has broken all of his hands'
b. Philippe c'est cass6 tous les doux bras
Philippe has broken all the two hands
'Philippe has broken both of his hands'
The puzzle posed by French is the following: what blocks tous 'all' in (32-a), given
that the structure in (32-b), which is strictly more complex than (32-a), is not considered
an alternative to it? The French facts suggests that a full account of anti-presuppositional
effects with all cannot rest on the existence of a lexical item meaning both. Though it takes
us slightly off-path, before moving on, I want to suggest a possible way of thinking about
all and both that would account for both the English and French facts. 5
5Thanks to Danny Fox (p.c.) for suggesting the analysis in this section.
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The approach makes crucial use of Sauerland's (2003) system for interpreting grammat-
ical number (see also Sauerland, Andersen & Yatsushiro 2005; Dvorak & Sauerland 2006).
The key ingredients of this system are the following. First, plural and singular marking is
not semantically interpreted on NPs; rather, number features head their own projections,
OPs, which take DPs as arguments. This enriched syntax of nominals is represented in (33).
(33) OP
DP
A
SINGULAR/PLURAL D NP
Number features represent (e, e) identity functions. The meanings for plural and singular
features are given in (34).
(34) a. fPLURALJ =A X. X
B. SINGULAR = XX.: ATOM(X). X
The feature [PLURAL] is an unrestricted function, i.e. its meaning is essentially that of the
DP argument, but [SINGULAR] introduces the presupposition that the entity denoted by its
argument is atomic. Consequently, the structure in (35) is interpretable, but the structure in
(36) is not: the plurality the boys is not in the domain of [SINGULAR].
(35) OP
DP
SINGULAR D NP
the boy
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(36) OP
0 DP
SINGULAR D NP
the boys
The entries in (34) alone do not fully capture the distribution of singular and plural morphol-
ogy. This is because as it stands, we predict the following structure to be well-formed. Be-
cause [PLURAL] is presupposition-less, it should in principle be compatible with an atomic
argument, so why do we find plural incompatible with singularities?
(37) OP
0 DP
PLURAL D NP
the boy
Sauerland argues that MP is responsible. Because [SINGULAR] carries a stronger presup-
position than [PLURAL], MP demands that the former should be preferred whenever it is
felicitous.
This general account of number straightforwardly extends to quantificational DPs once
we make the assumption that quantifiers undergo QR and leave behind a type e trace. QR is
necessary to resolve a type mismatch: a DP of generalized-quantifier type would otherwise
be required to compose with a 4-feature, which takes a type e argument. This solution is
illustrated in (38).
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(38) TP
DP TP
Some boys(,,,) 1 TP
OP TP
O(e,e) tie are nice
The presuppositional semantics for number marking above, together with MP, thus pro-
vides a general account of the distribution of number features on referential and quantifica-
tional DPs. Returning now to both and all, the core idea that I want to pursue is this: both
and all are spell-outs of a universal quantifier plus number, where the crucial difference
between the two expressions lies in the identity of the number feature itself. Specifically,
all spells out V + [PLURAL], whereas both spells out V + [DUAL].
To pursue this idea fully, we would need to make the following assumption: every
language, even those that lack the relevant morpho-syntactic correlates, is furnished with a
feature [DUAL], with the meaning in (39).
(39) fDUAL = UX: IXI= 2.X
In English, this feature is syncretic with [PLURAL] with respect to both number marking
on nominals (e.g. two boys and three boys both surface with -s) or in verbal agreement
(the verb must display plural agreement for both two boys and three boys). However, the
distinction between a [PLURAL] OP and a [DUAL] OP becomes visible when they combine
with a universal quantifier. Specifically, the framed portion of the structure in (40) spells
out as all, whereas the corresponding elements in (41) spell out as both.
Parallel sentences with both and all would make universal claims, with the former car-
rying a duality presupposition. MP, moreover, would mandate the use of the structure in
(39) over (38) whenever the duality presupposition is satisfied in the context. The main
difference between our earlier assumptions and this one is source of the duality presuppo-
sition. Here, the presupposition is contributed by number morphology and not encoded as
part of the meaning of the quantifier.
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OP OP
DP DP
PLURAL D NP DUAL D NP
1 1
(40) V all (41) V both
The English facts thus can be explained on this view. What we would need to say about
French is that while its grammar generates the two structures in (41) and (40), there is a
paradigm gap in the morphology. Parallel to English, French would spell out the framed
part of (40) as tous. However, no analogous spell-out exists for (41). Importantly, since
alternatives for MP are structures or LFs on our revised assumptions, a structure involving
V + [DUAL] would nevertheless compete with one involving V + [PLURAL]. MP would in
turn block the use of tous when the domain of quantification is a two-membered set. Given
the paradigm gap, the only solution French-speakers have is to resort to a different structure,
e.g. (32-b), altogether.
4.6 Summary and next steps
This chapter set out to investigate children's ability to adjudicate between structures diverg-
ing only in presuppositional strength, and in turn, their knowledge of Maximize Presuppo-
sition!, the principle governing this type of competition. We examined two sets of putative
MP-competitors: both vs. all and another vs. a. The experiments revealed an asymme-
try: preschoolers were able to detect the infelicity of a statement with the plain indefinite
in another-environments, but unable to detect the infelicity of an all-statement in a both-
environment. I took these findings to serve as motivation for revising some of the initial
assumptions about MP, in particular about what constitutes a competitor for MP. These re-
visions led to the conclusion that the choice between a and another is not in fact modulated
by MP.
We started with the question of whether preschoolers are sensitive to MP and whether
they derive anti-presuppositional effects in an adult-like way. Regarding this question,
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preschoolers' non-adult behavior with both and all leads to the conclusion that they do
not have adult-like abilities with MP during this stage in development. In comparison, the
component of grammar that renders a-sentences odd in another-environments seems to be
earlier-acquired. The observed non-uniformity in development, on this new outlook, is no
longer a puzzle, then. Rather, it reflects non-uniformity in the underlying phenomena.
The state-of-affairs raises a new set of questions: what is behind the oddness effects
we observe with the plain indefinite, and why is this aspect of grammar easier for chil-
dren to master? The goal of the next chapter is to explore these questions in-depth. More
concretely, I pursue the hypothesis that the oddness of a in certain environments can be
explained as a consequence of an independently needed theory of focus. No reference is
made to parallel structures with another. Instead, expressions like another are simply res-
cue mechanisms that circumvent the problem caused by the plain indefinite.
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Chapter 5
Obligatory presuppositions
elsewhere
5.1 Introduction
The core finding from the preceding chapter was a developmental asymmetry. Faced with
two seemingly similar competition environments - both vs. all and another vs. a - children
showed an adult-like preference for the stronger competitor in the case of another and a, but
not both and all. Children found both and all equally acceptable in contexts where adults
strongly preferred both. Taking these findings as motivating a revision of the starting as-
sumptions, I argued that the choice between a and another does not fall under the purview
of the principle, Maximize Presupposition!. Consequently, preschoolers' performance in
this environment does not inform us of their competence with MP. Rather, preschoolers'
lack of a preference between both and all suggests that children in this age range are not
sensitive to MP in an adult-like way.
The fact remains, however, that a sentence with the plain indefinite is generally odd in
circumstances where the another-variant is usable. Understanding why this is may shed
light on why the developmental trajectories look the way they do. Thus, a key desideratum
is explaining what, if not MP, is at the source of the oddness of indefinites in another-
environments. The aim of this chapter is to provide such an explanation.
My proposal, in a nutshell, is that sentences with indefinites are odd in "repeat instance"
situations - situations where the presupposition of another is incidentally met - because
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they cannot be associated with a licit focus structure. Such sentences make existential
claims and when the claim is about an event that is identical to a preceding one, such an
existential statement is either uninformative, or construed with implicit (i.e. covert) domain
restriction. If the indefinite is covertly restricted, rules of focus require the restrictor to be
F(ocus)-marked. Focus cannot, however, be realized on this constituent due to the sim-
ple fact that it is silent. An additional principle - MINIMIZE Focus - blocks focussing
of some larger constituent with phonological content (which would resolve the issue of
phonologically realizing focus), resulting in the ineffability of these sentences.
Before laying out the details of the analysis, it is worth spelling of why such an al-
ternative is necessary in the first place. I will therefore begin with a discussion of why
extant accounts, e.g. MP, cannot account for the relevant oddness effects. As I will point
out in the next section, not only would our experimental findings remain a mystery on an
MP-based account, it also makes wrong predictions. It over-generates oddness effects with
indefinites, while also missing the generalization that the effect appears to be quite general,
extending beyond sentences with indefinites. In 5.3, I lay out my proposal. While the main
focus is on indefinites, I will also discuss how the key ideas may be carried over to other
environments. In the final portion of the chapter, I return to developmental issues. The
experimental findings from Chapter 4 are reconsidered in light of the account developed
here. The broader implications of the account, especially in relation to the development of
various types of pragmatic competition, are discussed.
5.2 Insufficiency of extant accounts
There are two existing candidate accounts for explaining the oddness effects in question.
The first, as already discussed at some length, is Maximize Presupposition!. In 5.2.1, I
show why an MP-based account is problematic above and beyond the conceptual issues
already pointed out in the previous chapter.
The second possibility has more appeal. Recently, it has been argued that certain "oblig-
atory presupposition" effects should be thought of as rescue mechanisms for circumventing
unwanted exhaustivity implicatures (Bade 2016; Aravind & Hackl 2017a). The presupposi-
tional expressions involved - too, again - have in common with another that they trigger
"second-instance" presuppositions, and so a unification is primafacie desirable. However,
I show in 5.2.2 that such an account is also empirically untenable.
142
5.2.1 Maximize Presupposition!
We already discussed two reasons to be suspicious of an MP-based story for the oddness
effect with indefinites. The first is the observed developmental asymmetry. Children were
adult-like in ruling out weaker indefinite sentences in another-environments, while failing
to show an analogous dispreference for all in both-environments. One reason for children's
divergent behavior across environments might be the fact that they implicate different pro-
cesses, with different developmental trajectories. Competition between both and all appears
to be a genuine MP effect, but the choice between a and another may not be governed by
this principle. Secondly, treating another and a as competitors would mean losing a gen-
eral, independently-motivated theory of alternatives. A structural-complexity based algo-
rithm for alternative-generation a la Katzir (2007)-a general and non-stipulative theory
that should apply to presuppositional alternatives, as well - would not generate a structure
with another as an alternative to the variant with a.
In what follows, I want to show that even if we put aside these concerns, an MP-based
account turns out to be inadequate. An explanation on which the felicity of another blocks
the use of a is both too strong -not all environments in which another is usable block
a - and too weak - intuitively similar oddness effects arise with sentences that do not
involve indefinites at all.
Too strong
The lexical entries assumed in the preceding chapter for a and another are repeated below:
(1) a. an[otheri]]j = .XP(e,t): P(g(i)). ZQ(e,t). Ey[y -f g(i) A P(y) A Q(y)]
b. fafc = 11P(e,t). XQ e,t). ly[P(y) A Q(y)]
On an MP-account, when contextual equivalence obtains between parallel structures with
a and another, the structure with another should be chosen. As explained in the previous
chapter, contextual equivalence between a NP VP and another NP VP will obtain whenever
it is common knowledge that the VP cannot be true of the same entity twice, e.g. with pred-
icates of consumption. Thus, the second sentence in (2) is odd because MP mandates the
use of another here: (i) a parallel structure with another would be contextually equivalent
to (2) - the witness of the claim in both cases is a different coffee from before, and (ii) the
presupposition of another is satisfied-the preceding sentence makes salient a coffee, as
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required for the felicity of another.
(2) I had a coffee. #Then, I had a coffee.
However, as we observe in (3), not all environments where the two criteria are met force
the use of another. In (3), contextual-equivalence would obtain between structures with
a and the presuppositionally-stronger another, by virtue of the fact that the same coffee
cannot be drunk twice. However, the indefinite is felicitous. This is unexpected on an MP-
account. MP is generally thought to be a compulsory principle, in that if the conditions for
its application are met, the stronger variant must be used.
(3) a. I had a coffee. Then, you had a coffee.
b. I had a coffee. Then, you had another coffee.1
Too weak
On the flip side, an account that relies on competition between a and another is arguably not
general enough. Intuitively similar oddness effects arise with sentences that do not involve
indefinites in the first place. Illustrative examples are given in (4) and (5).
(4) A: What did you do before lunch?
B: I worked.
A: Well what did you do after lunch?
B: #1 worked.
(5) A: Where were they in the summer of 2016?
B: They were in Cape Cod.
A: Where were they last summer?
#They were in Cape Cod.
Though the ill-formed structures here do not involve an indefinite, they are similar to cases
like (2) in that they describe a token occurrence of an event type that had happened before.
Moreover, as with (2), the structure can be rescued with the insertion of a presuppositional
1Another does not feel entirely good here, and to the extent that it does, one is tempted to interpret another
coffee as describing another kind of coffee. One reason for this could be that another is a more complex
expression that would otherwise make no contribution.
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expression, e.g. (6).
(6) A: Well what did you do after lunch?
B: I worked again/some more.
In these respects, the oddness effects exemplified by (7) and (8) seem to form a class with
that of cases like (2). However, it is not obvious how to subsume these kinds of cases under
the umbrella of MP, in part because it is not obvious what the ill-formed (a)-sentences
are competing with. To the extent that there is competition, it seems to be between some
presuppositional expression, e.g. again, some more, and its absence thereof.
5.2.2 Unwanted exhaustivity implicatures
While (4) and (5) do not look like paradigmatic MP-environments, they are reminiscent of a
different set of environments where expressions triggering "additive" or "second-instance"
presuppositions are obligatory. The cases that have received the most attention in the litera-
ture involve sequences like (7), where the second sentence in the pair is infelicitous without
the particle too (Kaplan 1989; Krifka 1999; Saebs 2004; Chemla 2008; Amsili & Beyssade
2009; Singh 2011; Bade 2016; Aravind & Hackl 2017a).
(7) a. Dana went to the party.
#Lee went to the party.
b. Dana went to the party.
/Lee went to the party, too
Though the obligatoriness of too in such cases has previously been analyzed as an MP
effect 2(Chemla 2008; Singh 2008; Amsili & Beyssade 2009), Bade (2016) presents a series
of arguments as to why this cannot be so. For instance, she points out that unlike canonical
MP environments, where, as mentioned earlier, the use of a presuppositionally stronger
expression is compulsory whenever that expression is felicitous, the obligatoriness of too is
variable. In (8-a), for instance too no longer seems to be mandatory.
(8) a. Dana went to the party and Lee went to the party.
2 Cherla (2008) argues that the competitor of too in these cases is a null morpheme that denotes the identity
function.
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b. Dana went to the party and Lee went to the party, too.
This is mysterious on an MP-based account. In both (7-a) and (8-a), the additive presuppo-
sition of too is satisfied (locally in the conjunctive environment; globally in cases like (7-a)
and (7-b). If too-sentences compete for MP with variants without the particle, we predict
a uniform preference for too in both cases. (Notice the family resemblance between these
cases and the a/another examples from (3) earlier.)
Bade (2016) proposes an alternative account, on which too is inserted to block an un-
wanted exhaustivity implicature that would contradict contextual knowledge. Exhaustive
interpretations arise due to the presence of a covert EXH operator (Fox 2007; Chierchia,
Fox & Spector 2012), which conveys exclusivity as part of its meaning. EX H takes a propo-
sition p and a set of alternatives (provided by the Question Under Discussion (QUD)) and
asserts that p is true and all non-weaker alternatives to p are false. In the absence of too, the
second sentence in sequences like (7) is, by default, interpreted exhaustively. This results
in the implication that no one other than Lee went to the party, which of course is at odds
with what was asserted just before. The insertion of too precludes the insertion of EXH, in
turn circumventing the problematic exhaustivity implicature.
Notice how the account explains the acceptability of (8-a). In this case, EXH can attach
above the entire conjunction. An exhaustive parse of the sentence would then be unprob-
lematic: the implication would be that no one besides Dana and Lee went to the party.
The account also predicts that when the form of the alternatives is such that negating them
would not lead to a contextual contradiction, too is optional. We see this in (9). In (9),
the second sentence is interpreted relative to the QUD, Besides Dana, who went?. The set
of alternatives that serves as the restrictor of EXH is therefore a set of propositions of the
form 'Besides Dana, x went'. An exhaustive interpretation of the second sentence leads
to the implication that Lee is the only person besides Dana who went, which is consistent
with-in fact, entails - the preceding sentence.
(9) A: Who went to the party?
B: Dana went to the party.
A: Besides Dana, who went?
B: Lee went to the party.
Could this account also explains the obligatoriness of another in the environments we
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care about? An extension of Bade's (2016) analysis to a vs. another is appealing, both
because of the similarities in the type of discourses in which the oddness effects arise,
and because of parallels between too and another. Both too and another presuppose that
the context makes salient some element different from the one the assertion is about; this
element is of propositional type in the case of too, but an individual in the case of another.
In spite of its appeal, a unification of the two cases is not so straightforward. Bade's
(2016) obligatory additive environments differ from the cases of interest here in the fol-
lowing way: another is required even when the additive-less variant would not create a
contextual contradiction. In other words, problematic exhaustivity implicatures cannot be
the full explanation. To see this, consider again a critical item from the elicited production
task (Experiment 2A) described in the previous chapter.
(10) Hippo was playing with his friend Raccoon. But he got a little hungry. So he got
an orange from his basket and ate it right up. But he was still hungry, so he got
an apple from his basket and ate it right up! He was too hungry so he didn't even
share with Raccoon! Then Raccoon had to go home and do some chores, so he
said, I'll be back later! Hippo was still hungry, so he then ate another apple! Then,
Raccoon came back to play and asked Hippo: "What did you do after you ate an
apple?". What did Hippo say to Raccoon?
a. I ate another apple.
b. #Iate an apple.
The set of alternatives EXH takes as its argument is provided by the QUD, which in this case
is Raccoon's question: What did you do after you ate an apple?. The alternatives are of the
form: 'I did P after I ate an apple.' An exhaustive interpretation of the sentence in (10-b) is
consistent with the context: eating an apple (and nothing else) is precisely what Hippo did
after the first apple-eating event. Nevertheless, the plain indefinite is dispreferred.
The same is true of the other environments we saw in the preceding section, e.g. (11).
(11) A: What did you do before lunch?
B: I worked.
A: Well what did you do after lunch?
a. B: #I worked.
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b. B:Iworked again.
The QUD What did you do after lunch? delimits the time points of interest to those after
lunch. An exhaustive interpretation of B's reply in (Il-a) should be unproblematic. It
conveys that all they did after lunch is work, which is consistent with their having done
nothing else before lunch. An expression like again is obligatory here all the same.
What we observe, then, is that the structures in question are odd in certain contexts even
when they are consistent with contextual information. This suggests that we are dealing
with a different type of phenomenon from the obligatory additive effects that are the focus
of Bade (2016).
5.2.3 Local summary
In this section, we have learned that existing explanations for the preference for presup-
positionally stronger expressions cannot explain the oddness-effects associated with indef-
inites. An MP-based account, for instance, over-predicts ill-formedness, and an alternative
exhaustification-based account wrongly predicts all of the cases examined to be felicitous.
Moreover, the empirical terrain seems to be broader than sentences involving indefinites,
further motivating an alternative account general enough to apply across various otherwise
dissimilar environments.
My goal in the next section is to argue for such an alternative. Pre-theoretically, what
is shared by the discourses of interest is that they describe two token events of the same
type. My proposal takes this observation as its starting point. I will argue that the problem
arises when a weak existential sentence is used to talk about a token occurrence of some
event type that has been instantiated previously.3 All that an existential statement requires
for its truth is one witness instantiating the claim. When the sentence is about the second
token of some event type that is known to have already taken place, such a statement will
either be (i) unrestricted and uninformative, or (ii) construed with an appropriate covert
domain restrictor that makes the sentence informative by excluding the prior token event.
The introduction of a covert restrictor, while solving the problem of uninformativity, creates
its own set of problems. Principles of focus will mandate that the covert restrictor must bear
F(ocus)-marking and moreover, that it is the only constituent that bears Focus. However,
3I argue below that the relevant sentences without indefinites, e.g. (11-a), also involve existential claims,
but over times rather than individuals.
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because Focus cannot be appropriately realized prosodically on a silent element, ineffability
ensues.
5.3 Proposal
In this section, I build the formal proposal. The analysis pursued here aims to derive the
oddness of indefinites in certain environments from an independently needed theory of
focus. In 5.3.1, I describe the framework for focus I will be assuming. After spelling
out the necessary auxiliary assumptions in 5.3.2, I turn to the details of the analysis in
5.3.3 and 5.3.4. The discussion in the previous section demonstrated the generality of the
phenomenon we are dealing with. With this in mind, 5.3.5 will show how the core proposal
can be extended to non-indefinite environments.
5.3.1 Framework
Sentences must be pronounced with varying prominence patterns, depending on the context
they occur in. Here and throughout, I use small caps to indicate when the expression bears a
high level of prosodic prominence. B's utterances in both (12) and (13), for example, would
typically be pronounced with a pitch accent on the subject DANA.
(12) A: John admires Sue.
B: No. DANA admires Sue.
(13) A: Dana admires Mary.
B: #No. DANA admires Sue.
Prosodic prominence on Dana in (12) and (13) signals that that constituent bears se-
mantic focus, and focus imposes specific requirements on the context. For the focus on the
subject in (12) and (13) to be felicitous, the context must provide an antecedent involving
a contrasting subject, but is identical otherwise. The discourse in (12) provides such an
antecedent; the discourse in (13) does not, hence its ill-formedness. Rooth's (1992) theory
of contrastive focus, which I lay out below, is aimed at explaining these types of effects of
focus.
Focus is represented in the narrow syntax with a formal feature "F" on focused con-
stituents (Jackendoff 1972); this feature mediates between pronunciation (i.e. stress/accent
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placement) and meaning (emphasis, highlighting). The principal interpretive effect of focus
is to introduce alternatives to the F-marked constitutent. Thus, the focussing of the subject
Dana in (13) results in the evocation of a set of alternative individuals x to Dana, and at
the level of the entire sentence, a set of alternatives of the form 'x admires Sue'. The set of
alternatives can be obtained by substituting constituents marked with the syntactic feature
F with contextually relevant alternative meanings. On Rooth's (1992) theory, in addition
to its the ordinary semantic value, ja]c, constituents have a focus-semantic value, axf,
representing the set of alternatives.
In Rooth's system, focus-semantic-values are obtained by replacing the F-marked con-
stituent with any element of the same semantic type. For instance, if the F-marked con-
stituent denotes an individual, its focus-value will be a set of individuals; if it denotes a
proposition, its focus-value will be a set of propositions. Here, instead, I adopt a structure-
sensitive algorithm for computing focus-semantic values proposed in Fox & Katzir (2011),
which is an extension of Katzir's (2007) theory for alternatives defended in the previous
chapter. The set of possible substitutions for an F-marked constituent includes constituents
of comparable complexity, as well as sub-constituents (14).
(14) a. Structural complexity
S' , S (to be read as: S' is at most as complex as S) if:
(i) S' can be derived from S by successive replacements of sub-constituents
of S with elements of the substitution source
(ii) where the substitution source for a constituent X is the lexicon and the
sub-constituents of X.
b. Complexity-based algorithm for computing focus-values
S]f = {S' : S' is derived from S by replacing focused constituents x1 ,...,xn
with y ,...,y, where I - x-,...,Yn x
An example of where the two theories would diverge is the following: whereas a type-based
algorithm for substitutions would take a complex, but entity-denoting DP Dana and Lee as
a suitable substitution for Dana in e.g. (12), a structure-based approach would not. For
further arguments that focus-semantic values must make reference to structured objects, i.e.
LFs, the reader is referred to Fox (1999); Fox & Katzir (2011).
The focus semantic value by itself does not yet predict the interpretive effects of focus.
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For this, Rooth introduces an operator, -, the Squiggle, which operates over focus-semantic
values. The operator takes two arguments: a syntactic phrase a and a covert pronoun,
typically represented as Ci. The phrase to which - adjoins is referred to as the prejacent
or the 'focus domain'. The pronoun is typically referred to as the 'focus anaphor'. Here,
I make the simplifying assumption that ~ attaches at the sentential-level, and in turn, that
the focus domain is always a clause. This is schematized in (15). Here, the DP Dana is the
focus within a focus-domain spanning the TP.
TP
(15) C7 DanaF admires Sue
The ~-operator accounts for the appropriateness of F-placement in a given structure by
introducing presuppositions that restrict the possible values for the focus anaphor. As a free
pronoun, C must receive a value made salient in the context. The - -operator requires that
the focus anaphor stand in one of two specific relations to the focus semantic value of the
prejacent:
(16) [ [a ~ CJ]] presupposes that either:
a. g(i) E ac f & g(i) 0 a c CONTRASTIVE Focus
b. g(i) C a f A -3p[p E g(i) 0 A p 7 a 0 ] ANSWER Focus
Assuming a is a clause, (16-a) mandates that the discourse supply an antecedent sentence
whose denotation (ordinary value) is an element of the focus-semantic value of a. Al-
ternatively, the pronoun may pick up a set of alternatives, and the contextually privileged
antecedent for the focus-anaphor is the denotation of an interrogative sentence that was ei-
ther uttered in or inferable from the immediately preceding discourse. (16-b) requires that
this question meaning be a subset of the focus-value of the prejacent, containing at least
one distinct element from the prejacent.
All of the cases of interest to us here involve repeat-occurrence situations where one
token event stands in contrast to another of the same type. Consequently, I believe it is
reasonable to restrict our attention to the contrastive focus relation in (16-a). Consider
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how it explains the contrast between (12) and (13) above. The first sentence in (12) is
a member of the focus-value of the second: it is derivable by the replacement of the F-
marked constituent with the DP John. Hence, it is an appropriate antecedent for the focus
anaphor, and the discourse is predicted to be acceptable. However, in the case of (13), ~
has us looking for an antecedent of the form x admires Sue. However, the only available
antecedent is the first sentence, Dana admires Mary, which is not a member of the focus-
value of the second sentence. This discourse is predicted to lead to a presupposition failure.
Finally, I assume that every sentence contains a ~-operator. As we will see later on, one
consequence of this is that every sentence is forced to contain an F-marked constituent. 4
5.3.2 Further assumptions
Three further assumptions are needed before we can proceed. The first concerns quantifier
domain restriction. The second is a ban against over-focussing, and the third a basic rule
governing focus-realization. These are spelled out below.
Contextual domain restriction
I make the fairly standard assumption that the domains of quantifiers, including indefinites,
are implicitly restricted. The sentence in (17), for example, almost never means that every
student in the world passed. A more sensible interpretation is something along the lines of
'every student in the speaker's class passed'.
(17) Every student passed.
Following Westerstahl (1984); von Fintel (1994) and many others, I assume a C-variable
approach to domain restrictions. Determiner quantifiers take as their first argument a vari-
able over sets (or properties). This variable receives a value from the context via the
contextually-supplied assignment function, which will then be intersected with the set (or
4 1n turn, every sentence would need to have an appropriate discourse antecedent. One may wonder whether
this assumption would lead us into trouble when it comes to discourse-initiating contexts. As long as we
assume that out-of-the-blue or "all new" sentences have sentence-wide focus, this should not be a problem. In
such cases the focus-semantic value of the sentence will be the set of all sentences. So, any proposition made
salient in the context, or any question that can be inferred from the context, including broad questions like What
happened?, could serve as suitable antecedents for the focus-anaphor.
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property) denoted by the nominal restrictor. The result is a more restrictive set that serves
as the quantifier domain.
An illustration is given below using the student example from earlier.
(18) [[ Every C7 ] student ] passedyg
a. Vx[(g(7)(x)) A student)(x) -+ passed(x)], where
b. g(7) = Ax. in-speaker's-class(x)
Importantly, the restrictor variable is syntactically present, as evidenced by the fact that it
can be bound (19).
(19) Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam. (Heim 1991)
---+Only one class x was so bad that no student in x passed the exam.
This will be crucial to us later on, as I will argue that the restrictor, being a syntactically
represented constituent, is a suitable element for bearing an F-feature.
MINIMIZE Focus
In Rooth's theory of focus, any constituent within the focus-domain that is new and left
unfocused will lead to infelicity. This is because the presuppositions of the -- operator
ensure that anything in the focus-domain that does not have an F-mark has an antecedent
made salient in the context.5 We see this illustrated in (20). In the ill-formed (20-b), too
few things are focused: there is F-marking only on the subject Lee. The focus-alternatives
will then be of the form x admires Courtney. The ~-operator presupposes that the value
of the focus-anaphor be a member of this set of alternatives. However, the only available
antecedent is Dana admires Sue, which is not in this set, and the result is a presupposition-
failure. So, the constraints imposed by - seem sufficient to explain problems of under-
focussing.
5 For ease of exposition, I am ignoring cases like (i), which involve what Rooth (1992) calls bridging by
entailment. The focus-value of the second sentence is a set of structures of the form x heard about them.
Though the preceding sentence is not a member of this set, intuitively, it licenses the focussing in [SueF heard
about them] because it entails, or at least implies, that Mary heard about the budget cuts, which is a member of
this set.
(i) (First, John told Mary about the budget cuts.) And then, SueF heard about them.
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(20) A: Dana admires Sue.
a. B: Yes. And LEEF admires COURTNEYF.
b. B': # Yes. And LEEF admires Courtney.
As it stands, however, the theory does not rule out cases of over-focussing, like (21-a). The
presupposition introduced by - - that the antecedent must be an element of the focus-value
of the prejacent-is in fact satisfied by the infelicitous (21-a). The antecedent sentence
Dana admires Sue is a member of the focus-alternatives of (21-a), which are of the form x
admires y.
(21) A: Dana admires Courtney.
a. B: #Yes. And LEE admires COURTNEY, too.
b. B': Yes. And LEE admires Courtney, too.
This is a general problem in this system: since the well-formedness of [a ~ CL] depends
solely on whether the value of Ci is an element of aIf, any superset of Iaf will meet this
condition if laljf does.
To rule out cases like (21-a), various authors have proposed conditions requiring spar-
ing use of F-markers. Different variants are found in e.g. Truckenbrodt (1995); Williams
(1997); Schwarzschild (1999); Sauerland (2005a); Wagner (2005); Buring (2008); Mayr
(2010, 2012). For present purposes, I will adopt the implementation in Fox & Spector
(2009) provided in (22).
(22) MINIMIZE Focus
A focus-domain cannot have focus-value F if it would satisfy the presuppositions of
the corresponding ~-operator with another focus-value F' (derivable by different
distributions of F-marking) and F' C F.
This condition ensures minimal F-marking by requiring structures to have the smallest set
of focus-alternatives that would result in that structure being contextually felicitous.
F-marked constituents are accented
According to Jackendoff (1972), focus has the following phonological effect: "If a phrase P
is chosen as the focus of a sentence S, the highest stress in S will be on the syllable of P that
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is assigned the highest stress by the regular stress rules" (p. 237). On a reformulation of
this idea within the Roothian system we have adopted, this means that the main prominence
within a focus-domain (i.e. the XP ~ attaches to) must be within the constituent that is
F-marked. We can capture this idea by positing the following condition:
(23) EXPONE Focus
For any focus domain a, the main stress/accent in a falls on the F-marked material
in a.
A more precise formulation of the conditions that relate - and prosodic prominence de-
pends on assumptions about phonological and phonetic implementation that go beyond
what can be discussed here, but it is a major area of study in and of itself (see e.g. Truck-
enbrodt 1995; Selkirk 1996; Williams 1997; Schwarzschild 1999; Wagner 2005; Biring
2016). The condition in (23), put simply, tells us that we need to be able to identify based
on how a sentence is pronounced (plus rules of prosodic realization) where the F-marking
lies in that sentence.
5.3.3 fI1-formedness of the indefinite
We now have the necessary ingredients to explain the ill-formedness of sequences like (24).
(24) a. I had a coffee.
b. #(Then,) I had a coffee.
The sentence in (24-b) expresses an existential claim. If the domain of quantification is the
same as that of (24-b), asserting this sentence would be vacuous: it has already been estab-
lished that there is a coffee (in that domain) the speaker has consumed. So that the second
sentence can be contextually informative, the domain must be appropriately restricted. That
is, the domain must be restricted so as to (minimally) exclude the coffee that the preceding
sentence was about. Given the assumptions laid out in the previous subsection, this domain
restriction is carried out by a C-variable in the syntax. In this case, the restrictor must pick
out a contextually relevant subset of coffees that doesn't have as a member the witness of
(24-a).
Thus, (24-b) could, in principle, have a meaning that is contextually unproblematic. As
I will show below, it nevertheless lacks an acceptable focus structure. For a sentence with a
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given F-assignment to be contextually felicitous, it must meet the following requirements:
(i) the presuppositions of -, (ii) MINIMIZE Focus, and (iii) EXPONE Focus. However,
no distribution of F-markers within a structure like (24-b) will be such that all three of these
conditions are met.
Let us consider some candidate F-assignments. In (25), the F-marked constituent is the
covert restrictor. Notice that this focus-structure meets the presuppositional requirements
imposed by ~ and MINIMIZE Focus. The focus-value of (25) will be of a set of structures
that vary in the place of the restrictor, i.e. a set of alternatives of the form I had a P
coffee. The -- operator, in cases of contrastive focus, presupposes that the focus anaphor
be a member of this set. The context provides a suitable antecedent, namely the preceding
sentence, which as we pointed out, must have a different domain from the one that follows.
Moreover, F-marking on the restrictor variable yields the smallest alternative set that would
have the value of the focus-anaphor as a member; in other words, MINIMIZE Focus is met.
The problem, however, is that EXPONE FOCUS, that is, the requirement that stress must fall
somewhere within the F-marked constituent, cannot be satisfied as a result of the fact that
the F-marked element is silent.
(25) [[I had a [C7]F coffee] ~ Ci]
a. /Presupposition of
b. /Minimize Focus
c. XExpone Focus
Now consider the following alternative where a larger constituent, the object DP, is F-
marked. The focus-value of this structure is a superset of that of (25). Given that the
focus-anaphor receives the same value - the denotation of the preceding sentence - the
presupposition of - will be met. Moreover, EXPONE FOCUs may now be satisfied, as there
is a phonologically realized F-marked constituent within which stress may fall. However,
this structure violates MINIMIZE Focus. As we already saw in (25), F-marking on a sub-
constituent of the object DP - namely, the restrictor - would be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements imposed by -.
(26) [[I had [a C7 coffee]F ] ~ Ci]
a. /Presupposition of ~
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b. XMinimize Focus
c. /Expone Focus
Finally, let us examine (27), which represents a completely F-less structure. Here, MINI-
MIZE Focus and EXPONE Focus are trivially satisfied by virtue of the fact that there is no
focus. However, the presupposition of - is not met. The focus-value of (32) is the singleton
set consisting of the sentence itself: {I had a C7 coffee}. The --operator presupposes that
the value of the focus-anaphor be a member of this set, distinct from the prejacent. Irre-
spective of what value the focus-anaphor is assigned, this requirement cannot be satisfied
when the focus-value is a set consisting of only the prejacent.
(27) [[I had a C7 coffee ] - Ci ]
a. XPresupposition of ~
b. /Minimize Focus
c. /Expone Focus
In sum, complying with one requirement of the grammar of focus means that one or more
of the others cannot be complied with. The result is either ineffability or presupposition
failure.
The ill-formedness of indefinites in another-environments can thus be explained with-
out recourse to competition with another. In fact, the focus-based account makes differ-
ent - and welcome - predictions from an MP-account. On the present account, whenever
the sole F-markable constituent is silent, we predict infelicity. We expect, therefore, that
when some other expression can bear focus, an indefinite should be permitted. This is pre-
cisely what we find with cases like (28), discussed in 5.2.1 as problems for an MP-based
account. What makes (28) different is that it allows for a possible focus structure as in (40),
where F-marking is on the subject. All three of the aforementioned requirements are satis-
fied given this F-assignment. The focus-alternatives will be of the form x had a C7 coffee.6
The preceding sentence can serve as a suitable antecedent for the focus-anaphor. There is
no other distribution of F-markers that would result in a smaller focus-value while satisfy-
ing the requirements imposed by ~; MINIMIZE Focus is thus met. Finally, the sentence
can be pronounced with stress on the F-marked constituent, you, thus satisfying EXPONE
6Notice that in this case, the second sentence will be informative without domain-shifting; the domain of
quantification may be the same as the previous sentence.
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Focus. (The reader can verify that on its most natural pronunciation, the second sentence
in (28) is indeed pronounced with prominence on the subject.)
(28) I had a coffee. (Then,) you had a coffee.
(29) [[[You ]F had a C7 coffee] - Ci ]
a. /Presupposition of
b. /Minimize Focus
c. /Expone Focus
5.3.4 Well-formedness of another
Constraints on focus distribution and realization make sentences with indefinites ill-formed
when describing a second-occurrence event. Incidentally, such contexts are also ones where
the requirements of another -that the context makes salient some other individual that is
in the extension of the NP restrictor - will be met. Thus, the utterance of the first sentence
in sequences like (24) not only makes a subsequent sentence with the plain indefinite in-
felicitous, it also makes a sentence with another felicitous. Moreover, the other portion in
another, defined in (30), can be taken to play the same role in sentences like (31-b) as the
covert restrictor in the unacceptable (24-b) with the plain indefinite.
(30) Rotheripg = A PKe,t) :P(g(i)). A xe. x -fg(i) A P(x)
(31) a. I had a coffee.
b. (Then,) I had another coffee.
Other, on the definition above, has an adjectival meaning. It combines with a predicate-
denoting NP as its argument and (i) triggers an anaphoric presupposition that the context
provide a suitable antecedent that is in this set and (ii) returns a subset of the original set
that excludes this salient individual. It is in this latter respect that other is similar to the
implicit restrictor discussed in the previous subsection. A crucial contribution of either is
the further restriction of the domain of quantification to exclude some contextually salient
entity.
With regards to focus, things proceed in a similar fashion as earlier. Being the only
novel constituent in the sentence, other is F-marked. The focus-structure for (31-b) is as
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in (32). This structure is superior to any of the candidates for the plain indefinite variant
in that all three of requirements of focus under consideration are met. The focus-value
for the sentence will be a set of alternatives derived by substitution or deletion of the F-
marked constituent other. An antecedent for the focus anaphor that is a member of this set
is made salient by the preceding utterance of (31-a). No other F-distribution will satisfy the
requirements of ~; MINIMIZE Focus is satisfied. Finally, focus can be exponed on other;
the modifier does seem to carry stress in sentences like (31-b).
(32) [[I had an[otheri]F coffee ] Ci]
a. /Presupposition of ~
b. /Minimize Focus
c. /Expone Focus
The core contrast has now received an explanation. We have accounted both for why
in certain contexts, a sentence with a is unacceptable and why a structure with another is
acceptable. The account diverges fundamentally from an MP-approach is in its treatment
of another as a rescue strategy. That is, the (in)felicity of a sentence with a does not depend
on the existence of a parallel structure with another. We expect, then, that a variety of
expressions can do the same job as another, so long as there is a supportive context. For
instance, in a situation where the order of events is relevant and clear, as in the examples in
(33), a second feels as natural as another.
(33) I ran a lap, but I still had energy left, so...
I ran a second lap.
Non-presuppositional modifiers like restrictive relative clauses can also do the same, as
illustrated by (34-a). In fact, you might add any contextually relevant modifier and that
seems to do the trick.
(34) a. This morning, I phoned a politician. Later, I phoned a politician that I really
despise.
b. This morning, I phoned a politician. #Later, I phoned a politician.
What is arguably special about another is that all its sole contribution is the exclusion of
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some salient entity from the domain of quantification. Compared to other expressions that
may serve a similar function, e.g. a second, the contextual requirements another imposes
is maximally minimal.
5.3.5 Extension to other environments
One of the reasons for rejecting an MP-account of the oddness of indefinites was the ob-
servation that similar kinds of oddness effects arise with sentences which do not contain
an indefinite. Cases like (35) and (36), where the additive particle again seems obligatory,
illustrate the generality of the phenomenon in question.
(35) A: What did you do before lunch?
B: I worked.
A: Well what did you do after lunch?
a. #I worked.
b. I worked, again.
(36) A: Where were they in the summer of 2016?
B: They were in Cape Cod.
A: Where were they last summer?
a. #They were in Cape Cod.
b. They were in Cape Cod, again.
On the account developed here, cases like these can receive a parallel treatment as those
involving indefinites. What drives the ill-formedness of certain sentences, on the present
account, is the fact that the only F-markable constituent in the structure is silent. In this
section, I show how this is also at the heart of the problem with sentences like (35-a) and
(36-a).
Before we get to formal matters, some preliminaries are in order. In order to be able to
extend our account to cases like (35) and (36), which are about different time points at which
two identical events took place, we must enrich our semantic framework to include a basic
type for time intervals, type i. Tenseless phrases - bare VPs or vPs - denote predicates
of times, < i, t >, which combine with a Tense morpheme to yield a truth-value. I assume
a quantificational analysis of tense (Prior 1957, 1967, Montague 1973, Dowty 1979, etc.),
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where it introduces a temporal quantifier. The PAST tense morpheme introduces existential
quantification over preceding times. A sentence in the past tense, such as (36-a), could be
taken on this analysis to convey the following meaning:
(37) Et'[t' < now A they were in Cape Cod at t']
Following Ogihara (1995, 1996) and Musan (1995), I assume that just like nominal
quantifiers, these temporal quantifiers may be contextually restricted. That is, the domain of
quantification (a set of times) can be further confined to some salient interval in accordance
with the context. The necessity of such restrictions is demonstrated by sentences like (38).
If a sentence in past-tense represents an existential claim about a prior time, B's response
in (38) would be trivially true after the first time in life that she ate lunch. Clearly, we don't
find B's utterance uninformative in this way; rather, it seems to be conveying that B has
eaten lunch that day.
(38) A: Did you eat lunch?
B: Yes. I ate lunch.
Technically, this type of context-dependency can be modeled in exactly the same way as
in the nominal case - via a restrictor variable that the temporal quantifier takes as its first
argument. In this case, the C-variable must denote predicates (or properties) of times, rather
than individuals. As illustration, B's response in (38) might be represented as in (39), where
the contextually-supplied value for the C-variable might be, e.g. the set of time intervals
that overlap with lunch-time that day. This set is intersected with the predicates of times
denoted by the vP, and this more restricted set serves as the domain of quantification for the
Tense-operator.
(39) a. [TP [ PAST C4 ] [vp I eat lunch]]
b. g(4) = .Xt. t E {t': t' C today's-lunch-hour}
c. (39-a) g = 3t'[t' < now A t' c {t": t" C today's-lunch-hour} A B ate lunch
at t']
With these assumptions at hand, let us turn to the analysis of cases seen above. I will
use (35) to illustrate. The first and second statements by B in (35) express claims about
the past. Given our treatment of the past tense as an existential quantifier, the domain of
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quantification must be appropriately restricted in (35-a) so that the sentence can be infor-
mative. In other words, the sentence will be construed with a C-variable, which, given the
preceding question, may receive as its value the set of times after lunch.
Notice that now we are in the same situation as before. The most restrictive, felici-
tous assignment of focus involves F-marking on the covert restrictor, as in (40). However,
EXPONE Focus cannot be satisfied as the restrictor is silent.
(40) [[1 PAST [C4]F worked ] Ci]
a. /Presupposition of ~
b. /Minimize Focus
c. XExpone Focus
In such environments, additive again plays the same role as other in sentences with
indefinites. Again is a temporal adverb that indicates repetition. It comes with a presuppo-
sition about a prior time at which the situation described occurred. Thus, a sentence like
(41) is felicitous only if the context makes clear that (41-a) is true. Furthermore, the content
of the presupposition triggered by again is anaphoric (Soames 1989; Heim 1990; Kamp &
Rossdeutscher 1994; Fabricius-Hansen 2001; van der Sandt & Huitink 2003; Beck 2006):
we should be able to identify the relevant prior time that the presupposition triggered by
again makes reference to.
(41) Dana won the race, again.
a. Presupposition: Dana has won the race before.
b. Assertion: Dana won the race at a time other than that earlier time.
The assertive contribution of again is a restriction of the time intervals under consideration
to those distinct from this presupposed earlier time. In this regard, it is similar to another.
But the distinctness implication contributed by again is stronger than that of another. Again
does not just assert non-overlap between the two times under consideration. There is, in
addition, a temporal order that is imposed: the time interval referred to in the presupposition
must be an earlier one. This is illustrated by the examples in (42) from Heim (1990).
The sentence in (42-a), but not (42-b), leads to the inference that John's birthday precedes
Mary's birthday. Since the two sentences differ only in the presence/absence of again, this
inference must be contributed by again.
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(42) a. We will have pizza on John's birthday. So we shouldn't have pizza again on
Mary's birthday.
b. We will have pizza on John's birthday. So we shouldn't have pizza on Mary's
birthday.
I assume the entry for again as in (43), where it is a temporal modifier.
(43) againji = XP(jit). AXti : P(g(i)) . t E P A t > g(i)
The adverb attaches to a tenseless bare vP, which denotes the predicate of times, 4, that it
then modifies. The result of modification by again is two-fold: (i) a presupposition that 0
was true at some contextually salient time and (ii) the restriction of this predicate to a set
of times thatfollow this contextually salient time. When the restricted predicate composes
with past tense, the result is an existential claim that there is some preceding time point in
this set that satisfies 0.
On this treatment of again, it - like other in another-sentences - does overtly what the
covert restrictor would do in the additive-less sentences. A structure like (35-b) would have
the representation in (44). The focus-alternatives for this structure will be those derived
via substitution or deletion of the F-marked adverb. B's first sentence - I worked - is a
suitable antecedent for the focus-anaphor. F-marking on the adverb is, moreover, minimal
and phonetically realizable. Thus, the constraints on focus that need to be satisfied for the
felicity of the sentence are indeed satisfied.
(44) [[I worked againF] Ci]
a. /Presupposition of
b. /Minimize Focus
c. /Expone Focus
To recap, what goes wrong in cases like (35) and (36), as well as the ill-formed in-
definite cases e.g. (24), is exactly the same: the mutually unsatisfiable need to exclu-
sively F-mark a silent element and to phonologically realize the corresponding constituent
as prosodically prominent. This means that the ill-formedness of structures without other or
again and the insertion of these expressions are orthogonal. In fact, as briefly remarked ear-
lier, the "remedy" for the oddness effect may be variable. The coffee examples from earlier
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can be rescued by the insertion of another (45-a) or, for that matter, by again (45-b). On the
present account, the main difference between the two rescue strategies below (beyond the
specific presuppositions the speaker is committed to) lies in the nature of the alternatives
being evoked.
(45) I had finished my coffee.
a. So I had another coffee.
b. So I had a coffee again.
5.3.6 Summary
In this section, I developed an account of the infelicity of indefinites in another-environments
that did not make reference to competition with another. Instead, I argued that the oddness
effects with indefinites fall out from an independently needed theory of focus. Another is
nothing more than a rescue strategy; there are others besides this particular expression.
5.4 Implications for child language
We now have a new outlook on the phenomena of interest. The ill-formedness of the (a)
sentence in (46) is due to competition with the presuppositionally stronger (b) variant; the
ill-formedness of the (a) sentence in (47) is not. Rather, the oddity of the latter results from
the failure to satisfy independently motivated constraints on focus.
(46) Context: I have two children.
a. #1 brought all of my children to the party.
b. I brought both of my children to the party.
(47) Context: I had a coffee.
a. #Then, I had a coffee.
b. Then, I had another coffee.
In our experiments, children showed an adult-like preference for sentences like (47-b) over
(47-a). In contrast, they were unable to choose between sentences like (46-a) and (46-b).
Thus, aspects of grammar that govern the preference for (47-b) over (47-a) is in place
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by the preschool age range, unlike those that are at play in the contrast in (46). In this
section, I want to consider in more depth what these findings tell us about the development
of presupposition and about pragmatic development more broadly.
5.4.1 What children know
Experiments 2A and 2B of Chapter 4 revealed adult-likeness in children's choices between
a and another sentences. Most relevant for our purposes is the fact that children rejected
sentences with a in another-environments. Their preferred productions in these environ-
ments involved variants with another, paralleling adults.
Children's ability to rule out indefinite sentences in "repeat-occurrence" environments
shows us that they have command of the principles of focus-placement which render struc-
tures like (47-a) ineffable. They appear to have knowledge of the constraints imposed by
the ~-operator -i.e. they know what must be F-marked in a structure -and how this
focus-placement affects pronunciation. This is largely consonant with what we already
know about children's developing abilities with focus. Previous experimental results sug-
gest that children mark focus in an adult-like manner very early on. For example, Hornby
& Hass (1970) showed that when describing a sequence of two pictures differing by only
one feature, children appropriately stressed the word that carried the contrastive informa-
tion in the description of the second picture (e.g. a boy vs. A GIRL is riding a bike). Using
a similar method, MacWhinney & Bates (1978) found that the use of stress to mark con-
trast was well-established and consistent by the age of three. More recently, MUller, H6hle,
Schmitz & Weissenborn (2005) conducted a study where SVO sentences were elicited from
4-and-5-year-olds in a question-answer task. The results support the conclusions from the
earlier studies: in the critical trials, children produced the constituent corresponding to the
wh-word with a higher mean pitch than in control trials, where the same expression in the
same position was not an answer to the question.
The present studies go beyond these existing findings in two significant ways. First,
whereas the previous studies demonstrated early knowledge of what must bear focus, the
studies reported here show that children also know what must not be focused. Recall that
on the present account, the ill-formedness of indefinite sentences in another-environments
results from an interaction between various constraints, one of which is MINIMIZE Focus.
The fact that children reliably reject such sentences is evidence, albeit indirect, that this
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constraint is in place.
Secondly, on this account, an understanding that the plain indefinite is unacceptable
in certain environments is independent of an understanding of what to produce instead.
This leads to a different set of developmental predictions compared to an MP-competition
account. More specifically, the present account would be consistent with a two-step acqui-
sition path where children initially recognize the unacceptability of the relevant indefinite
sentences, but fix the problem in non-adult ways. For instance, rather than use another,
they might choose to adjust their contextual assumptions in a way that would allow for the
F-marking on something other than the silent restrictor. What our experimental findings
suggest, however, is that by the age of 3, children also have the requisite rescue strategies
in place: children's preferred response in the relevant environment involved another.7
A final point worth noting that if this analysis is on the right track, children's success
in ruling out indefinites in repeat-instance environments can be taken to demonstrate their
understanding of a broader phenomenon. Children who succeeded in this task are predicted
to show comparable success ruling out sentences like (48-a).
(48) A: What did you do before lunch?
B: I worked.
A: Well what did you do after lunch?
a. #1 worked.
b. I worked, again.
5.4.2 What children don't know
At the same time that young children display sophistication in their treatment of sentences
with indefinites, they behave in a strikingly non-adultlike manner with all. Concretely, they
were happy to produce and accept sentences with all in contexts where both would have
been felicitous. We established in the previous chapter that unlike a vs. another, the choice
between both and all is governed by competition for MR Children's difficulties making this
choice in an adult-like way -even when they seemingly know the meanings of the items
in question - point to difficulties with MP as a principle governing utterance choice.
7This might be a richer interpretation than warranted. The fact that our experiments privileged another - by
priming another in the production study and by presenting another as the alternative description in the Felicity
Judgment study - may have inflated their use of this particular rescue strategy.
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What could be behind these difficulties? One possibility is that children in this develop-
mental stage lack MP altogether. That is, they simply do not have a principle that governs
the choice between contextually-equivalent, but presuppositionally-divergent alternatives,
and thus, use them interchangeably. If so, the development of this principle of language use
would be qualitatively different from the principle that was the focus of the first half of the
dissertation - the common ground requirement on presuppositions. The latter seems to be
in place early and in spite of the noisy input that children are privy to. The development
of this felicity condition on presupposition could thus be thought of as an illustration of
the Poverty of the Stimulus argument: children demonstrate underlying knowledge of the
principle in spite of experience which fails to provide sufficient evidence for the princi-
ple. By contrast, the possible lack of command of MP could serve as an illustration of an
Abundance of the Stimulus argument. Because of adult speakers' adherence to MP, chil-
dren never hear all used in a context that makes clear that the domain of quantification has
exactly two members. Nevertheless, they tolerate all-sentences in both-contexts. If this is
indeed due to a lack of MP, the input may not ultimately be very helpful in the development
of this principle. Instead, there must be a maturational shift in some relevant component
of grammar or language use between birth and -6 years of age, which is the age at which
children in our experiments seemed to be recruiting MP in an adult-like way.8
The conclusion that knowledge of MP is altogether missing from children's gram-
mars might be too strong, however. One cause for concern is Wexler's (2003) observation
that children do not over-use indefinites in environments where existence can be taken for
granted (we return to this data-point later in this section). I therefore want to argue for
a somewhat weaker alternative interpretation of the experimental results. Children may
very well have the underlying principle in place. However, they could find it difficult to
always deploy it in adult-like ways for the same reasons, as I argued in Chapter 2, they have
difficulties meeting the common ground requirement despite knowing that it is in force.
Specifically, a general problem coordinating on what is common ground might govern both
their over-use of certain presuppositional items (e.g. the definite article) as well as their
8The precise statement of what is delayed in development will vary with diverging approaches to MP.
For example, recently, there have been attempts to reduce MP to a grammatical theory of implicatures (Magri
2009; Singh 2011; Marty 2017): MP-effects are simply exhaustification at the level of presupposition. A formal
implementation of this idea is found in Marty (2017). The operator responsible for exhaustification, EXH, is
treated as a partial function, defined only if the presuppositions of the contextually-equivalent alternatives are
false. On this approach, a child who lacks MP may be lacking the right semantic representation of this operator.
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under-use.
Consider what adult-like application of MP entails. Knowing the nature of MP and
knowing the meanings of the relevant competitors will only get the child so far. Beyond
this, the child must be able to ensure that the context is one that meets the criteria for MP
to kick in. Specifically, it must be established that the presuppositions of the stronger com-
petitor are met, and moreover, that the competing alternatives are contextually equivalent.
As discussed in Chapter 2, this task is made difficult by the fact that the common ground
of conversation is rarely, if ever, settled explicitly. As a result, speakers are always working
under some degree of uncertainty about what is mutually known or accepted. Not only are
adults adept at solving this coordination problem in the face of such uncertainty, even if a
mistake is made, they know how the situations may be remedied - unmet presuppositions
may be accommodated. Consequently, in most circumstances where the speaker knows the
presupposition p of the stronger competitor is true, it would be rational to adhere to MP:
p is either common belief or will be made common belief by the fact of speaker's uttering
the sentence (cf. Schlenker 2012). However, the costs associated with maximizing pre-
suppositions may be very different for children. As suggested by the findings in Chapter
3, children do not have the same expectations about accommodation as adults. For them,
presupposing something that is not common ground may be very well result in a conver-
sation breakdown. This could lead to a certain amount of over-cautiousness on the part of
young children. From the child's perspective, the utterance of a sentence with an unmet
presupposition poses a more serious problem than a failure to adhere to MP, given that the
utterance of a presuppositionally weaker utterance could still lead to a successful context
update. If this is right, then children's over-use of all in our experiments is not due to a lack
of sensitivity to MP, but because they deemed it the safer option compared to the stronger
both.
Before concluding, it is worth pointing out that the connection between accommoda-
tion and MP plays an important role in Schlenker's (2012) theory of MP, where MP is taken
to derive from Gricean Maxim of Quantity. The starting point for his approach is the ob-
servation that in circumstances involving presupposition accommodation, a sentence may
be more informative than an assertively equivalent one. Maxim of Quantity would then
require a speaker to choose a sentence S over a weaker sentence S' not due to its assertive
contribution, but because of its presuppositions. This special case is extended to situations
where the presuppositions of the relevant sentence is common ground by invoking a notion
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of Fallibility: even if a proposition was at some point t entailed by the common ground,
there is always a non-zero chance that the addressee has forgotten (or isn't adequately at-
tending to it) at time t+l when the utterance is being made. If agents are fallible in this
sense, there is some expected utility in reintroducing the presupposition into the common
ground, even when it was previously common knowledge: there is a non-zero chance that
the information is informative. On this account, mastery of accommodation is then a pre-
requisite for mastery of MP, because it is precisely the expectation that a fallible agent will
accommodate informative presuppositions that motivates presuppositional maximization.
If this approach is on the right track, a lack of sensitivity to MP is precisely what we would
expect given the findings in Chapter 3.
5.4.3 Competition effects in child language
Divergent acquisition paths
In this chapter and the last, we encountered two types of competition effects. The first,
Maximize Presupposition! has been a main focus of our discussions. The second is MIN-
IMIZE Focus, a principle that compares structures with diverging Focus distributions and
chooses the most restrictive one compatible with the context. If what we have said so far
in these chapters is on the right track, an important conclusion that follows is that children
have trouble with the first type of competition effect, but not the second. We must now
ask: what are the properties of MINIMIZE Focus that facilitate its earlier development
compared to MP?
Both MINIMIZE Focus and MP involve comparing forms and selecting the optimal
candidate. There are various aspects of MINIMIZE Focus, however, that make this task
easier compared to MR First, the issue of determining whether two structures compete is
trivial in the case of MINIMIZE Focus. If alternative-generation is indeed constrained by
something like structural complexity, one of the tasks when determining whether a structure
S' competes with S involves ensuring that S' is at most as complex as S. The complexity
requirement will always be met in the case of MINIMIZE Focus: the competitors un-
der consideration are the variants of the same structure with different constituents bearing
F-marking. Put differently, the competitors for MINIMIZE Focus are invariably equally
complex.
A second, related aspect of the acquisition task where MINIMIZE Focus and MP di-
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verge is with respect to their dependence on lexical knowledge. The presence vs. absence
of a piece of relevant vocabulary affects whether or not the use of another piece of the lexi-
con gives rise to MP-effects (Matthewson 2006; see also Deal 2011 for similar claims with
regards to scalar implicatures). Consequently, a prerequisite for full command of MP is
knowing the structure of the lexicon of one's language. In order for a child to recognize
that the use of an expression X makes a true sentence unacceptable in a context c, she must
know, first and foremost, that there is a stronger competitor Y that is usable in c. If at
some point in development, the child lacks this knowledge, she will find X acceptable in c
irrespective of her knowledge of MP.9
The learning task is different with MINIMIZE Focus. There are two elements of the
lexicon of the language that the child needs to have acquired: the feature F and the focus-
interpretation operator ~. Because focus is intrinsically related to general rules governing
cooperative discourse, a reasonable assumption is that every language makes use of this
machinery. In Roothian terms, this could very well mean that the syntactic feature F is part
of the featural inventory of every language, and the operator ~ is part of the lexicon of every
language. It is plausible then that these are aspects of language that the child does not need
to learn.1 0 In turn, the scope of the application of MINIMIZE Focus is maximal: every
discourse involving a declarative statement constitutes potential evidence for this principle.
Different, but the same?
The picture that emerges from the above discussion is this: MP and MINIMIZE Focus rep-
resent two different types of competition effects in natural language, whose developmental
trajectories vary accordingly. This picture, however, is complicated by the fact the two prin-
ciples have been argued to be related. More specifically, a number of authors have posited
that Minimize Focus is a species of Maximize Presupposition! effect (Truckenbrodt 1995;
Sauerland 2005b; Wagner 2005; Mayr 2010; Goodhue 2018). The conceptual motivation
for a unification of MINIMIZE Focus and MP is clear. Both are competition effects where
the candidate that imposes the strongest requirements on the context is selected as the win-
9This alone does not offer an explanation for the experimental results, as already pointed out. The control
conditions in the experiments demonstrated that children have the right semantic representations for both and
all.
101n fact, given that these are both covert elements at least in English, it is not obvious how the English-
acquiring child could learn it in the first place.
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ner, and a unification would be parsimonious. On the other hand, the conditions imposed by
focus are about the salience of its antecedents - that an antecedent belonging to the focus-
value of the prejacent is made contextually salient - and not about their truth being shared
knowledge. Because this requirement imposed by ~ is world-independent - whether some
sentence is a member of the alternative-set is a matter that is either logically true or logically
false - the metric of strength that MP draws upon, presuppositional strength (49), simply
does not apply.
(49) Presuppositional Strength
0 is presuppositionally stronger than y iff {w: yV(w) = #} C {w: 0 (w) = #}
Arguably, structures with less F-marking impose stronger contextual requirements be-
cause they admit fewer assignments that render the structure felicitous. To see this, consider
the pair in (50).
(50) a. [[Dana admires [Sue]F] C7 -1
b. [[Dana [admires Sue]F] C7 -]
The presupposition associated with (50-a) is that the value assigned to the focus-anaphor
by the contextually supplied assignment function, g(7), be a member of its focus-value, a
set of alternatives of the form, 'Dana admires x'. The presupposition associated with (50-b)
is that g(7) is a member of the set of alternatives of the form, 'Dana V-s x'. A structure
like (50-b) has an interpretation relative to an assignment function g which maps 7 to the
proposition that Dana dislikes Lee, but (50-a) does not. Put differently, the structure in
(50-a) may be thought of as being anaphorically "stronger" than (50-b), where anaphoric
strength is defined as in (51).
(51) Anaphoric Strength
0 is anaphorically stronger than yf iff {g: yf 9 = #} C {g: 9/J = #
In other words, while minimizing focus does not correspond to "defined at fewer worlds",
it does correspond to "defined at fewer assignments", Making formal use of this notion of
anaphoric strength, however, requires modifications to the standard theory of Maximize
Presupposition!, as well as the semantic and pragmatic machinery we have been assuming
thus far. Below, I will briefly sketch one way of refining our assumptions such that the
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two competition effects can be subsumed under a single "umbrella" principle requiring that
speakers maximize links to the context, whether it be presuppositional links (i.e. reminders
about the sort of worlds still under consideration) or anaphoric links (reminders about the
conversational record).
We have thus far been working with the assumption that the meaning of a sentence is to
be identified with a set of worlds, the worlds in which that sentence is true. The context was
taken to be a set of worlds, such that an update of it with a proposition results in a smaller
set of worlds. A simple enrichment to this system would involve treating propositions not as
a set of verifying worlds, but a set of verifying world-assignment pairs Kw, g) (see e.g. Heim
1983). Let us call these ordered pairs information states, written s. We write: s, = w, sg= g.
Correspondingly, the Stalnakerian model of the context-set must be enriched from a set of
worlds compatible with the participants' common knowledge to now a set of information-
states. We will continue using the symbol c to represent such sets. Intuitively, a context
now is a set of all the ways the world and discourse model might be, in view of the mutual
beliefs and conversational record of the discourse participants. An assignment-function is
generally thought to be partial, with a just a few variables in its domain. We assume that
every assignment in a given context has the same domain. If sg assigns no value to an index
i, then sg (i) = s(i) = #.'
Equipped with this enriched system, we can now devise a general principle that de-
mands that one choose, from among a set of alternatives, the felicitous sentence that is
compatible with the smallest set of world-assignment pairs. For lack of a better term, we
might think of this as "linking strength":
(52) Maximize contextual linking
If two sentences $ and V are alternatives whose presuppositions are satisfied in c,
and
a. 4 and V are contextually equivalent relative to c, and
b. {s: V(s)=#} C {s: O(s) = #}
1 1There will be inevitable further ramifications of this type of enrichment that I will simply gloss over here.
For instance, whereas the Stalnakerian update of a context-set always corresponds to elimination of worlds
(i.e. a monotonically decreasing context set), in the more fine-grained conception of the context-set, we can
conceive of other types of updates. An obvious one is expanding the domain of the assignment functions, where
the world-assignments pairs in the context are updated to pairs of worlds and extended assignments, where the
extended assignments are constrained by the old ones, but add on possible values for new referents.
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0 should be preferred to iy in c
This principle would reproduce the effects of Maximize Presupposition!, while also im-
posing requirements based on possible assignments. Specifically, the principle would also
require that the contextually felicitous sentence which would have an interpretation relative
to the fewest assignments be favored. Beyond MINIMIZE Focus, a principle along these
lines may be needed independently to account for preferences for anaphora in various do-
mains, e.g. use of pronouns, ellipsis, etc. For instance, (52-b) would have something to say
about why we prefer the sentence in (53-a) over (53-b) given the context in (53). Whereas
the sentence in (53-a) only has an interpretation relative to assignments with 3 in its do-
main, (53-b) is not assignment-dependent and so would be defined under any assignment.
The principle in (52), in turn, would require that whenever felicitous, (53-a) be used instead
of (53-b).
(53) I saw John today.
a. He3 looked angry.
b. John looked angry.
If there is indeed an umbrella principle such as MC that leads both to MP-effects as well
as MINIMIZE Focus, children's apparent command of the latter would be evidence that the
general principle itself is in place. The divergence between the two types of effects remains
to be explained, but to start, we might consider an important conceptual difference between
anaphoricity and presuppositionality. At various points throughout the dissertation, includ-
ing in 5.4.2, I raise the possibility that children have more difficulties coordinating on the
common ground. With respect to MP, they may be unsure of whether the presupposition
of the stronger competitor is in fact shared knowledge. When combined with an inabil-
ity to shift the context in necessary ways when faced with a missing presupposition, this
uncertainty leads to an under-application of MR Anaphora, by contrast, does not involve
accessing facts about the world; rather, it involves accessing information about the history
of the discourse. That is, they need not reason about what their interlocutor knows, but
rather, what they may be 'attending to'. This distinction might be key to the child, who is
likely much more confident in her assessment of when an anaphoric link is possible com-
pared to when a proposition is mutually accepted. The former does not require reflecting or
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reasoning about another agent's mental states, but only the consideration of facts about the
conversational record.
This distinction between presuppositionality and anaphoricity might also help reconcile
the experimental findings reported here and Wexler's observation about definite/indefinite
use. The relevant facts, once again, are as follows: children have difficulties maximizing
presupposition with both and all, but, if Wexler is right, they seemingly have no difficulties
maximizing presupposition with the and a. If this is a stable contrast, it is a puzzling one. If
utterance choice in both cases is governed by a requirement to choose the presuppositionally
strongest felicitous sentence, nothing I have said so far would suffice in explaining why
children over-use all but not a. However, a crucial difference between the and both is that
the former is arguably ambiguous between anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses (Schwarz
2012). In so-called anaphoric uses the interpretation of a definite seems to depend on that
of a preceding expression, typically an indefinite noun phrase. Thus, in (54-a), the definite
description the book is understood to be the very book that John was said to have bought in
the first sentence. Moreover, anaphoric definite descriptions, like pronouns, can be bound
variables, as well, as shown by (54-b).
(54) a. Mary bought a book and a magazine. The book was expensive.
b. John gave every child a gift that he himself enjoyed more than the child.
If the environments in which children seemingly adhere to MP with the/a are ones in which
the can receive an anaphoric construal, the source of their adult-likeness might be the same
as with MINIMIZE Focus.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter began with the question of what blocks indefinites in environments where
another is felicitous. I proposed that the oddity of indefinites follows from principles gov-
erning focus. In certain environments, where another is incidentally felicitous, a sentence
with an indefinite lacks a licit focus-assignment, resulting in ineffability.
Crucially, the idea that sentences involving a and another compete for MP was aban-
doned. Nevertheless, the account made use of another type of competition, MINIMIZE
Focus, where different possible focus-assignments for a structure are considered and the
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representation with the most restrictive focus-distribution is chosen. This set up the sec-
ond part of the chapter, which considered issues relating to the development of seemingly
similar competition effects. I suggested various reasons why MINIMIZE Focus shows a
faster acquisition trajectory compared to MP, including its potential universality and lack of
susceptibility to idiosyncrasies of the lexicon. Finally, I speculated on the possibility that
MP and MINIMIZE Focus ultimately come down to the same thing: a general preference
for structures that maximize links to the conversational context. The divergence in devel-
opmental trajectories may then have to do with children's difficulties assessing what might
be common knowledge versus part of the conversational record. A full assessment of these
ideas, and a more thorough investigation of what is shared and distinct between the two
principles is a broader research program that I must leave for future work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
To conclude, I'd like to offer a brief summary of the preceding chapters, discuss its impli-
cations for models of presupposition and models of pragmatic development, and speculate
on some directions for future research.
6.1 Summary of findings
Overall, the thesis aimed at arriving at a better understanding of children's knowledge
of presuppositions and anti-presuppositions. Specifically, two broad questions were ad-
dressed:
1. Do children know what the conversational context must look like in order for the
use of a presuppositional sentence to be appropriate? Specifically, do they know the
common ground requirement - the requirement that presuppositions be previously
established common knowledge -and do they know how this requirement can be
violated?
2. Do children know the circumstances under which the use of a presuppositionally
stronger sentence over an otherwise equivalent, but presuppositionally weaker, alter-
native is forced? That is, are they sensitive to Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991)
as a principle governing utterance choice?
The Stalnakerian view of presupposition invokes a constraint on the common ground,
which requires "logical priority" of presupposed content. The most obvious way in which
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this priority shows up in language use is as temporal priority - that is, presuppositions are
presuppositions of the interlocutors. However, the formal requirement can also bet met in a
more nuanced and less straightforward way: via accommodation, where listeners adjust the
context post-hoc so as to meet the requirements of an already uttered sentence. The exis-
tence of these two systems poses serious challenges to the learner. The formal requirement
that presuppositions be entailed by the context prior to assertion is not always transparently
met in everyday conversation and thus, the child's input. She must still somehow extract
the right principle from a set of data that doesn't look like it adheres to it.
The difficulty with (2) lies in identifying all and only those environments where Max-
imize Presupposition! applies, a difficulty reflected in the fact that there is often disagree-
ment in the literature about what types of oddness effects are in fact anti-presuppositional
effects. Consequently, even if the child is biased to posit that a principle like Maximize Pre-
supposition! is operative in grammar, the non-trivial task of figuring out whether it applies
in a given environment lies ahead.
In spite of these apparent challenges, the findings from the studies here reveal in preschool
aged children remarkable sophistication in at least some of the skills implicated in presup-
position use. We find also an equally illuminating lack of command with others. In what
follows, I recapitulate some of the core findings.
In the first half of the dissertation, I examined participants' biases about the intended
listener of an uttered sentence as a proxy for their biases about the state of the conversational
context. In Chapter 2, it was shown that 4-to-6-year olds, like adults, preferred that the
presuppositions of an uttered sentence be entailed by the context prior to the utterance
of that sentence: when given a choice between two possible addressees, they displayed a
strong bias towards the one who already knew that the presupposition holds. This bias,
moreover, was uniform across triggers that resist accommodation, e.g. too, and those that
readily allow for accommodation, e.g. definite descriptions. These findings thus indicate
that an important aspect of presupposition use - the common ground requirement - and in
turn, the crucial distinction between asserted and presupposed content in natural language,
is understood by children at least by the early preschool years.
Chapter 3 focused on apparent counter-examples to the common ground requirement.
Speakers sometimes violate the common ground requirement and use presuppositions to in-
troduce information that is new to the listener; cooperative listeners accommodate the novel
presupposition by adjusting their beliefs to bring it in line with the requirements of the ut-
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tered sentence. With respect to their tolerance for such informatively used presuppositions,
children diverge from adults. The experiments in Chapter 3 created a conflict between
the use conditions governing presuppositions - that they are common knowledge - and
assertions -that they are not common knowledge. The choice was between (i) a poten-
tial addressee who knew both the presupposed and asserted content of an uttered sentence
vs. (i) a potential addressee who knew nothing. In such circumstances, adults chose the
latter, indicating a preference for violating the use condition on presupposition over that
governing assertion (presumably because accommodation can remedy violations of the for-
mer). Children up until age 6, on the other, were at a loss in this situation. They chose at
random, suggesting that they treat the pragmatic conditions governing assertion and pre-
supposition on par and equally inviolable. Together, the findings from Chapters 2 and
3 suggest a developmental path where the formal requirement - that presuppositions be
presuppositions -is acquired before an understanding that this requirement can sometimes
not be met in practice, and how competent language users can tacitly make adjustments to
allow the conversation to move forward.
Chapter 4 turns to Maximize Presupposition! (MP), a pragmatic principle that dictates
that one choose, from a set of contextually equivalent competitors, the presuppositionally
strongest alternative compatible with the context. I examined sensitivity to this principle in
3-to-6-year-olds with two environments commonly thought to implicate MP-competition:
(i) the preference for both over all when the cardinality of the domain is exactly two (ii)
the preference for another NP over a NP when there is a different salient entity that satis-
fies NP other than the witness of the current statement. Our results revealed an unexpected
non-uniformity across environments: children were adult-like in their preference for an-
other over a, but found both and all equally acceptable in situations where adults strongly
preferred both. I argued that this non-uniformity should be taken as indication that the two
environments are underlyingly different. Specifically, I suggested that unlike both and all,
a and another do not directly compete for Maximize Presupposition!.
Chapter 5 pursued this idea, and developed an alternative analysis for the oddness of
indefinites in another-environments. I derived the oddness effects from an independently
needed theory of focus. The problem with these sentences, in a nutshell, is that they lack a
viable focus-structure. More concretely: In environments where the claim is about a second
occurrence of an event type known to have occurred previously, a sentence with an indefinite
is either uninformative (and thus ruled out for assertability reasons) or restricted by a covert,
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but syntactically real, restrictor pronoun. Principles of focus ensure that the restrictor bears
Focus-marking, and moreover, that it is the only constituent that bears Focus-marking. F-
marking on the restrictor is necessary to meet the presuppositions of the focus-interpretation
operator, -. The latter restriction, that nothing else bear Focus, is due to a different principle
that leads to competition, MINIMIZE Focus, which forces the choice of a representation
with the minimal felicitous F-distribution. The problem, however, is that because F-marking
cannot be prosodically realized on silent elements, the resulting structure will be ineffable.
On this analysis, another, along with a range of other additives, are rescue mechanisms for
circumventing this situation.
The upshot of this discussion was that the relationship of another to a is fundamentally
different from that of both to all, and it should then not surprise us that adult-likeness in the
two environments emerges at different points. Children's success in ruling out a-sentences
in the right environments tells us many things. For instance, they know the relevant prop-
erties, including the presuppositions, of the ~-operator. Moreover, they know and can
deploy the principle MINIMIZE Focus and identify the best candidate out of the various
competitors. They have difficulties, however, with Maximize Presupposition! as the prin-
ciple at the heart of another type of competition. In trying to explain this divergence, I
pointed to various possible reasons why MINIMIZE Focus may pose fewer challenges to
the learner: it is at play in every utterance, it does not demand knowledge of the potentially
idiosyncratic lexicon of the language (not every language has a both, for instance). Alter-
natively, the key difference may lie in children's developing abilities evaluating assessing
world-dependent and assignment-dependent phenomena. MINIMIZE Focus, like Maxi-
mize Presupposition!, could be an instantiation of our general tendencies to signpost links
to the context, but whereas the latter involves signaling overtly what set of worlds are still
under consideration, the latter involves marking anaphoric links, i.e. what has already been
said.
6.2 Theoretical Implications
No aspect of presupposition has escaped theoretical debate and controversy. Part of the
reason for this is that the empirical facts are far from clear and speakers' intuitions often
seem unreliable (Soames 1976; von Fintel 2004). As Soames (1976) puts it, "logical pre-
supposition is not a relation about which we have direct intuitions, but rather is a theoretical
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construct that can be used to account for certain inferences." Given this state of affairs, re-
sults of studies in child language offers a new and much-needed kind of empirical evidence
that can help arbitrate among theories of presupposition.
In this regard, there are things to be learned from those points where children show
early mastery as well as places where children show difficulties. A major point of con-
tention in the literature on presupposition, discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 3, is the
question of whether presuppositions should be characterized as categorically imposing a
common ground requirement. The difficulty for such a theory is that it is surface-false:
in everyday conversation, speakers routinely presuppose information that was not already
shared knowledge. However, children's behavior in our studies is consistent with a strict
adherence to this common knowledge requirement, despite all the evidence to its contrary
in their experience. In fact, although adults are tolerant of (certain) novel presuppositions,
children initially do not consider such uses a possibility for any kind of presupposition
trigger. The behavioral patterns exhibited by children thus provide significant support for
thinking of presuppositions as uniformly imposing constraints on the incoming context,
even though this fact is masked in adult language because of the existence of cooperative
strategies like presupposition accommodation. On the other hand, these data are difficult
to reconcile with theories that impose weaker conditions on the common ground (Gazdar
1979; Soames 1982), or ones in which the presuppositional status of some content depends
on third-party properties, such as discourse structure and QUD (Simons 2001; Simons et al.
2010; Beaver et al. 2017).
At an even more fundamental level, these developmental data suggest that children
go through a stage of development where they treat the pragmatic conditions governing
assertion and presupposition as being equally inviolable. That is, to the child, assertion
and presupposition are at the same level of pragmatic import. This supports a theoretical
perspective where presupposition is treated as a primitive category of natural language, at
least in as much as assertion. Put differently, the child data suggest that attempts at deriving
presuppositions from a single level of content plus general conversational principles (e.g.
Simons 2001; Abusch 2002; Abbott 2006; Beaver et al. 2017) would be a step in the wrong
direction. Thus, child behavior, which is uncolored by other factors that may complicate
adult language use, demonstrates the true nature of the underlying principles in a clearer
way.
The results from Chapters 4 and 5 could be taken as another illustration of this general
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idea, this time in the domain of Maximize Presupposition!. As already mentioned, a major
issue in theorizing about MP has been the identification of the right competitors. Develop-
mental data can bring independent evidence into the mix, helping determine whether some
environment implicates MP. In the present studies, children'a asymmetric success with an-
other vs. a led to the eventual conclusion that the two expressions do not directly compete.
These results, in a somewhat indirect way, can also be taken as an argument for a
complexity-based approach to alternatives, in all domains. The environment that we took to
be outside the purview of MP based on the child data is precisely the sort that a complexity-
based approach would independently rule out from direct competition.
6.3 Developmental Implications
The question of how children acquire presuppositions is among a broader set of questions
about how minds develop. It is an especially interesting one because it is not at all obvious
that a child should come in hypothesizing that some pieces of information are grammatically
marked as old. The learning problems exposed earlier deepen the puzzle. Presuppositions
convey information that is already taken for granted by all conversation participants, except
when they are not (e.g. accommodation). There is pressure towards presupposing as much
as possible when all else is equal, but only when certain, sometimes hard-to-evaluate, crite-
ria are met. How does the child converge on the adult-like use of presuppositions given the
inconclusive, and sometimes seemingly contradictory, evidence in the input?
A broad conclusion from the results reported in this thesis is that children at a fairly
young age know what presuppositions are and how they are subject to a specialized set of
use conditions. In light of these findings, the picture that I am drawn to is this: Children
never have to learn that a linguistic device such as presupposition exists. This is part of their
hypothesis space. Children's minds, moreover, must be furnished with innate capacities
for social interaction. Knowledge of the semantic category presupposition, in conjunction
with a basic set of skills underlying cooperative social interaction, might be sufficient to
converge on the core use conditions on presuppositional sentences: that one should not take
for granted what their interlocutor might not be taking for granted, that one signpost and
remind the listeners of the presumptions being made at a given point in the conversation,
etc..
Children's early competence in presupposition use also has broader implications for
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models of pragmatic development. Much of the early work in language development
underestimated children's pragmatic abilities: children were argued to be egocentric (Pi-
aget 1959; Maratsos 1976; Karmiloff-Smith 1979), oblivious to their conversation partners'
goals and intentions (Pechmann & Deutsch 1982; Perner & Leekam 1986; Sonnenschein &
Whitehurst 1984; Epley, Morewedge & Keysar 2004; Davies & Katsos 2010), insensitive
to general concerns about informativity (Noveck 2001; Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer &
Bastide 2007; Huang & Snedeker 2009), etc. Recent years, however, has seen a paradigm
shift. Studies using new and sophisticated paradigms have revealed that children are capa-
ble of fairly complex reasoning about the social world from infancy (Baillargeon, Scott &
Bian 2016; Tomasello, Carpender, Call, Behne & Moll 2005; Saxe 2013). For instance, in-
fants can formulate accurate expectations about others' actions and intentions, like reaching
for an object you saw a moment ago. Moreover, they can utilize these skills when making
communicative choices (see e.g. Matthews 2014 for a review). Even though children's
pragmatic abilities continue to develop throughout early childhood and beyond, rich social
skills seem to underlie human interactions from the very beginning. The present findings
add to this growing body of evidence. Children success in aspects of presupposition use
show that they can (i) construct models of others' mental states, (ii) track the conversational
record and the common ground, and (iii) consider alternative linguistic forms to choose the
most appropriate one in a given context.
Our results show, then, that by the early preschool years, some non-trivial mentalizing
abilities are be available to young children. At the same time, it is still possible that their
abilities not include more sophisticated aspects of reflection, deliberation and revision. That
is, the full complexity of an adult "Theory of Mind" - which has much larger scope, greater
precession, and more flexibility -may be continuing to develop over the preschool years.
This, in turn, might lead to difficulties deploying, in an adult-like manner, principles of
presupposition use that are nevertheless underlyingly present. A recurrent idea throughout
the dissertation was the notion that children have difficulties making accurate guesses about
the nature of the common ground. That is, they may not always be able to infer correctly
what information their interlocutor may already be taking for granted or be willing to take
for granted. This difficulty may lead to (i) over-use of presuppositions, e.g. the well-known
over-use of the definite article, (ii) under-use of presuppositions, e.g. the difficulties max-
imizing presupposition with both, and (iii) a failure to anticipate the listener's willingness
to make certain contextual adjustments, e.g. their lack of adult-like expectations about ac-
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commodation.
In this respect, presupposition use differs fundamentally from anaphora, where no re-
flection of another's information state is needed. Rather, what needs to be consulted is
the nature of the preceding discourse record, which suffers from much less indeterminacy.
This gives a new way of thinking about the earlier acquisition of anaphoric triggers like too
compared to non-anaphoric ones. The early appearance of triggers like too in child speech
need not mark these types of expressions as belonging to a fundamentally different category
from other presuppositional expression. Rather, children may simply be more certain about
the success of their utterances with these expressions compared to non-anaphoric ones.
6.4 Future Work
We have made progress, but many questions remain. I will conclude by pointing to some
of the more pressing ones.
The system underlying presupposition seems to be stably in place by the preschool
years, in spite of the noisiness of the empirical terrain is noisy and the routine collapsing,
in ordinary conversation, of important distinctions between presupposition and assertion.
Based on this fact, I argued that the semantic and pragmatic components that underlie this
system are not learned. But when do these components emerge, or mature? Are there
conceptual shifts that must take place before children the conversational principles govern-
ing presuppositions can develop? For instance, infants' social behavior starts undergoing
dramatic changes at the end of the first year. They begin reliably sharing attention and in-
formation (Brooks & Meltzoff 2005; Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano & Tomasello
2006; Beier & Spelke 2012), engaging in helpful actions toward others in the absence of
explicit request (Warneken & Tomasello 2006), and learning from the communications and
actions of others (Agnetta & Rochat 2004), all at around 10-12 months of age. Relevantly
for our purposes, the absence of these types of social abilities in infants younger than 10
months could signal an inability to represent of something like the common ground. In
turn, conversational principles that impose constraints on the common ground might also
be non-existence at this stage.
At the same time, children know the meanings of several words much earlier than that,
at least at 6 months (Bergelson & Swingley 2013; Bergelson & Aslin 2017). Do they
also know some presuppositional words? Or does the learning of presupposition-triggering
184
expressions depend on the mastery of the relevant pragmatic principles, like the common
ground requirement and Maximize Presupposition!?
This brings us to a very hard problem, and thus an important area for future work: How
do children map onto the meanings of the various presuppositional words to begin with?
The learner's task, when trying to identify presuppositional content, is two-fold. She must:
(i) distinguish presupposed content from entailed content (e.g. distinguish a lexical item
like again from twice) and (ii) distinguish between content that is formally required, as op-
posed to incidentally present, in the context. What tools might the child bring to the task?
One option might be to simply keep track of the fact that some lexical item never occurs
in a situation where the presupposition is not already established common knowledge. For
reasons discussed at various points in the dissertation, relying on this alone would be a
mistake: presuppositions are used informatively, and even if they weren't, children are not
always adept at correctly guessing what is and isn't common knowledge in the first place.
A second possibility is that they rely on logical properties of presuppositions as a semantic
category (which, too, may be something they don't have to learn). For example, they may
pay selective attention to linguistic environments where presupposition projects, which dis-
tinguishes presupposed content from garden-variety entailments. A final possibility is that
there are principled ways of predicting what information conveyed by an expression will
end up being a presupposition. One such algorithm is provided in Abrusain (2011) for ver-
bal presupposition triggers. She proposes, roughly, that any information conveyed by an
utterance that is separable from the event time of the matrix predicate ends up being pre-
supposed. It remains to be seen whether this type of algorithm is broad enough in scope
to cover the whole range of presuppositional phenomena, but something like a 'triggering
algorithm' might make the learner's task considerably easier.
There are important aspects of presuppositions that this dissertation has not touched
upon, even though they interact with topics that were under discussion. A case in point is
presupposition projection. Do children know, for any given embedding environment, how
the presuppositions of embedded constituents are inherited by the complex structure on the
whole? Are these properties mastered in a uniform fashion across projection environments?
These questions are non-trivial precisely because presuppositions do not project uniformly
across embedding environments. Presuppositions of elementary clauses are sometimes in-
herited wholesale when the clause is embedded under a truth-conditional operator (1-a),
but sometimes, the presuppositions associated with complex sentences (so-called "filters"
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in Karttunen's (1973) terminology) seem to be weaker than those of its simplex constituents
(1-b)-(l-d). Thus, whereas (1-a) presupposes that Sam has a guitar, the presupposition as-
sociated with (1-b)-(1-d) is of conditionalized form: If Sam is a musician, he has a guitar.
(1) a. Sam didn't bring his guitar to the party.
b. If Sam is a musician, he will bring his guitar to the party.
c. Sam is a musician and he will bring his guitar to the party.
d. Either Sam is not a musician or he will bring his guitar to the party.
This non-uniformity is not predicted on the view of semantic presuppositions I have been
assuming so far, where the third-value, '#', represents undefinedness, or lack of a semantic
value (Hein & Kratzer 1998). All else equal, what is expected on this approach is that an XP
dominating a presuppositional clause will also lack a semantic value if that presuppositional
clause lacks a semantic value. In other words, we predict that if Sam turns out not to
have a guitar in w, all of the sentences in (1-a)-(1-d) be undefined at w. The empirical
inadequacy of this perspective is clear from the above examples. Fortunately, there are
several semantic theories of presuppositions on which the observed projection patterns are
in fact predicted. Such theories either encode projection behavior (i) directly as a lexical
property of connectives (e.g. Heim 1983), (ii) a consequence of the way presupposition
failure is repaired within trivalent system (Beaver & Krahmer 2001; George 2008; Fox
2008), or (iii) a consequence of how contexts evolve over the course of evaluating a complex
sentence (Stalnaker 1974; Karttunen 1974; Soames 1982; Schlenker 2009).
While all these theories capture the adult data, they make potentially divergent acquisi-
tion predictions, making child data, once again, an important theory arbitrator. For instance,
Heim (1983) predicts that as soon as the child knows the meaning of a given connective,
she also knows how presuppositions project from the scope of that connective. On the other
hand, this is not a given on trivalent approaches, e.g. Beaver & Krahmer 2001; George
2008 and Fox 2008. These proposals adopt a different conceptualization of '#', as standing
for something like 'either true or false, but we don't know which'. From this perspective,
a conjunctive sentence need not denote # just because one of the conjuncts does. For in-
stance, if it turns out that Sam is not a musician, it does not matter that the second conjunct
in (1-c) contains a presupposition trigger; the sentence will simply be false. With respect
to acquisition, these approaches are consistent with a stage at which children know the bi-
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valent meaning for a connective, but posit a non-adult trivalent expansion. For instance,
children may initially project presuppositions cumulatively (i.e., presupposition-failure is
always inherited globally) and only later arrive at an understanding that a proposition can
have a definitive truth value even when its component parts fail to.
A final point worth mentioning concerns what is known as the 'Proviso Problem'
(Geurts 1996; see brief discussion in Chapter 3), where we find projection and accom-
modation interacting in interesting ways. Consider the complex sentences in (2), which
contrasts from their counterparts in (1-b)-(1-c) above in that they seem to be associated
with the stronger presupposition that Sam has a guitar.
(2) a. If Sam is happy, he will bring his guitar to the party.
b. Sam is happy and he will bring his guitar to the party.
c. Either Sam is not happy or he will bring his guitar to the party.
One way of approaching this problem has been to say that though the semantics generates a
conditionalized presupposition of form 'if Sam is happy, he has a guitar', but there is an ad-
ditional strengthening mechanism at work. Specifically, q, rather than ifp, then q, is accom-
modated by listeners in communicative situations where it is implausible that the speaker
takes for granted that if p, then q. For instance in the above examples, it would be odd
for a speaker to believe that someone's ownership of a guitar is contingent on their current
state of happiness. Listeners, treating their interlocutor as rational, shift instead to a more
realistic context, one where the person in question is assumed to have a guitar, period. In
light of the findings in Chapter 3--that children do not have adult-like expectations about
accommodation - Proviso environments become an especially interesting environment for
testing children's understanding of presupposition projection, their reasoning about the in-
formation states of their conversation partner, and their expectations about the nature of the
common ground.
As this brief discussion shows, the domain of presupposition acquisition has by no
means been exhaustively explored. What we have learned through the present investigation
teaches us that children know a whole lot about presuppositions. But while we have covered
some of the basics, there is also a whole lot more to learn. Much work remains.
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